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Introduction
This dissertation attempts in four essays to contribute to economic research in
two separate fields, and is therefore divided into two self-contained parts.
Part I (Dynamic Macroeconomics) is rooted in the modern macroeconomic
literature that aims at exploring theoretical departures from the classic rational
expectations (RE) paradigm. According to the latter, economic agents know at all
dates the full state of the economy as well as the structure which generated the
state itself. Our study rather accounts for a time-varying structure and imperfect
observability of the model’s variables (chapter 1), and for advanced information on
the future states - that is, for news shocks and anticipation (chapter 2).
In chapter 11, the problem of finding a solution to time-varying linear RE sys-
tems involving past expectations of the future state values and noisy observations
is addressed. This is done by introducing a novel dynamic policy optimization for-
mulation for forward-looking models, consistent with the classical rational choice
paradigm. For a well-identified class of time-dependent RE frameworks, it is shown
that there exists always an equilibrium path having the property of being the closest,
in mean square, to the state motion of the autoregressive dynamic equation govern-
ing the perfect foresight behavior of the economic system. A recursive algorithm -
based upon Kalman filtering - providing the exact expression for the conditional ex-
pectations (hence, the solution) and the optimal filtering estimate, is also presented.
The approach developed in chapter 1 is able to handle higher order models as well
as nonlinear ones. An extension to the relevant class of Markov-switching RE mod-
els, which have recently been advocated to investigate the role of regime switching
monetary policy in New-Keynesian frameworks and the effects of parameter insta-
bility (e.g., Davig and Leeper, 2007; Liu et al., 2009), is also presented.
Most importantly, the solution algorithm of chapter 1 naturally applies to set-
tings with time-dependent structures, which is attractive for empirical applications.
Classical methods for solving linear stochastic systems under RE, such as Blanchard
and Kahn (1980), King and Watson (1998, 2002), Klein (2000) and Sims (2002), pos-
tulate indeed a structural representation in which the parameters that govern the
1This chapter is based on Carravetta and Sorge (2010, 2011).
iv
behavior of the dynamic system do not vary over time2. From a different perspec-
tive, the analysis of the combination of stochastic control techniques, time-varying
parameters and the RE hypothesis is part of a promising research project aiming
at mitigating the well-known Lucas critique (1976) by providing methods able to
yield optimal policy instruments in models under RE, even in the presence of time-
dependent - possibly uncertain - model structure (e.g. Amman and Kendrick, 2003;
Tucci, 2004). We build upon the mentioned strands of literature by proposing a
Kalman filter-based technique for the estimation of the expectational term forcing
a general vector stochastic system with time-varying structure3, for which initial
conditions knowledge only is required.
In chapter 24, we study identification of linear dynamic RE models under news
shocks. The main question addressed is whether these models are empirically dis-
tinguishable from lagged expectations RE systems under i.i.d. fundamental shocks
which rather allow for equilibrium serially correlated sunspots.
Moving from the seminal work of Azariadis (1981) and Kass and Shell (1983),
economic theorists have paid attention to the role of extrinsic uncertainty as driver of
changes in economic beliefs, which may involve causal effects on cyclical fluctuations
aside from shocks to fundamentals (e.g. Schmitt-Grohe´, 1997; Benhabib and Farmer,
1999). A related though different strand of literature has recently grown up which
exploits the idea that advance information or “news” about future developments
in the economy can induce cycles in the major economic aggregates, regardless of
whether the information content of the news is later rectified or not (e.g. Beaudry
and Portier, 2004; Jaimovich and Rebelo, 2009).
Chapter 2 explores the empirical separability of news shocks and sunspots mod-
els. By means of the general martingale solution approach, we show that it may
prove impossible to decide on an econometric basis whether the actually observed
data is generated by determinate models driven by news shocks or rather by indeter-
minate ones forced by sunspot variables. More specifically, for any exactly identified
news shocks model, there exists an observationally equivalent class of indeterminate
RE systems, which are only subject to i.i.d. fundamental shocks. Since the alterna-
2An important exception, though limited to a specific case, is Blake (1990), which extends the
Blanchard and Kahn (1980)’s famous framework to one where coefficients are policy-dependent.
3For example, the inflation target or the parameters governing the reaction of the interest rate
to current values of inflation and output within a Taylor-type rule for the baseline New Keynesian
framework (e.g. Gal`ı, 2008).
4This chapter is based on Sorge (2011a).
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tive models possess different determinacy properties, different implications for policy
making are also likely to arise. Given the prominent position gained by theories re-
garding news shocks and anticipation effects in the modern business cycle debate,
this finding points to the opportunity of supplementing likelihood-based empirical
investigations of news shocks in estimated DSGE models with testing strategies for
the indeterminacy hypothesis.
Part II of the dissertation (Political Economy) aims to contribute to the
literature on the role of self-interested groups in the political arena.
In chapter 35, we investigate theoretically how the presence of (corruptible) judi-
ciaries that oversee the political process impacts on one of the mechanisms by which
lobby groups can influence policy outcomes, i.e. bribery. Since the scope of corrup-
tion depends on the expected benefits to politicians from becoming corrupt, system-
atic and well-targeted efforts toward the investigation and prosecution of bribery
cases might serve as a powerful device for corruption deterrence. However, effective
judicial oversight typically faces institutional and operational constraints, like po-
litical interference or judicial subversion, which may hinder the proper functioning
of this mechanism. In fact, independent judiciaries that act in corrupt societies are
vulnerable to taking bribes (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002). We develop an endogenous
policy model to shed some light on these and other related issues concerning political
corruption and judicial independence.
We show that judicial independence is a necessary condition for deterrence effects
to arise from the oversight activity of judiciaries. In fact, dependent judges are not
able to prevent the interest group and the government from maximizing the profits
from the deals between them. From an institutional design perspective, our results
make a strong case for insulating judicial branches from political interference.
While the independence of the judiciary is crucial to its effectiveness, it may
also foster corruption in this branch because no other government entity has the
authority to oversee it. Hence, judges must be subject to mechanisms that hold
them accountable for their institutional role. Our analysis suggests that preserving
the efficiency of independent judiciaries can serve as an instrument for self-enforced
judicial accountability, even in the presence of corrupt judges.
5This chapter is based on Albanese and Sorge (2011).
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In chapter 46, we study the process of legislative delegation in the presence of
bureaucratic lobbying. Strategic appointments are introduced in Bennedsen and
Feldmann (2006)’s delegation model in which a legislator delegates policy authority
to a bureaucracy, who holds superior information regarding the political environ-
ment. An organized group is able to influence the process by initiating bargaining in
policy implementation. The bureaucracy is not viewed as an exogenous entity, but
rather assumed to be endogenously appointed by the government administration.
We show that the possibility of strategic agency selection fully restores gen-
eral results from the conventional theory of delegation. In particular, bureaucratic
lobbying never reduces the scope of delegation across different political systems (par-
liamentary versus separation of powers), as it engenders no influence on the extent
of (expected) policy bias induced by delegated legislation. By contrast, the optimal
degree of delegated authority emerges as an exclusive relationship between agency
discretion, on the one hand, and the ideological conflict between the higher-level in-
stitutions (the legislature and the administration), and the uncertainty surrounding
the political environment, on the other.
The model has important consequences for the theory of agenda setting and
political control. First, our analysis contributes to the well-known debate over de-
vices available to a legislature to control bureaucratic policy-making, for it suggests
that strategic appointments may work as a substitute for legislative oversight (e.g.,
Gailmard, 2009). An important corollary of this result is that the legislature need
not shape delegated legislation on the degree of interest group influence on agency
decision-making. Second, from the perspective of optimal statutory design, the
model predicts that divided governments should be characterized by more stringent
boundaries to which agency decisions ought to conform, independently of the active
participation of interest groups in agency decision-making.
Although collected into two parts, the next four chapters each present one idea
as a self-contained unit.
6This chapter is based on Sorge (2011b).
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Part I
Dynamic Macroeconomics
1
Chapter 1
Kalman Filter Approach to Solution of Noisily Ob-
served Rational Expectations Models
1.1 Introduction
Since the early work of Muth (1961) and Lucas (1972, 1976), the concept of
rational expectations (RE) has become the standard tool of modeling expectations in
dynamic stochastic macroeconomic models. It essentially reduces to the assumption
that agents collect and make optimal use of all available (pertinent) information as
to the economic environment when formulating their forecasts of economic variables
of interest (e.g., prices, interest rates, government policies). More specifically, the
RE hypothesis requires that the prediction made by the forecaster, conditional on all
the information available at the time the prediction is made, be consistent with the
forecast model derived from the underlying economic structure, where no systematic
forecast errors are involved (e.g., Shiller, 1978; Barth et al., 1982).
In models where expectations on future states influence current dynamics, an
infinity of solutions under the assumption of RE has been proven to exist. Since
this result was established by the early work of Sargent and Wallace (1973), Shiller
(1978) and Blanchard (1979), several attempts have been made toward an evaluation
of the relevance of this issue to macroeconomic modeling - e.g., McCallum (1983)
- while other authors have aimed at offering a wide array of instruments intended
to select a particular solution among all the available ones. Such non-uniqueness
property, arising even in linear dynamic systems, has thrown into question the ra-
tionality of equilibria and somewhat been interpreted as a serious weakness for the
RE hypothesis.
A more subtle issue, on the ground of which the latter has been often criticized,
lies in that, even in its strongest forms, it fails to shed light on the process by
which economic agents translate current information - what they truly observe and
know about - into optimal forecasts, which are simply assumed - and turn to be
self-fulfilled - not systematically different from equilibrium outcomes (Lucas and
Prescott, 1971).
Attempting to address such issues, Basar (1989) and De Santis et al. (1993) con-
2
sider a slightly different theoretical setting. In the former, an alternative formulation
of RE models is proposed as scalar linear difference stochastic equations forced by
a function of the information available up to the current time, which is determined
by solving a quadratic cost index optimization problem over a finite time interval.
Existence, uniqueness and minimum variance property of the state solution for the
policy optimization formulation are derived and compared with the direct solution
to the RE dynamic model1.
An analogous problem statement, generalized to the vectorial case, is considered
in De Santis et al. (1993), where the concept of “ideal” behavior of a RE model is
introduced and a method for estimating the control function based on a reference
framework adaptive algorithm is proposed. The reference model is chosen as the
autoregressive stochastic difference equation describing the ideal situation of perfect
foresight and the optimal2 estimate of the future (two-step ahead) state is com-
puted via the Kalman filter (Kalman, 1960). An approximate solution of the actual
problem is then determined by using the output (noisy) measurements of the actual
system in the previously obtained estimator and then using the latter as control
function.
Following De Santis et al. (1993) and Carravetta (1996), in this work we address
the problem of finding the solution of the general RE model in state-space form3,
involving past expectations of the future state values and noisy observations of the
state vector. For a well-specified subset in the class of RE models dealt with in
present work, a “nearly ideal” RE solution under a well-specified model reference
adaptive technique and an estimation algorithm for it, based upon Kalman filtering,
are provided. We show that the state motion is the closest, in mean square, to the
evolution the system would have if agents were able to form an exact prediction of
- i.e., perfectly foresee - the future state values.
1Similarly, in Chow (1980b) a general difference model forced by an economic agent’s action
is considered. Here the agent is assumed to maximize an objective expressed as a quadratic cost
function and the problem of optimal estimation for linear RE models is dealt with, providing a
family of consistent estimators. From a slightly different perspective, Chow (1980a) deals with
structural RE models, where optimal control rules are applied to the reduced form equations with
policy invariant coefficients.
2The criterion of optimality here refers to the minimum variance principle.
3The utility of state-space form representations for macroeconometric models is highlighted in
Wall (1980). In this setting, estimation and model identification problems can be carried out for
all the main expectations formation mechanisms by exploiting the recursive estimation methods
for state-space models derived from Kalman filtering theory.
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The basic structure of the procedure employed herein for combining econometric
tools with dynamic economic theory builds upon Carravetta (1996). In this respect,
the contribution of the present work is twofold. On the one hand, we show that
what was implicitly conjectured in De Santis et al. (1993) and further argued in
Carravetta (1996) as to the existence of an exact RE equilibrium, which could be
found by means of a causal model forced by the optimal prediction of the perfect
foresight state, is not factually correct, as it fails to obtain as a general property
of RE models. A full characterization of RE models in the class we deal with is
provided for which an RE equilibrium, equivalent to the nearly ideal state motion,
exists as the unique (to within stochastic equivalence) solution of linear time-varying
RE models amenable with Kalman filtering theory. On the other, we improve upon
the previous results in the literature by constructing an estimation algorithm for
linear models which exploits the actual measurement of the state vector, rather
than being based on the fictitious output generated by the ideal (reference) model,
as in De Santis et al. (1993).
The analysis presented here is related to different lines of research. Previous
studies have focused on the fundamental problem in estimating structural RE mod-
els which stems from the presence of unobservable components (e.g., Chow, 1980b;
Hansen and Sargent, 1980; Pesaran, 1989). In particular, Broze and Szafarz (1991)
describe classical estimation schemes based on replacing the expectation term by
suitable proxies (OLS estimator) or by the realized (observed) values of the vari-
ables (error-in-variable approach). In assessing the non-uniqueness specificity of
(most) RE models, they offer a thorough analysis of the conditions under which the
equilibrium path actually followed by the economy can be statistically determined a
posteriori by using the data to estimate the unrestricted parameters of the general
reduced form (“letting the data ex post select the right model”). Similarly, Tucci
(2004) emphasizes the possibility of exploiting the observational equivalence between
the linear (scalar) stationary RE models estimated via the error-in-variable method
and an error-in-variable model with restricted time-varying parameters, in order to
(indirectly) test for the RE hypothesis using estimated residuals. The approach fol-
lowed by Broze and Szafarz (1991) and extended in Tucci (2004) differs from ours
in that we rather question the modeling of the mechanism of RE formation from an
ex ante (solution) point of view, according to which rational economic agents are
likely to simulate econometricians when forming their expectations about the future
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state of the economy they act in (“letting the data - as they become available - help
them select the optimal model”).
From this perspective, our analysis is related to studies on the process of ex-
pectation formation. Previous work on this subject differs from the present one
in that it generally focuses on learning behavior, that is the way systematic fore-
casting biases are eliminated over time (e.g., Marcet and Sargent, 1989; Evans and
Honkapohja, 2001). Specifically, the adaptive learning literature endows boundedly
rational agents with a forecasting model - the perceived law of motion of the econ-
omy - which can be an arbitrary function of past endogenous and past and current
exogenous variables, and has to be optimally parameterized based on new data and
observable (past) forecast errors. RE equilibria are thus regarded as asymptotic
outcomes of this learning process, whenever conditions for convergence of agents’
beliefs to the equilibrium values hold. Though methodologically related, our method
also differs from the Bayesian learning literature (e.g., McGough, 2003; Bullard and
Suda, 2008), as these studies typically assume that agents employ filtering tech-
niques to update estimates of (possibly time-varying) parameters within not fully
rational forecasting functions. Rather, our approach posits that non-fully rational
agents may be thought of as revising their (best) estimate of the (hidden) variables
governing the dynamics of the economic system as new observations are generated,
when only a reduced information set - the measurement process - is available to
them.
It is well known that the dimension of the solution set for RE models is closely
related the stability properties of the latter, and that stability restrictions can be
advocated in order to weaken the multiplicity issue (e.g., Blanchard and Kahn, 1980;
Salemi, 1986). However, as the agents’ expectations in RE frameworks are typically
obtained by recursively iterating the system into the future, (asymptotic) station-
arity is needed for this process to be well-defined. While equilibrium stability is
usually enforced by the existence of transversality conditions in the underlying (in-
finite horizon) dynamic economic frameworks, there exist models for which no such
boundary conditions arise or rather, though present, they do not serve as necessary
optimality requirements (e.g., Halkin, 1974; Driskill, 2006). In this respect, we em-
phasize that, by providing a readily computable expression of the RE component
both in finite and infinite horizon model representations, our method need not in-
voke approximation hypotheses or stability concepts to solve forward the system,
5
for only initial conditions knowledge is required.
Our work also relates to the application of classical stochastic control theory
techniques to RE dynamic systems. Starting with the seminal contributions of Lu-
cas (1972) and Kydland and Prescott (1977), much criticism has been raised as
to the use of control theory in economics, one of the major drawbacks being its
inability to deal with RE due to the failure of the causality hypothesis (Aoki and
Canzoneri, 1979; Chow, 1980a; Kendrick, 1981). The literature in the field has
mostly aimed at overcoming the time inconsistency issue by providing methods for
deriving optimal (policy) instruments in models under RE, even in the presence
of time-dependent (possibly uncertain) parameters (e.g., Amman and Kendrick,
2003); interestingly, Tucci (2004) also discusses the suitability of adaptive control
techniques in the presence of time-varying parameters to control RE systems esti-
mated by the error-in-variable method. In our framework, we interpret the choice
of the input sequence in a dynamic policy optimization setting as being based on
the expectations agents have about future values of the state vector, conditional on
past and present (noisy) observations. As a consequence, the problem of deriving
reduced form representations free of expectational terms in order to compute the
admissible set of instruments (Amman and Kendrick, 1999), is irrelevant for our
results.
Canonical methods for solving linear stochastic models under RE, such as Blan-
chard and Kahn (1980), King and Watson (1998) and Sims (2002), postulate a
structural representation in which the parameters that govern the behavior of the
dynamic system are taken to be time-invariant4. In contrast to traditional ap-
proaches, the Kalman filtering-based solution method we propose is also able to
handle frameworks in which the model parameters are allowed to change over time,
as is the case in RE equilibrium models whose structure is supposed to react to pol-
icy variables. Accordingly, it offers a potentially helpful tool for obtaining suitable
descriptions of several important scenarios occurring in macroeconometrics, such as
inflationary situations which are surrounded by a rapidly evolving environment. The
stationary case is also presented and sufficient conditions are provided which assure
the existence of a steady state solution and of a filtering state estimate with constant
steady state error covariance matrix. Finally, we briefly discuss an extension of our
4An important exception is Blake (1990), which provides a set of conditions for recovering the
reduced RE form for linear models under anticipated policy reversal.
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method to Markov-switching RE models in the latter part of this work.
The remaining chapter is organized as follows. In section 1.2 the problem we deal
with is formally stated for linear time-varying RE models. In section 1.3 we present
particular solutions for a general dynamic stochastic difference systems, including
the one generated when forcing the latter with the optimal (minimum variance) esti-
mate of the perfect foresight (ideal) state, fed by the measurement of the actual state
variables - the result derived in De Santis et al. (1993) is thus revised accordingly.
In section 1.4, a characterization of the subset in the class of RE models dealt with
in the present study, which admits these particular solutions, is established, whereas
section 1.5 is devoted to the analysis of the stationary case. In section 1.6, we study
the Markov-switching case. Section 1.7 concludes. For the sake of exposition, all
the proofs and technical details are relegated to the Appendix.
1.2 The model and the problem statement
In this work we are interested in reconsidering linear RE models and their solu-
tions from a point of view which, along the lines of Basar (1989), deviates to some
extent from the approaches typically adopted in the macroeconomic literature. To
illustrate this point, let us first consider the following linear stochastic discrete-time
system:
xt+1 = Atxt +Btut + vt, x0 = x¯ (1.1)
which generalizes the form presented in De Santis et al. (1993) to the time-varying
parameters case. It stands also as a time-dependent version of the generalized
expectations models (GEM) introduced in Wall (1980), to which many underlying
econometric models can be transposed - e.g., all those described by autoregressive-
moving average (ARMA) processes (Hamilton, 1994).
In equation (1.1), xt, ut, vt are all vectors in <n; At, Bt are real square n × n
matrices, Bt non-singular for any t. The initial state x¯ is assumed to be a zero-mean
Gaussian random variable with known covariance matrix P0. The sequences {xt, ut}
describe the dynamic evolution of an economic variable of interest and the action
(control) a representative economic agent can exploit to influence the evolution of
the economic system, respectively. The sequence {vt} represents an unobserved
structural disturbance and is modeled as a zero-mean white Gaussian sequence with
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assigned positive definite covariance matrices {Qt}.
We assume uncertainty in the measurement of the state variables (noisy obser-
vations) according to a linear transformation acting on the state process:
yt = Ctxt + wt, y0 = y¯ (1.2)
where yt ∈ <m is the output vector, Ct ∈ <m×n and the initial value y0 ≡ C0x¯+w0 is
denoted by y¯; wt is the zero-mean white Gaussian sequence with known covariance
matrices Wt ≡ E
(
wtw
T
t
)
, which accounts for the output measurement noise. For
simplicity, the system-equation noises and the measurement errors {vt}, {wt} are
assumed to be mutually independent as well as independent of the initial state x¯.
In the classical RE approach, the economic agent takes his decisions on the
basis of his expectations about future values of the sequence {xt} - let us consider,
for instance, the two-step ahead state xt+2. Specifically, the RE assumption sets
ut = E(xt+2|Yt) in (1.1), with Yt denoting the σ-algebra generated by the output
process {yj, j ≤ t}. A linear RE model, where the state variables evolution depends
only on past expectations about their future values and on a given random process,
is thus obtained as5:
x˜t+1 = Atx˜t +BtE(x˜t+2|Y˜t) + vt, x˜0 = x¯ (1.3)
y˜t = Ctx˜t + wt, y˜0 = y¯ (1.4)
In De Santis et al. (1993) an interesting circumstance, arising under RE, is
pointed out. In this situation the “ideal” decision would consist in the exact knowl-
edge of xt+2: if the agent were to perfectly foresee the future state values in a world
where economic decisions are forecast-dependent, his choice would indeed equal the
actual two-step ahead value of the state variables, i.e. ut = xt+2. In this case, we
would have an ideal evolution {x∗t} of the state process, governed by the following
5Equation (1.3) can be interpreted, for example, as the equilibrium condition of an asset market
framework. Note that, given the reliance of the state on past expectations, the latter does not fit
into the general setup of Blanchard and Kahn (1980).
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second order autoregressive (AR) model6:
x∗t+1 = Atx
∗
t +Btx
∗
t+2 + vt (1.5)
to which the following (fictitious) measurement equation is attached:
y∗t = Ctx
∗
t + wt (1.6)
where it is assumed x∗0 = x0 = x¯, x
∗
−1 = 0.
Since the expectational term at time t depends on the values of the state at
future times, the solution of the RE model (1.3)-(1.4) cannot be found by means of
substitution of the state values in the state equation. For this reason the model is
often called non-causal, and the existence of a solution for it is not evident at all
(e.g., Broze et al., 1985).
Nevertheless, solutions to (1.3)-(1.4) exist, yet these are in general non-unique7.
In this work, an algorithm is provided for computing the conditional expectations of
the future state E(x˜t+2|Y˜t) which enables us to find a particular solution to a subclass
of the general RE models (1.3)-(1.4) - namely those displaying no backward-looking8
dimension - by estimating the control sequence {uˆt} (among all the admissible Yt-
adapted ones {ut}) via a reference model adaptive technique. The actual system
is indeed forced to “track” a model whose evolution describes the ideal situation of
perfect foresight of the two-step ahead state value. As the resulting state motion a
fortiori is the closest - in mean square - to the “ideal” one given by the corresponding
perfect foresight model, it can be regarded as the mostly meaningful in the RE
philosophy.
As a measure of the closeness to the ideal state motion, it will be used the
variance of the difference between the ideal and the actual state at any time, that
is:
I(u, t) =def E
(
(xt − x∗t )T (xt − x∗t )
)
6Strictly speaking, equation (1.5) belongs to the family of discrete-time descriptor systems,
frequently used to model economic processes. For non-singular Bt, the system at issue admits an
autoregressive representation.
7Basar (1989) offers an example of a scalar and stationary version of the RE model dealt with
in the present work, which is satisfied by two different (not stochastically equivalent) random
sequences starting from the same initial condition.
8That is, in which no lagged values of the state vector enter the right-hand side of the RE
equation (1.3).
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where E denotes the expectation operator. The dependence of the index I(u, t)
on the input sequence u ≡ {uj}, j = 0, 1, . . . comes implicitly from the true state
sequence {xt} given by (1.1)9. Consistently with the RE hypothesis10, in our setting
the economic agent has full knowledge of the time-varying parameters as well as
of the model structure - i.e., of the linear shape of the system and measurement
equations (1.1)-(1.2). For the purpose of the analysis, we also require that the model
structure be fully captured by the latter, since unmodeled dynamics might seriously
worsens the filter performance by causing the estimation algorithm to diverge.
In the next section, a closed loop solution, that is a sequence uˆ = {uj} where
uˆj = uˆ(j, yj, . . . , y0), is found to the minimization problem of the index I(u, t) for
any t = 0, 1, . . ..
1.3 The general solution for the dynamic stochastic model
1.3.1 The “nearly ideal” solution
Let us define the deviation from the ideal state motion x∗t as:
t = xt − x∗t (1.7)
and consider for a non-negative integer N the following quadratic index:
I¯(u,N) =
N+1∑
t=0
E(Tt t) (1.8)
It is straightforward to derive a difference equation for the error t using equations
9Note that, due to the causality of the model (1.1), this dependence involves only the input
values up to time t−1. General assumptions such as controllability and observability are required.
In particular, no further constraints are considered for the admissible set of instruments.
10Under the RE hypothesis, the full state of the economy at all dates and the structure that
generated that state are part of the information set upon which expectations are built.
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(1.1) and (1.5):
t+1 = xt+1 − x∗t+1
= Att +Bt
(
ut − x∗t+2
)
= Att +Btut − x∗t+1 + Atx∗t + vt
(1.9)
with initial condition 0 = 0. Let us define the vectors:
zt =def

t
x∗t
x∗t+1
y∗t
; ζt =def
(
vt
wt+1
)
so that we can write the following recursive equation for the augmented state zt,
t ∈ [0, N + 1]:
zt+1 = A¯tzt +B1,tζt +B2,tut, z0 = z¯ (1.10)
where the matrices A¯t ∈ <3n+m×3n+m, B1,t ∈ <3n+m×n+m and B2,t ∈ <3n+m×n have
a block structure with all block-entries being square matrices of dimensions n × n
(see Appendix A.1).
In order to obtain an output equation for (1.10), let us consider equation (1.2)
which gives the actual sequence of observations:
yt = Ctxt + wt = Ctt + y
∗
t = C¯tzt (1.11)
where C¯t ∈ <m×3n+m has the following block structure:
C¯t =
(
Ct 0 0 I
)
Equation (1.11) links the actual observations yt to the state variables zt given by
(1.10); hence it can be correctly used as the output measurements of the augmented
linear discrete-time system in which the first n entries of the state vector describe the
evolution of the deviation from the ideal behavior of the RE model. The following
result holds:
11
Property 1. The new state system with free error measurement, constituted by
equations (1.10)-(1.11), has Gaussian state noise.
Proof. - See Appendix B.1.
We can solve the problem of finding the set of controls {uˆt}Nt=0 which minimizes
the objective functional (1.8), as a linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) stochastic con-
trol problem on the discrete and finite interval [0, N+1] for the system (1.10)-(1.11).
The problem writes then as follows11:
min
{ut}Nt=0
N+1∑
t=0
E(zTt Mzt) (1.12)
subject to the linear system equations (1.10) and observations (1.11), with M being
the symmetric matrix with the identity matrix I as first block on the main diagonal
and 0’s elsewhere. The equations yielding the sequence of optimal controls {uˆt} are
in the well known closed-loop form (Bertsekas, 1976):
uˆt = Ltzˆt (1.13)
where zˆt =def E(zt|Yt), Yt denoting the σ-algebra generated by the observations
given by equation (1.11), which are available at time t. The matrices Lt ∈ <n×3n+m
have the following expression for t ∈ [0, N ]:
Lt = −(BT2,tKt+1B2,t)−1BT2,tKt+1A¯t
with Kt given by the following backward recursive equation:
KN+1 = M
Kt = A¯
T
t
[
Kt+1 −Kt+1B2,t
(
BT2,tKt+1B2,t
)−1
BT2,tKt+1
]
A¯t +M
(1.14)
In order to compute the input sequence (1.13), the derivation of the conditional
expectations zˆt is needed. This can be accomplished by means of the Kalman filter
equations implemented on the system (1.10)-(1.11), provided (A¯t, B1,t) is a control-
lable pair, whereas (C¯t, A¯t) is an observable one. For any deterministic input ut, the
11No penalty (possibly time-varying) weights on the deviations of the state variables from their
desired path - the second order AR process (1.5) - are considered, with no loss of generality.
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Kalman filter equations, in a form which accounts for the absence of measurement
noise (Kalman, 1960; Kailath, 1980), are the following:
zˆt+1 =
[
I − K¯t+1C¯t
] [
A¯tzˆt +B2,tut
]
+ K¯t+1yt+1
where K¯t is the precomputable filter gain recursively given by
12:
K¯t = Pt|t−1C¯Tt
(
C¯tPt|t−1C¯Tt
)−1
Pt+1|t = A¯tPtA¯Tt + Q¯t
Pt = Pt|t−1 − K¯tC¯tPt|t−1
(1.15)
Pt and Pt|t−1 being the filtering and one-step prediction error covariances respectively
(see Appendix D.1)13. As the input gets stochastic, and measurable with respect to
the observations (y1 . . . yt) up to time t (as in (1.13)), substituting simply ut = uˆt
gives the optimal filter equations for the case at issue (Carravetta et al., 2002; Liptser
and Shiryaev, 2004)14:
zˆt+1 =
[
I − K¯t+1C¯t
] [
A¯t +B2,tLt
]
zˆt + K¯t+1yt+1 (1.16)
Equation (1.14) for t = N is as follows:
KN = A¯
T
N
[
M −MB2,N
(
BT2,NMB2,N
)−1
BT2,NM
]
A¯N +M
and since: (
BT2,NMB2,N
)−1
= B−1N B
−1T
N
MB2,N
(
BT2,NMB2,N
)−1
BT2,NM = M
12The matrix C¯tPt|t−1C¯Tt whose inverse appears in equation (1.15) is always non-singular (see
Appendix C.1).
13To initialize the prediction error covariance, namely P0|−1 = E(z0zT0 ), it is sufficient to use the
initial condition for the the states zt.
14What is shown in Carravetta et al. (2002), is that such property is a fairly ‘universal’ one
in filtering theory, in that it holds for a large class of non-linear filters and non-linear ‘feedback’
systems (including of course the linear case). However it has being formerly known for a long time
to hold in the conditionally-Gaussian case (as reported in Liptser and Shiryaev’s textbook). The
system at issue lies indeed within the latter.
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it follows that KN = M . Therefore we have:
Kt = M, 0 ≤ t ≤ N
and the matrices Lt of the controls (1.13) are given by the following formula:
Lt = −
(
BT2,tMB2,t
)−1
BT2,tMA¯t (1.17)
Insofar as this formula does not depend on the finite horizon N , it yields the
optimal control law for all the LQG control problems under the quadratic index
(1.12) for any N = 0, 1, . . .. As a control sequence minimizing (1.8) does minimize
all the variances E
(
Tt t
)
for any t = 0, 1, . . ., we state the following:
Proposition 1. Given the model (1.1) with noisy observations (1.2), the sequence
of agent’s decisions uˆ = {uˆt} which produces for any t = 0, 1, . . . the mean square
minimum deviation from the ideal state motion is given by the following equation:
uˆt = −
(
BT2,tMB2,t
)−1
BT2,tMA¯tzˆt (1.18)
where zˆt is given recursively by equations (1.15) and (1.16).
We can add further theoretical insight into the nearly ideal control law (1.18), by
expressing it as a function of the conditional expectations of the future ideal state,
zˆt = E(zt|Yt). To this end, let us make some manipulations on the matrix Lt giving
the linear feedback rule for the optimal control:
Lt = −
(
BT2,tMB2,t
)−1
BT2,tMA¯t =
(
−B−1t At −B−1t At Bt 0
)
which, along with the definition of zt, can be used in (1.13) to yield:
uˆt =
(
−B−1t At −B−1t At Bt 0
)
zˆt
= −B−1t AtE(t|Yt)−B−1t AtE(x∗t |Yt) +B−1t E(x∗t+1|Yt)
= −B−1t Atˆt −B−1t Atxˆ∗t +B−1t xˆ∗t+1|t
(1.19)
Equation (1.19) allows us to express the optimal control sequence {uˆt} in a more
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convenient form than (1.18), as stated in the following:
Proposition 2. For the dynamic stochastic model (1.1)-(1.2), the sequence of agent’s
decisions {uˆt} which produces for any t = 0, 1, . . . the mean square minimum devia-
tion from the ideal solution is given by the following equation:
uˆt = −B−1t Atzˆ1,t −B−1t Atzˆ2,t +B−1t zˆ3,t (1.20)
where zˆ1,t, zˆ2,t, zˆ3,t ∈ <n are the first three subvectors of zˆt ∈ <3n+m recursively given
by equations (1.15) and (1.16).
The so obtained sequence given by equation (1.20) therefore represents the con-
trol rule which produces an evolution of the state xt featuring the minimum variance
displacement t from the ideal state x
∗
t for any t = 0, 1, . . .. An agent acting in an
economic environment as described by equations (1.1)-(1.2) and holding expecta-
tions on the future values of the state xt, will then be sure - by taking the sequence
{uˆt} of actions - of exerting the “best” (from his point of view) influence on the
future evolution of the economic variables, as this will be the closest one - in mean
square - to the ideal evolution the system would have if the agent could act as an
“oracle”.
1.3.2 The solution for the optimal estimate of the ideal state
Let us now compute the solution of (1.1)-(1.2) when the optimal estimate of the
ideal two-step ahead value of the state, i.e. x∗t+2, is used as input. To this end, we
first demonstrate the following:
Lemma 1. Given the linear system (1.1)-(1.2), the σ-algebra Yt = σ(y1, y2, . . . , yt)
is invariant with respect to all admissible - i.e., Yt-adapted - control laws u = {ut}.
Proof. - See Appendix E.1.
Let us now exploit the properties of the augmented system (1.10)-(1.11):
zt+1 = A¯tzt +B1,tζt +B2,txˆ
∗
t+2|t, z0 = z¯ (1.21)
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where, using the definition of zt and the assertion of Lemma 1
15:
xˆ∗t+2|t =def E(x
∗
t+2|Yt) = B′E(zt+1|Yt) = B′zˆt+1|t, B′ = [0 0 I 0]
and hence:
zt+1 = A¯tzt +B1,tζt +B2,tB
′zˆt+1|t, z0 = z¯ (1.22)
Taking expectations conditional on Yt yields
16:
zˆt+1|t = A¯tzˆt +B2,tB′zˆt+1|t = (I −B2,tB′)−1 A¯tzˆt (1.23)
In order to obtain the filtering estimate zˆt, we apply the Kalman filter to the
state equation (1.22) together with the measurement relation (1.11). Equations
(1.22) and (1.11) can be viewed as a linear model driven by the stochastic term
zˆt+1|t, which is a measurable function of the observations (y1 . . . yt) up to time t
and hence can be treated as a deterministic one when applying the Kalman filter
equations (Carravetta et al., 2002). By using the input sequence ut = B
′zˆt+2|t we
obtain, through equation (1.23), the optimal filtering estimate as:
zˆt+1 =
[
I − K¯t+1C¯t
]
(I −B2,tB′)−1 A¯tzˆt + K¯t+1yt+1 (1.24)
where the gain K¯t is given by the same equations (1.15) derived for the nearly ideal
case.
Finally, equations (1.23) and (1.24) allows us to recover the one-step prediction
optimal minimum variance estimate zˆt+1|t for all t, and exploiting the definition of
the vector zt we can easily extract the optimal prediction estimate of the two-step
ahead ideal state xˆ∗t+2|t.
1.4 The solution of the dynamic RE model
In this section we fully characterize the subset in the general class of RE models
(1.3)-(1.4) for which a nearly ideal equilibrium exists. To this end it is sufficient to
15The latter enables us to neglect the notation difference between the σ-algebras generated by
different (admissible) control functions for the causal model (1.1)-(1.2).
16The matrix (I − B2,tB′) is always non-singular, as it can be readily verified by direct substi-
tution.
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pin down an expression for the conditional expectation E(x˜t+2|Y˜t) which appears in
(1.3).
Let us consider the system (1.1)-(1.2) with ut = uˆt, where uˆt is the agent’s
action producing the nearly ideal solution given by Proposition 1. We write the
state equation of the model (1.1) at the step t + i + 1 and for the particular input
sequence (1.18):
xt+i+1 = At+ixt+i +Bt+iuˆt+i + vt+i
for any t, i = 0, 1 . . ., and letting Yt denote the σ-algebra generated by the corre-
sponding observations {yj, j ≤ t}. Taking conditional expectations yields:
xˆt+i+1|t = At+ixˆt+i|t +Bt+iE (uˆt+i|Yt) (1.25)
since E(vt+i|Yt) = 0 for i = 0, 1, . . .. It is straightforward17 to see that, given the
results obtained in the previous Section, we have:
E (uˆt+i|Yt) = −B−1t+iAt+ixˆt+i|t +B−1t+ixˆ∗t+i+1|t (1.26)
Thus, substituting (1.26) into (1.25) we obtain the relation:
xˆt+i+1|t = xˆ∗t+i+1|t, i = 0, 1, . . . (1.27)
that is, for any t and the input uˆt the optimal prediction of any future ideal state,
given the actual measurement (y0 . . . yt), is equal to that relative to the actual state.
For i = 0 one obtains:
uˆt = −B−1t Atxˆt +B−1t xˆt+1|t (1.28)
Now, consider the solution of the dynamic stochastic model (2.1)-(2.2) when
forcing the model with the sequence ut = E
(
x∗t+2|Y ′t
)
where Y ′t denotes the σ-
algebra generated by the observations (y′1 . . . y
′
t), which in turn are produced by the
model itself up to the current time. Let us denote this solution by {x′t}18:
x′t+1 = Atx
′
t +BtE
(
x∗t+2|Y ′t
)
+ vt, x
′
0 = x¯ (1.29)
17See Appendix F.1.
18The corresponding observation equation is y′t = Ctx
′
t + wt, with initial condition y
′
0 = y¯.
17
Taking expectations conditional on Y ′t we have:
E
(
x′t+1|Y ′t
)
= AtE (x
′
t|Y ′t ) +BtE
(
x∗t+2|Y ′t
)
and hence, since the filtrations satisfy Yt = Y
′
t from Lemma 1:
E
(
x∗t+2|Yt
)
= −B−1t AtE (x′t|Yt) +B−1t E
(
x′t+1|Yt
)
so that the expression for E
(
x∗t+2|Yt
)
is in the same form of (1.28), which provides
uˆt as a function of the state and the observations.
Although the noises and the initial conditions in (1.1)-(1.2) under the input se-
quence uˆt are the same of those in (1.29) and its corresponding observation equation,
the two solutions need not coincide. Indeed, the following is shown:
Lemma 2. The two state motions generated by the dynamic stochastic model with
noisy measurement (1.1)-(1.2), when forced by the control sequences (1.20) and xˆ∗t+2|t
respectively, differ by a Y -measurable quantity, that is xt = x
′
t + ξt−1 for all t, ξt−1
being a Yt−1-adapted process.
Proof. - See Appendix G.1.
The following characterization result is thus derived:
Theorem 1. In the general class of RE models (1.3)-(1.4), the absence of backward-
looking dimension (At = 0) is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a solu-
tion - recursively computable via the causal model (1.1)-(1.2) with initial conditions
knowledge only - coinciding both with the nearly ideal solution x = {xt} , y = {yt}
and the approximate solution x′ = {x′t} , y′ = {y′t}.
Proof. - See Appendix H.1.
This result is summarized in the following:
Proposition 3. The linear stochastic forward-looking RE model with noisy obser-
vations and time-varying parameters:
xt+1 = BtE(xt+2|Yt) + vt, x0 = x¯ (1.30)
yt = Ctxt + wt, y0 = y¯ (1.31)
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always admits a solution having the property of being the closest (in the mean square
sense) to the ideal evolution {x∗t} given by the corresponding first-order autoregres-
sive process (Bt non-singular):
x∗t+1 = Btx
∗
t+2 + vt, x
∗
0 = x¯
This solution is equal to the ones of the causal dynamic stochastic model (1.1)-(1.2)
obtained with the following choices for the control ut:
(i) ut is set to the optimal control law with respect to the performance index (1.8);
(ii) ut is set to E(x
∗
t+2|Yt), where Yt = {yj, j ≤ t} is generated by (1.2).
Several RE models fit into the subclass (1.30)-(1.31), for instance any model
in which the t-dated state vector depends upon t+ 1-dated expected states and an
exogenous random (zero-mean white Gaussian) process, when the conditional math-
ematical expectation is formed with respect to the σ-algebra Yt−1 (Pesaran, 1989).
For this class of RE models, the nearly ideal solution has been shown to be an equi-
librium, which is also given by the causal model obtained by forcing (1.1) with a
suitable control, as derived in the previous sections. This was implicitly conjectured
in De Santis et al. (1993) for the time-invariant version of (1.3)-(1.4); while such
conjecture fails to obtain as a general property of dynamic RE models, Theorem 1
fully characterizes the subset in (1.3)-(1.4) for which it proves true.
1.5 The stationary case and steady state behavior
We now consider a dynamic model as (1.1)-(1.2) with time-invariant parameters:
xt+1 = Axt +But + vt, x0 = x¯ (1.32)
yt = Cxt + wt y0 = y¯ (1.33)
where the matrices A,B ∈ <n×n, C ∈ <m×n, and A is stable - i.e., all its roots lie
inside the unit circle19. The sequences {vt} , {wt} are stationary Gaussian zero-mean
white noises mutually uncorrelated, uncorrelated with the initial state x¯ and having
19Again, we require that B be invertible. Note that A = 0 is stable.
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covariances Q ∈ <n×n and W ∈ <m×m respectively. The initial state x¯ has mean
zero and known covariance matrix E(x¯x¯T ) = P0. The reference model, giving the
ideal solution, satisfies the AR process:
x∗t+1 = Ax
∗
t +Bx
∗
t+2 + vt, x
∗
0 = x0 (1.34)
to which the fictitious measurements y∗t = Cx
∗
t + wt, with y
∗
0 = y¯, is attached.
The optimal control sequence {uˆt} is then obtained as a particular case of Propo-
sition 2:
uˆt = −B−1Azˆ1,t −B−1Azˆ2,t +B−1zˆ3,t (1.35)
where zˆ1,t, zˆ2,t, zˆ3,t ∈ <n are the first three subvectors of zˆt ∈ <3n+m and zˆt =
E(zt|Yt), Yt being the σ-algebra generated by {yj, j ≤ t}. The conditional expecta-
tions on the augmented state zt, needed for the computation of (1.35), are given by
the recursive equations:
zˆt+1 =
(
I − K¯t+1C¯
)
A¯zˆt+
+D1zˆt + K¯t+1 (yt+1 +D2zˆt) , zˆ0 = E(z0)
(1.36)
where K¯ is the precomputable filter gain:
K¯t = Pt|t−1C¯T
(
C¯Pt|t−1C¯T
)−1
Pt+1|t = A¯PtA¯T + Q¯
Pt = Pt|t−1 − K¯tC¯Pt|t−1
P (0| − 1) = E(z0zT0 )
(1.37)
(D1 ∈ <3n+m×3n+m and D2 ∈ <m×3n+m are given in Appendix I.1).
Equation (1.36) results from the application of the Kalman filter to the following
system describing the evolution of zt:
zt+1 = A¯zt +B1ζt +B2ut, z0 = z¯ (1.38)
yt = C¯zt (1.39)
where the matrices A¯ ∈ <3n+m×3n+m, B1 ∈ <3n+m×n+m and B2 ∈ <3n+m×n are the
time-invariant versions of those presented in Appendix A.1.
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It is well known that the stability of the matrix A¯ is sufficient to guarantee that
the gain K¯t given by equations (1.37) converges to a finite value as the time index
goes to infinity, and it is thereby feasible to exploit the asymptotic approximation
of the Kalman filter. In order to check the stability of A¯, let us note that it displays
the following block-triangular structure:
A¯ =
(
A A¯12
0 A¯22
)
so that, being A stable by hypothesis, we need to check only the block:
A¯22 =
 0 I 0−B−1A B−1 0
0 C 0
 = ( A¯′11 0
A¯′12 0
)
whose stability is then given by the eigenvalues of:
A¯′11 =
(
0 I
−B−1A B−1
)
The characteristic equation results in the following:
∣∣λ2B − λI + A∣∣ = 0 (1.40)
and hence, if all the 2n solutions of (1.40) are within the unit circle of the complex
plane, there exists the asymptotic approximation of (1.36) and the steady state gain
K¯ can be precomputed by iterating (1.37) until convergence is achieved, or equiva-
lently solving the algebraic Riccati equation.
1.6 An extension to Markov-switching RE models
A number of recent studies have made important progress toward connecting the
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reduced form econometric literature on regime switching autoregressive processes,
which can be traced back to Hamilton (1989), with structural economic theory, by
developing the notion of Markov-switching Rational Expectations (MSRE) models,
that is dynamic forward-looking stochastic frameworks in which the parameters
governing the behavior of the system are taken to be functions of a discrete-state
Markov chain.
Since able to account for parameter instability and yield quantitatively different
responses of macroeconomic variables to fundamental shocks from those implied by
fixed regime models, MSRE systems have recently been advocated to investigate
the role of regime switching monetary policy in New-Keynesian frameworks (e.g.,
Davig and Leeper, 2007) or rather to gauge the effects of uncertainty over structural
parameters governing the optimal behavior of rational agents (e.g., Liu et al., 2009).
From a technical viewpoint, regime dependency engenders structural nonlinear-
ities which prevent from employing standard solution tools for linear RE systems,
such as Blanchard and Kahn (1980)’s, King and Watson (2002)’s and Sims (2002)’s.
In this respect, a number of authors have been interested in deriving determinacy
(local uniqueness) conditions for RE equilibria to MSRE models. In their seminal
contribution to the generalization of the Taylor principle, Davig and Leeper (2007)
study how regime switching alters determinacy properties of RE solution and provide
analytical restrictions on monetary policy behavior to ensure local uniqueness of the
equilibrium path. By focusing on bounded solutions, Davig and Leeper (2007) find
out that, while accounting for structural shifts noticeably enlarges the determinacy
region relative to the constant parameter setup, regimes that fail to fulfill the gener-
alized Taylor principle may well be characterized by improved time series properties
as reaction to fundamental shocks, even when sunspot noise or nonfundamental un-
certainty are ruled out. The nonlinearity problem is addressed by introducing a
two-step solution method that consists in studying an augmented system which is
linear in fictitious variables, the latter coinciding with the actual ones in some of
the regimes, and then using the solution to the linear representation in order to
construct solutions for the original nonlinear system.
From a more general perspective, Farmer et al. (2008, 2009) have provided a
series of characterization results for the set of minimal state variable (MSV) solu-
tions as well as the full set of RE equilibria - also sunspot ones - to MSRE frame-
works, which satisfy a suitable stability concept. Their approach rests on expanding
22
the state-space of the underlying stochastic system and to focus on an equivalent
model in the expanded space that features state-invariant parameters. Furthermore,
Farmer et al. (2009) demonstrate an equivalence property between determinacy for
MSRE models and mean-square stability in a class of Markov jump autoregressive
systems.
Here we show how to generalize the Kalman filter approach presented in the
previous sections to solution of MSRE models20. To this end, let us introduce the
following class of purely forward-looking MSRE models with noisy observations on
the state vector, defined on a properly filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft} ,P):
xt+1 = Γ
−1
s(t)E[xt+2|Ft] + Γ−1s(t)Ψs(t)vt, x0 = x¯ (1.41)
yt = Φs(t)xt + wt (1.42)
where xt is an n-dimensional real vector of random variables of economic interest,
yt is an m-dimensional real vector of observables, and the state error vt ∈ <n, the
measurement noise wt ∈ <m and the initial state x¯ ∈ <n are zero-mean white
Gaussian processes. With no loss of generality, the covariances of the unobserved
structural disturbance and of the measurement noise are normalized to the In×n and
Il×l identity matrices respectively, whereas x¯ has covariance P0. Γs(t),Ψs(t) and Φs(t)
are conformable matrices holding the coefficients of the underlying economic model,
with Γs(t) assumed invertible, as in Farmer et al. (2009).
In (1.41)-(1.42), the regime switches are governed by an ergodic discrete-state
Markov chain indexed by s(t), with s(t) ∈ S := {1, . . . , S}. Let S˜ denote the σ-field
of all subsets in S, and F˜t the σ-field of <n+l in which (xt, yt) lie. We define:
Ω :=
∏
t∈T
(<n+lt × St)
where <n+lt ,St are copies of <n+l,S and T denotes a discrete-time set of interest.
Let Tt := {k ∈ T ; k ≤ t} for each t ∈ T , then:
F := σ
{∏
t∈T
(αt × βt) ;αt ∈ F˜t, βt ∈ S˜,∀t ∈ T
}
20For a generalization of this approach to nonlinear models in which the conditional expectations
term is a nontrivial function of the current states and the fundamental shocks, see Sorge (2010a).
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and for each t ∈ T :
Ft := σ
∏
ι∈Tt
αι × βι ×
∏
τ∈T \Tt
<n+lτ × Sτ ;αι ∈ F˜ι, βι ∈ S˜, ι ∈ Tt

with Ft ⊂ F . Then (Ω,F , {Ft} ,P) defines a stochastic basis for (1.41)-(1.42), with
P representing a probability measure such that:
P {s(t+ 1) = j|Ft} = P {s(t+ 1) = j|s(t)} = ps(t)j
with pi,j ≥ 0 for i, j ∈ S and
∑S
j=1 pij = 1 for each i ∈ S. The initial conditions
(x¯, s0) are taken to be independent random variables.
More specifically, the information set available at time t, upon which conditional
(rational) expectations E[·|Ft] in (1.41) are built, includes the complete filtrations
generated by the output process (1.42), namely {yk, k ≤ t}, and by the Markov state
realizations {sk, k ≤ t}21. We thus allow for observable shifts in modes solely, as in
most of the macroeconomic literature on regime switching RE models (e.g., Davig
and Leeper, 2007; Farmer et al., 2009)22. Accordingly, while the current values of
parameters are known, future ones are uncertain. As a working assumption, we also
require that x¯, vt, wt and st be mutually independent.
Let the representative agent behave according a specific forecasting function ut,
which need not coincide with RE, and consider the following Markov jump (control-
lable) system with linear noise corrupted observations:
xt+1 = Γ
−1
s(t)ut + Γ
−1
s(t)Ψs(t)vt, x0 = x¯ (1.43)
yt = Φs(t)xt + wt (1.44)
where ut is is Ft-measurable, and define the perfect-foresight (Markov jump autore-
gressive) dynamics where the two-step ahead values of the xt variables are perfectly
anticipated and no (endogenous) forecasting errors are made:
x∗t+1 = Γ
−1
s(t)x
∗
t+2 + Γ
−1
s(t)Ψs(t)vt, x
∗
0 = x¯, x
∗
−1 = 0 (1.45)
21Note that we assume simultaneous determination of expectations and state shocks vt, although
the latter are taken to be hidden variables.
22For theoretical work dealing with unobserved current regimes, see, among others, Andolfatto
and Gomme (2003), Leeper and Zha (2003) and Davig (2004).
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y∗t = Φs(t)x
∗
t + wt (1.46)
where both (1.43)-(1.44) and (1.45)-(1.46) are defined on (Ω,F , {Ft} ,P).
Let us introduce:
t := xt − x∗t , z′t :=
(
′t x
∗′
t x
∗′
t+1
)
and consider the problem of finding an input sequence u = {ut}t∈T, T = [0, T ] ⊂ IN,
ut ∈ Ut - with Ut denoting the space of all square-integrable Ft-measurable random
vectors - which minimizes the objective functional:
J(u) = E
T+1∑
t=0
(z′tMzt) (1.47)
under the following state-space recursive constraints:
zt+1 = As(t)zt +Bs(t)ut + Cs(t)vt, z0 = z¯ (1.48)
yt = Φ¯s(t)zt + wt (1.49)
where M consists of the identity matrix In×n as first block on the main diagonal
and 0’s elsewhere. The expression (1.49) can be properly used as the observation
equation for the augmented Markov jump system (1.48) in which the first n entries
of the state vector zt describe the evolution of the deviation from the autoregressive
behavior of the MSRE model.
The design of an input sequence {uˆt}, t ∈ T minimizing (1.47) subject to (1.48)-
(1.49) is accomplished by employing an optimal Markov jump feedback controller
in conjunction with the minimum mean-square estimate (MMSE) obtained by a
time-varying Kalman filter. We indeed show that a separation principle holds for
the system at issue - i.e., the optimal input sequence depends on the observed state
only through the optimal estimate of the latter. In the classical literature on Markov
jump linear quadratic (MJLQ) problems (e.g., Costa et al., 2005), it has been shown
that the solution of such problems engenders a twofold set of coupled Riccati equa-
tions, each associated to the filtering and control programs respectively. Since these
backward-recursive equations cannot be represented as a single higher-dimensional
Riccati equation, structural concepts and algorithms from the classical linear theory
are not directly applicable to Markov jump systems. While further requirements are
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generally needed to determine the existence of a steady-state solution for the coupled
Riccati equations (e.g., Blair and Sworder, 1975; Chizeck et al., 1986 ; Abou-Kandil
et al., 1995), we prove that, when applied to the solution method for MSRE models
we propose in this work, this issue vanishes for the Riccati gain admits a simple time-
invariant and state-independent representation, both in finite and infinite horizon
problems. The following statement clarifies this insight:
Theorem 2. Given the system (1.43)-(1.44), the input sequence uˆt := {uˆt} which
produces for any t = 0, 1, . . . the mean-square minimum deviation from the Markov
jump autoregressive state motion (1.45), is in the form:
uˆt = Γs(t)xˆ
∗
t+1|t (1.50)
where the optimal estimate xˆ∗t+1|t := (0 0 I 0)
′E[zt|Ft] is obtained recursively via a
time-varying Kalman filter.
Proof. - See Appendix J.1.
The estimator of the one-step ahead perfect-foresight state, xˆ∗t+1|t, is mean-square
optimal with respect to the σ-algebra generated by the actual measurement process
(1.42), the only available data. Our final claim rests on showing that, for any t
and the input (1.50), the optimal two-step ahead prediction of the perfect-foresight
state x∗t following the regime switching law of motion (1.45), given the measurement
(y0, . . . , yt) and the filtration σ(s
t) = (s0, . . . , st), is equal to that relative to the
actual state xt in (1.43):
Corollary 1. Let x = (xt), y = (yt) be the solution of (1.43)-(1.44) under the control
law uˆt. Then, for any t and Markov state s(t) = i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , S}, it holds:
xˆt+2|t = xˆ∗t+2|t (1.51)
Proof. - It readily follows from Theorem 2 and the independence assumption be-
tween vt and st.
Consider now the perfect-foresight Markov jump state motion (1.45). It is easily
verified that:
Γ−1s(t)E[x
∗
t+2|Ft] = Γ−1s(t)uˆt
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which shows, in conjunction with the assertion of Corollary 1, that the optimal
feedback controller (1.50) has the same structure of the conditional (rational) ex-
pectation term E[xt+2|Ft], and hence the solution x = (xt), y = (yt) of (1.43)-(1.44)
with uˆt ≡ E[xt+2|Ft] is an REE for the Markov-switching model (1.41)-(1.42). In
other words, both in finite and infinite horizon formulations, there always exists
an REE x = (xt) which is computable via a causal Markov jump (controllable)
system of the form (1.43)-(1.44), when the forcing forecasting function used by the
representative agent is designed as the optimal Markov jump feedback control law
uˆ.
In principle, it is desirable to rule out explosiveness in economic behavior by
requiring RE equilibria to be stationary. How can this be accomplished in the
presence of MSRE models? As emphasized in Farmer et al. (2008, 2009), answering
this question is not a trivial task. In the following, we establish a simple easy-to-
check condition for the mean-square stability of the RE solution as derived in the
previous Section. To this end, let ut = uˆt in (1.43)-(1.44), and consider the evolution
equation for the RE equilibrium:
xt+1 = xˆ
∗
t+1|t + Γ
−1
s(t)Ψs(t)vt (1.52)
with:
xˆ∗t+1|t = Γs(t−1)xˆ
∗
t|t−1 + K¯t−1Φ¯s(t−1)ηt−1 + K¯t−1wt−1 (1.53)
where K¯t is the precomputable filter gain and η := zt − zˆt denotes the estimation
error23.
We study the first two moments of the equilibrium process xt, i.e. mt = E [xt] and
γt = E [xtx
′
t], which characterize its mean-square stability. Indeed, system (1.52)
is mean-square stable if its first and second moments converge to finite (possibly
zero) values in the limit for t → ∞. From (1.52) we have mt → 0 if and only
if m∗t = E[xˆ
∗
t+1|t] → 0. Moreover, provided that the noise covariance is uniformly
bounded with respect to t, i.e. there exists L ∈ < such that:
S∑
i=1
‖Γ−1i ΨiΨ′iΓ′i−1‖P{s(t) = i} ≤ L < +∞, ∀t (1.54)
23See the optimal filter derivation in the proof of Theorem 2.
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then γt → 0 if and only if γ∗t = E[xˆ∗t+1|txˆ∗
′
t+1|t]→ 0.
Taking expectations in (1.53) yields:
E
[
xˆ∗t+1|t
]
= E
[
Γs(t−1)
]
E
[
xˆ∗t|t−1
]
from which m∗t → 0 obtains if:
max
i
max
j
∣∣∣λj(Γi)∣∣∣ < 1 (1.55)
where λj(Ξ) denotes the j-th eigenvalue of a matrix Ξ.
As to the second moment, since ηt is orthogonal to xˆ
∗
t+1|t and the measurement
noise wt proves independent of xt and the σ-algebra {yk, k ≤ t}, we readily derive:
γ∗t = E
[
Γs(t−1)γ∗t−1Γ
′
s(t−1)
]
+ E
[
K¯t−1K¯ ′t−1
]
+E
[
K¯t−1Φ¯s(t−1)P¯t−1Φ¯′s(t−1)K¯
′
t−1
]
where P¯t = E [Pt] and Pt := E [(zt − zˆt)(zt − zˆt)′|sk, k ≤ t] is the mean-squared error
covariance. Thus, γ∗t → 0 for t→∞ obtains if:
max
i
max
j
∣∣∣λj(ΓiΓ′i)∣∣∣ < 1 (1.56)
and:
S∑
i=1
‖ΦiΦ′i‖P{s(t) = i} ≤ L < +∞, ∀t (1.57)
‖P¯t‖ ≤ L < +∞, ∀t (1.58)
In fact, (1.57) is always verified as P is a probability measure, and from (1.58) it
follows that K¯tK¯
′
t is bounded as well
24. As for P¯t, its evolution is described by the
following recursive equation25:
P¯t+1 = E[As(t)P¯tA
′
s(t)] + E[Cs(t)C
′
s(t)]
−E[As(t)P¯tΦ¯′s(t)
(
I + Φ¯s(t)P¯tΦ¯
′
s(t)
)†
Φ¯s(t)P¯tA
′
s(t)]
24Note that E[As(t)A′s(t)] has the same eigenvalues as E[Γs(t)Γ
′
s(t)] and in addition zero eigen-
values.
25Given a matrix Ξ, we denote its pseudoinverse by Ξ†.
28
where P¯0 = cov(z0, z0). Riccati equations with Markov jump coefficients have been
extensively studied in the engineering literature (e.g., Chizeck et al., 1986; Chizeck
and Ji, 1988; Abou-Kandil et al., 1995; Costa et al., 2005 ). According to well-known
results established in the mentioned references, condition (1.55) entails condition
(1.58). It follows that requirement (1.55) - which also implies (1.56) - is sufficient
for the mean-square stability of the obtained RE equilibrium.
1.7 Conclusion
Under the RE hypothesis, subjective forecasts of decision makers are replaced
with the mathematical conditional expectation of some future model’s equilibrium
state with respect to all the information available as to the economic environment.
Since rational expectations need to be model-consistent and are endogenously de-
termined, the hypothesis provides little insight into the mechanism of optimal fore-
casting.
In the present work, we introduce a dynamic policy optimization formulation for
forward-looking models, consistent with the RE philosophy, and address the problem
of finding a solution to RE models containing past expectations of future states.
The general stochastic linear Gaussian vector case with time-varying parameters
is considered and a “nearly ideal” solution for a well-specified subset in the class
of general RE models (1.3)-(1.4) is accordingly found. In such class, though the
dynamic system is not causal, it always admits a solution which can be generated
by means of a causal model, as conjectured in De Santis et al. (1993). Our method
thus pins down a unique solution by construction and can be easily applied in
estimation. As the equilibrium state motion minimizes a variance index in the set
of all the Yt-adapted input sequences {ut},a fortiori it is the mean square closest
to the ideal evolution given by the corresponding perfect foresight model, among all
the other possible solutions.
De Santis et al. (1993) only addresses the problem of state filtering when as-
suming the dynamic system be driven by the optimal prediction of the ideal state.
We show that the optimal prediction of the ideal state does not generate the nearly
ideal state motion; nevertheless, we provide a recursive algorithm for computing and
filtering the latter, establishing the existence of well-defined link to optimal control
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issues. Since the so obtained solution represents the best tracking of the ideal evolu-
tion, our analysis has indeed implications for decision theory under uncertainty, as
economic agents can use equation (1.18) in order to take the best forward-looking
decision at any time. To assume rationally formed expectations means indeed that
economic agents attempt to predict the future as well as possible, given all the avail-
able information. If not as a normative tool for decision theory, our model can thus
be reasonably thought of as a positive description of reality. On the other hand,
also from an econometric perspective, equation (1.24) can be exploited in order to
estimate the state variables when these are not directly observable, not even at the
current time.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 The initial condition for equation (1.10) is given by:
z0 =

0
x∗0
x∗1
y∗0
 =

0
x¯
B−10 x¯
C0x¯+ w0

The matrices A¯t ∈ <3n+m×3n+m, B1,t ∈ <3n+m×n+m and B2,t ∈ <3n+m×n appearing
in the same equation have the following block structure:
A¯t =

At At −I 0
0 0 I 0
0 −B−1t At B−1t 0
0 0 Ct+1 0
;
B1,t =

I 0
0 0
−B−1t 0
0 I
; B2,t =

Bt
0
0
0

B.1 Proof of Property 1We show that the system (1.10)-(1.11) has Gaussian state
noise. Indeed, being the original noise sequences {vt} and {wt} mutually uncorre-
lated and Gaussian, it follows that they are also jointly Gaussian and ξt = [vtwt+1]
T
has covariance matrix:
E(ξtξ
T
t ) =
(
Qt 0
o Wt+1
)
and hence the covariance matrix Q¯t of the white noise term B1,tξt forcing equation
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(1.10) is easily obtained as:
Q¯t = B1,tE(ξtξ
T
t )B
T
1,t
C.1 We prove that the matrix C¯tPt|t−1C¯Tt whose inverse appears in equation (1.15)
is always non-singular. Using the second expression in (1.15) we have indeed:
C¯tPt|t−1C¯Tt = C¯tA¯t−1Pt−1A¯
T
t−1C¯
T
t + C¯tQ¯t−1C¯
T
t
and from the definition of the matrices C¯t and Q¯t we obtain:
C¯tQ¯t−1C¯Tt = CtQt−1C
T
t +Wt
and hence, the non-singularity of the matrix at issue readily follows from taking into
account that:
C¯tA¯t−1Pt−1A¯Tt−1C¯
T
t ≥ 0
CtQt−1CTt ≥ 0; Wt ≥ 0; Wt = W Tt
D.1 In (1.15), Pt and Pt|t−1 are the filtering and one-step prediction error covariances
respectively:
Pt = E
(
(zt − zˆt) (zt − zˆt)T
)
Pt|t−1 = E
((
zt − zˆt|t−1
) (
zt − zˆt|t−1
)T)
and zˆt|t−1 =def E(zt|Yt−1).
E.1 Proof of Lemma 1 We prove that, given the linear system (1.1)-(1.2), the
σ-algebra Yt = σ(y1, y2, . . . , yt) is invariant with respect to all admissible - i.e., Yt-
adapted - control laws u = (ut). To this end, let us consider for the sake of simplicity
the time-independent version of the model (1.1)-(1.2):
xt+1 = Axt +But + vt
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yt = Cxt + wt
where x0 = x¯ is fixed. Let u = (ut) and u˜ = (u˜t) be two admissible control processes
with corresponding solutions x = (xt), y = (yt) and x˜ = (x˜t), y˜ = (y˜t), respectively,
and filtrations (Yt) and (Y˜t). For t = 0, y0 = Cx¯+w0 = y˜0, so that trivially Y0 = Y˜0.
Proceeding by induction, assume that Ys = Y˜s, s ≤ t, then:
yt+1 − y˜t+1 = C(xt+1 − x˜t+1) = CA(xt − x˜t) + CB(ut − u˜t) (1.59)
But:
xt = A
tx¯+
t−1∑
i=0
AiBut−1−i +
t−1∑
i=0
Aivt−1−i
and similarly for x˜t. Therefore:
xt − x˜t =
t−1∑
i=0
AiB(ut−1−i − u˜t−1−i)
By induction hypothesis, us − u˜s is both Ys- and Y˜s-measurable for s ≤ t. Ac-
cordingly, the right-hand side of (1.59) can be written as g(y0, . . . , yt) as well as
g˜(y˜0, . . . , y˜t) such that:
yt+1 = y˜t+1 + g˜(y˜0, . . . , y˜t)
and:
y˜t+1 = yt+1 − g(y0, . . . , yt)
This shows the assertion. The same result holds plainly for the time-varying model
(1.1)-(1.2) in the main text.
F.1 To obtain equation (1.26), it is sufficient to note that the optimal decision
uˆt has indeed an alternative expression, which easily follows by substituting (1.7) in
(1.19), namely:
uˆt = −B−1t
[
Atxˆt − xˆ∗t+1|t
]
The result follows exploiting the following identities (which hold to within stochastic
equivalence):
E (xˆt+i|Yt) = E (E (xt+i|Yt+i) |Yt) = E (xt+i|Yt) = xˆt+i|t
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E
(
xˆ∗t+i+1|Yt
)
= E
(
E
(
x∗t+i+1|Yt+i+1
) |Yt) = E (x∗t+i+1|Yt) = xˆ∗t+i+1|t
G.1 Proof of Lemma 2 We show that the two state motions generated by the dy-
namic stochastic difference model with noisy measurement (1.1)-(1.2), when forced
by the input sequence (1.20) and the optimal minimum variance (prediction) esti-
mate of the two-step ahead state, respectively, differ by a Y -measurable quantity,
that is xt = x
′
t + ξt−1 for all t, ξt−1 being a Yt−1-adapted process. To this end, let us
consider the two systems, given by forcing (1.1)-(1.2) with uˆt and ut = xˆ
∗
t+2|t, respec-
tively. As said, the same σ-algebra is generated by the corresponding observations
equations. According to equation (1.28) we have:
uˆt = −B−1t
[
Atxˆt − xˆt+1|t
]
and:
xˆ∗t+2|t = −B−1t
[
Atxˆ
′
t − xˆ′t+1|t
]
The systems can be rewritten as:
xt+1 = Atxt − AtE(xt|Yt) + E(xt+1|Yt) + vt, x0 = x¯ (1.60)
yt = Ctxt + wt, y0 = y¯ (1.61)
and:
x′t+1 = Atx
′
t − AtE(x′t|Yt) + E(x′t+1|Yt) + vt, x′0 = x¯ (1.62)
y′t = Ctx
′
t + wt, y
′
0 = y¯ (1.63)
Define the innovations:
x˜t = xt − E(xt|Yt−1), (x˜0 = x¯)
x˜′t = x′t − E(x′t|Yt−1), (x˜′0 = x¯)
so that, from (1.60)-(1.63) one obtains:
x˜t+1 = Atxt − AtE(x˜t|Yt)− AtE(xt|Yt−1) + vt, x0 = x¯ (1.64)
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yt = Ctxt + wt, y0 = y¯ (1.65)
and:
x˜′t+1 = Atx′t − AtE(x˜′t|Yt)− AtE(x′t|Yt−1) + vt, x′0 = x¯ (1.66)
y′t = Ctx
′
t + wt, y
′
0 = y¯ (1.67)
Let us assume - the induction hypothesis at time t, which clearly holds at t = 0 -
that with probability one:
xt = x
′
t + ξt−1
with ξt−1 being a Yt−1-adapted process. Then:
x˜t = xt − E(xt|Yt−1) = x′t − E(x′t|Yt−1) = x˜′t
and, by comparing (1.64) against (1.66):
x˜t+1 = x˜′t+1
or:
xt+1 − x′t+1 = E(xt+1 − x′t+1|Yt)
Defining ξt = E(xt+1 − x′t+1|Yt), we finally have:
xt+1 = x
′
t+1 + ξt
That is, the two state motions differ by a Y -measurable quantity26.
H.1 Proof of Theorem 1 To show the assertion, we make use of the following:
Property 2. The two solutions x = (xt), y = (yt) and x
′ = (x′t), y
′ = (y′t), with
filtrations (Yt) and (Y
′
t ) coincide if and only if Atˆt = 0.
Proof. SUFFICIENCY: Assume Atˆt = At(xˆt− xˆ∗t ) = 0. From the ideal model (1.5):
At(xˆt − xˆ∗t ) = 0 ⇔ xˆ∗t+1|t = Atxˆt +Btxˆ∗t+2|t
26Coherently, for the observations we have yt = y′t+ηt−1, with ηt−1 being a Yt−1-adapted process.
This result is fully consistent with the fact that such observations generate the same σ-algebra.
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and rearranging yields:
xˆ∗t+1|t = Atxˆt +Btxˆ
∗
t+2|t ⇔ xˆ∗t+2|t = B−1t [xˆ∗t+1|t − Atxˆt] = uˆt
Since the initial conditions (x¯, y¯) and the system/measurement errors are the same
in the two dynamic systems generated by the optimal controls uˆt and the optimal
minimum variance estimate xˆ∗t+2|t, it follows that x = x
′ ∀t.
NECESSITY: Assume now xt = x
′
t ∀t, then from the ideal model (1.5) one has:
xˆ∗t+2|t = uˆt = −B−1t (Atxˆt − xˆ∗t+1|t) ⇔ At(xˆt − xˆ∗t ) = 0
Property 3. The state motion xt = x
′
t is an RE equilibrium for (1.3)-(1.4) if and
only if Atˆt = 0.
Proof. SUFFICIENCY: Let us consider the following systems:
xt+1 = Atxt +Btuˆt + vt (1.68)
and
x′t+1 = Atx
′
t +Btxˆ
∗
t+2|t + vt (1.69)
Evidently x0 = x
′
0 since for this to hold it is necessary and sufficient that:
xˆ∗1|0 = Atx¯+Btxˆ
∗
2|0
which is always true given the dynamics (evaluated at t = 0):
x∗t+1 = Atx
∗
t +Btx
∗
t+2 + vt (1.70)
Assume now xs = x
′
s, s ≤ t. By induction, for xt+1 = x′t+1 to hold, it is necessary
and sufficient - given (1.68) and (1.69) - that:
xˆ∗t+1|t = Atxˆt +Btxˆ
∗
t+2|t
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or equivalently - given (1.70):
At(xˆt − xˆ∗t ) = 0
Provided the latter condition is fulfilled, for any t we have:
xt = x
′
t, yt = y
′
t
and therefore:
E
(
x∗t+2|Y ′t
)
= E
(
x∗t+2|Yt
)
= uˆt
This shows the equivalence between the nearly ideal solution of subsection (1.3.1)
and that obtained in subsection (1.3.2) for ut = xˆ
∗
t+2|t. It follows that equation
(1.27) holds true also for such control sequence, yielding - for i = 1 - xˆt+2|t = xˆ∗t+2|t
and hence the solution of (1.1)-(1.2) with:
ut = xˆ
∗
t+2|t = uˆt = E(xt+2|Yt)
is a solution of the RE model (1.3)-(1.4).
NECESSITY: Assume xt = x
′
t is an RE equilibrium, then it must solve:
xˆt+1|t = Atxˆt +Btxˆt+2|t
Since xt is generated by the optimal control uˆt, equation (1.27) holds true and the
previous RE model proves equivalent to:
xˆ∗t+1|t = Atxˆt +Btxˆ
∗
t+2|t
which, given the dynamics (1.5), implies Atˆt = 0.
Sufficiency of the claim in Theorem 1 follows directly from Property 2 and 3. To show
necessity, it is sufficient to note that, when xt = x
′
t, from the recursive equations:
xt+1 = Atxt +BtLtzˆt + vt
x′t+1 = Atx
′
t +BtB
′(I −B2,tB′)−1A¯tzˆt + vt
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with Lt given by (1.17), it follows necessarily:
−(BTt Bt)−1BT2,tA¯t = B′(I −B2,tB′)−1A¯t
which defines a set of parametric restrictions of the form:
−(BTt Bt)−1BTt At = 0 (i)
−(BTt Bt)−1BTt At = −B−1t At (ii)
(BTt Bt)
−1BTt = B
−1
t (iii)
Noticing that (ii) and (iii) are identities27, from (i) it follows that At = 0.
I.1 The matrices D1 ∈ <3n+m×3n+m and D2 ∈ <m×3n+m in equations (1.37) are
given by:
D1 =

−A −A I 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
; DT2 =

CA
CA
−C
0

J.1 Proof of Theorem 2 To save notation, let us define u+t = [u
′
t, u
′
t+1, ..., u
′
T ]
′,
and let ξt = [ξ′0, ..., ξ
′
t]
′ denote a sequence of random vectors ξ0, ..., ξT . The σ-algebra
generated by ξ0, ..., ξt, namely σ(ξ
t), will be for simplicity identified with the vector
ξt.
We first derive the conditional expectations for the augmented state vector zt. This
is accomplished by employing a time-varying Kalman filter for the state-space system
(1.48)-(1.49). Indeed, the objective is to identify at every time step t, an estimate
zˆt that minimizes the mean-squared error covariance:
Pt = E
[
(zt − zˆt)(zt − zˆt)′|st
]
A potential issue lies in that the noise provides information about the state since
27Indeed (BTt Bt)
−1BTt is a pseudoinverse (in this case, actually the inverse) of Bt.
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the regime switching matrices multiplying the two depend on the same underlying
Markov state. However, as long as the current realization of the Markov chain is
observable, the state variable zt and the noise vt become independent. Likewise,
though the noise turns correlated, conditioned on the current state estimate and the
Markov state, the next period noise remains (conditionally) zero-mean.
Since the estimator at time t has access to observations (y0, ..., yt) and the Markov
state values (s0, ..., st), the optimal linear MMSE filtering estimate E[zt|Ft] is ob-
tained from a time-varying (sample path) Kalman filter (e.g., Chizeck and Ji, 1988).
Let st = i ∈ S be the Markov state observed in time t, then:
zˆt = zˆt|t−1 + K¯t
(
yt − Φ¯izˆt|t−1
)
, zˆ0 = E{z0} (1.71)
K¯t = Pt|t−1Φ¯′i
(
I + Φ¯iPt|t−1Φ¯′i
)†
(1.72)
zˆt+1|t = Aizˆt +Biut
Pt = Pt|t−1 − K¯tCiPt|t−1
Pt+1|t := E
[
(zt+1 − zˆt+1|t)(zt+1 − zˆt+1|t)′|st
]
= AiPtA
′
i + CiC
′
i
where P0 = cov(z0, z0|s0).
Using the measurement equation (1.49), (1.71) rewrites:
zˆt+1 = Aizˆt +BiutK¯t
(
Φ¯i(zt − zˆt) + wt
)
which along with (1.48) yields the equation of the estimation error ηt := zt − zˆt:
ηt+1 =
(
Ai − K¯tΦ¯i
)
ηt + Civt − K¯twt (1.73)
from which we observe that ηt is independent of ut.
We turn now to the Markov jump LQG problem described by (1.47)-(1.48)-(1.49).
Let us define the cost-to-go at t:
Jt(u
+
t ,Ft) = E
{
T+1∑
s=t
zTsMzs
∣∣∣Ft} (1.74)
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and the optimal cost-to-go (at t):
J∗t (Ft) = min
u∈U
Jt(u
+
t ,Ft) (1.75)
where U readily follows from the above defined Ut, and the min is taken samplewise
with respect to Ft. Finally denote:
u+t
∗
= arg min
u∈U
Jt(u
+
t ,Ft) (1.76)
The optimality principle ensures that
(
u+t
∗)+
t+1
= u+t+1
∗
, i.e. the restriction of the
optimal control sequence for the t-th instance of the sequence (1.75) of optimal
control problems, is the optimal control for the t + 1-th problem. Straightforward
computation yields the following recursive relation between the optimal cost-to-go
functionals (1.75):
J∗t (Ft) = E {z′tMzt|Ft}+ min
ut
E
{
J∗t+1(Ft+1)
∣∣Ft} (1.77)
which is the general equation of the Dynamic Programming Algorithm (DPA). Going
backwards, at the last stage one has:
u+0
∗
= arg min
u∈U
J0(u
+
0 ,F0)
hence a fortiori:
u+0
∗
= arg min
u∈U
E
{
J0(u
+
0 ,F0)
}
= arg min
u∈U
J(u)
which delivers the desired solution.
As to the initial stage, we need J∗T (FT ), which requires us to solve for:
u∗T = arg min
uT
JT (uT ,FT ) = arg min
uT
E
{
z′TMzT + z
′
T+1MzT+1
∣∣FT} (1.78)
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and then to substitute it into the functional:
J∗T (IT ) = JT (u
∗
T ,FT )
= E
{
z′TMzT + z
′
T+1MzT+1
∣∣∣FT}
= E
{
z′TMzT + z
′
TA
′
s(T )MAs(T )zT + u
∗
T
′B′s(T )MBs(T )u
∗
T
+2z′TA
′
s(t)MBs(T )u
∗
T + v
′
TC
′
s(T )MCs(T )vT
∣∣∣FT}
where it has been used the independence of zT , s(T ) and vT , which implies:
E
{
z′TA
′
s(T )MCs(T )vT |FT
}
= E
{
z′TA
′
s(T )MCs(T )E{vT}|FT
}
= 0 (1.79)
as well as:
E
{
u′TB
′
s(T )MCs(T )vT |FT
}
= E
{
u′TB
′
s(T )MCs(T )E{vT}|FT
}
= 0 (1.80)
by the independence of sT , yT , hence of uT ≡ uT (FT ), and vT .
Noting that uT only affects the quadratic form of zT+1 in (1.78), thus using the
system equation, it holds:
u∗T = arg min
uT
E
{
z′T+1MzT+1
∣∣FT} (1.81)
Using (1.79), (1.80), and noting that uT does not affect the quadratic terms in zT
and vT , we obtain:
u∗T = arg min
uT
E
{
uT
′B′s(T )MBs(T )uT + 2z
′
TA
′
s(t)MBs(T )uT
∣∣∣FT}
= arg min
uT
{
uT
′B′s(T )MBs(T )uT + 2zˆ
′
TA
′
s(t)MBs(T )uT
}
By setting to zero the derivative respect to uT of the positive quadratic functional
in the above equation, and solving with respect to uT , we get u
∗
T :
u∗T = −
(
B′s(T )MBs(T )
)−1
B′s(T )MAs(T )zˆT (1.82)
and substituting (1.82) into (1.78), the following expression of the optimal cost at
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time T obtains:
J∗T (IT ) = E
{
z′TKT zT + (zT − zˆT )′LT (zT − zˆT ) + v′TC ′s(T )MCs(T )vT
∣∣∣FT} (1.83)
where:
LT = A
′
s(T )MAs(T ) (1.84)
KT = M − LT + A′s(T )MAs(T ) = M (1.85)
Now, the DPA (1.77) for t = T − 1 implies:
u∗T−1 = arg min
uT−1
E
{
J∗T (FT )
∣∣FT−1}
= arg min
uT−1
E
{
z′TKT zT
∣∣FT−1} ,
= arg min
uT−1
E
{
z′TE{KT}zT
∣∣FT−1}
where the second equality comes from being the estimation error (zt − zˆt) not af-
fected by ut, and the third one from being zT ,FT−1 independent of s(T ). Hence, a
recursive representation arises for the problem at hand, with the following general
characterization of the optimal control holding true:
u∗t = arg min
ut
E
{
z′tE{Kt}zt
∣∣Ft−1}
whose value is given by:
u∗t = −
(
B′s(t)E{Kt}Bs(t)
)−1
B′s(t)E{Kt}As(t)zˆt (1.86)
where the gain Kt solves the backward-recursive equations:
Lt = A
′
s(t)E{Kt+1}Bs(t)
(
B′s(t)E{Kt+1}Bs(t)
)−1
B′s(t)E{Kt+1}As(t) (1.87)
Kt = E{Kt+1} − Lt + A′s(t)E{Kt+1}As(t), KT+1 = M (1.88)
As M is a square, idempotent matrix, from (1.85) it follows that Kt = M for all
periods t = 1, · · · , T and states s(t) ∈ S.
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Finally, by substitution of Kt in (1.86) we derive
28:
u∗t = Γs(t)xˆ
∗
t+1|t (1.89)
Insofar as the expression for the feedback matrices does not depend on the finite
horizon T , it yields the optimal control law for all the LQG control problems in the
(1.47)-(1.48)-(1.49) form for any T = 1, 2, . . ..
28The third entry of zˆt is E[x∗t+1|Ft].
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Chapter 2
On the Identifiability of News Shocks and Sunspot
Models under Rational Expectations
2.1 Introduction
In recent years, economists have been paying great attention to the idea that
advance information on shifts in fundamentals, as opposed to current changes in
opportunities or preferences, may configure an important driver of aggregate fluctu-
ations (e.g., Beaudry and Portier, 2006; Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2008; Jaimovich
and Rebelo, 2009). While the classic sunspot literature (e.g., Azariadis, 1981; Cass
and Shell, 1983; Benhabib and Farmer, 1994, 1999) emphasizes the importance
of forecast revisions driven by extrinsic (non-fundamental) uncertainty in rational
expectations (RE) frameworks, these studies rather investigate the possibility of
expectations-driven fluctuations in regular economies when accounting for an infor-
mation structure under which forthcoming developments in the economy are (pos-
sibly imperfectly) anticipated.
From a theoretical perspective, it has been demonstrated that the two types of
shocks to beliefs generally involve different cross-equation restrictions and implica-
tions for the dynamic properties of equilibria, and that models in which sunspots are
able to generate business cycle comovements may well fail to do so under news shocks
(e.g., Karnizova, 2007). A subsequent, fundamental research step appears then to
be the extension of these results to econometric issues, notably to the analysis of
whether stochastic systems driven by news shocks can be empirically distinguished
from ones which allow for sunspots.
The purpose of the present study is to show, in the same spirit of Beyer and
Farmer (2008), that expectations-driven models are plagued by a critical lack of
identifiability, since indeterminate equilibrium models other than those featuring
news shocks possess the same likelihood function as the latter. The observationally
equivalent frameworks are generally characterized by a lagged expectations struc-
ture, which can be associated with different microfoundations, like the presence
of staggered-price setting under past information (e.g., Woodford, 2003), informa-
tion stickiness (e.g., Mankiw and Reis, 2002) or imperfect information in monetary
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policy making (e.g., McCallum and Nelson, 2000). More generally, lagged expec-
tations terms arise in DSGE models whenever (some of the) control variables are
predetermined, or based on past information with respect to current observables.
By exploiting the general martingale difference solution approach (e.g., Broze and
Szafarz, 1991), we show that, for any exactly identified news shocks model with
VARMA equilibrium reduced form, an observationally equivalent class of lagged ex-
pectations linear RE (LRE) systems exists which is subject solely, though arbitrarily
(via indeterminacy), to i.i.d. fundamental shocks.
A key assumption of the literature on DSGE models with news shocks, the one
which crucially departs from standard business cycle analysis, is that forward-looking
agents are endowed with a richer information set than the one containing current
and past realizations of exogenous variables. Indeed, future shocks to the latter are
typically assumed to be - possibly only in part - anticipated (e.g., Schmitt-Grohe´
and Uribe, 2008). Interestingly, the observational equivalence result established in
this work involves stochastic difference models featuring some degree of informa-
tion stickiness, according to which past state variables partly determine the current
behavior of endogenous variables, and the largest σ-field upon which conditional
forecasts are built - i.e. the one containing current and past observables - is only a
subset of the one available to economic agents acting in news shocks frameworks.
The main implication of introducing lagged expectations terms in LRE systems is
that serially correlated sunspot variables arise in equilibrium reduced forms. Wang
and Wei (2006) were the first to point out this fact. However, Wang and Wei
(2006)’ solution algorithm for LRE systems with lagged expectations configures a
particular case of the general martingale difference approach presented in Broze and
Szafarz (1991), as the former restricts attention to linear stationary solutions and
thus implicitly excludes arbitrariness in the equilibrium MA coefficients, which can
be pinned down from structural parameters knowledge. We rather follow Broze and
Szafarz (1991) to exploit the possibility of equilibrium forecast errors that feature
an arbitrary correlation structure with respect to fundamental shocks1.
The analysis presented here is more closely related to the econometric literature
on the identification and estimation of indeterminate equilibrium RE systems. Ob-
servational equivalence is a general issue in RE models, as noticed in the the early
1That is, the analysis presented here does not rely on the existence of non-fundamental sunspot
noise, as in Beyer and Farmer (2007) and Sorge (2010b).
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work of Sims (1980) and Pesaran (1989) and recently emphasized by Beyer and
Farmer (2007, 2008). It lies indeed on the largely untestable nature of identifying
restrictions on the random processes which generate exogenous variables or the dy-
namic structure of RE frameworks. We contribute to this literature by extending
the equivalence result to news shocks versus indeterminate equilibrium LRE models.
Given the prominent position gained by theories regarding news shocks and antici-
pation effects in the business cycle debate, this finding points to the opportunity of
supplementing likelihood-based empirical investigations of news shocks in estimated
DSGE models with testing strategies for the indeterminacy hypothesis.
The remaining chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2, we illustrate how
the macroeconomic literature has introduced news shocks and anticipation in DSGE
modeling. Section 2.3 introduces the identification issue by looking at a highly styl-
ized model economy under perfect anticipation. In section 2.4 a general equivalence
result for multivariate news shocks LRE models is then established. section 2.5 offers
concluding remarks. For the sake of exposition, all the proofs and major technical
details are relegated to the Appendix.
2.2 Modeling news shocks in macroeconomics
Following the seminal work of Cochrane (1994), theories of news-driven busi-
ness cycles have recently gained a prominent position in the macroeconomic debate.
Beaudry and Portier (2006), via a structural vector-autoregressive (VAR) approach,
has found a non-negligible role for news shocks to total factor productivity (TFP)
as a source of economic fluctuations in most of aggregate variables (stock prices,
output, consumption, investment and hours)2. Several studies have been then de-
veloped to assess the importance of advance information for business cycles and
explore its implications for policy making (e.g., Beaudry and Portier, 2004, 2007;
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2008; Jaimovich and Rebelo, 2009).
At a purely conjectural level, the anticipation effect is easily understood by
2While sensibly improving the time series properties of dynamic stochastic models, news shocks
have been shown to introduce non-invertible MA components into equilibrium reduced forms (e.g.,
Leeper and Walker, 2011). As a consequence, the success of the SVAR approach to proper uncov-
ering this type of shock is controversial (Leeper et al., 2008; Fe`ve et al., 2009).
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introducing a simple stochastic process xt which evolves as:
xt = ρxt−1 + zt (2.1)
with |ρ| < 1. Assume this process forces a single-equation RE equation of the form:
yt = aEt[yt+1] + bxt (2.2)
where yt is an endogenous variable of economic interest
3. According to the RE
hypothesis, the term Et[yt+1] ≡ E[yt+1|Ft] represents the conditional mathematical
expectations of yt+1 with respect to all the information available at time t and in-
cluded in the information set Ft, where typically Ft = {a, b, yt−j, xt−j|j = 0, 1, · · · }.
However, a core assumption of the mentioned literature on news shocks is that the
information set upon which the economic agents build their expectations, is much
larger than one simply containing current and past realizations of the disturbance
impinging on the exogenous variable. The term zt is indeed assumed (e.g., Schmitt-
Grohe´ and Uribe, 2008) to be a linear combination of some components which are
anticipated several periods in advance as well as a surprise (unanticipated) innova-
tion at time t:
zt = v0,t + vt,NEWS ∀t
where, to allow for the variation in the timing of the arrival of the news, the an-
ticipated components are further decomposed as vt,NEWS =
∑q
j=1 vj,t−j, and vj,t−j
denotes j -period ahead news on changes in the level of zt anticipated at period t−j,
with q > 1 being the longest horizon over which anticipation occurs. Accordingly,
vj,t−j is in the period t− j information set of economic agents and yet results in an
actual change in the level of zt only in period t.
As to the statistical properties of the news shocks, it is commonly assumed that
the disturbances vj,t are i.i.d, normal with zero mean and finite variance σ
2
j , j ∈ [1, q].
This assumption implies zero correlation between the news and contemporaneous
shocks as well as zero cross-correlation among news shocks4; in other words, vj,t is
3Equation (2.2) may be given several economically meaningful interpretations. See, e.g., Blan-
chard and Fischer (1989).
4For a wider representation of news shocks models, which allows for serially correlated news
processes, see Leeper and Walker (2011).
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uncorrelated across time and across anticipation horizon:
E[vj,tvi,t−n] = 0, i = j ∈ [1, q], n > 0
E[vj,tvi,t] = 0, j 6= i
The forcing error term zt is therefore unconditionally mean zero and serially uncor-
related, that is E[zt] = 0 and E[ztzt−n] = 0, n > 0; moreover, it is unforecastable
given only past realizations of itself, since E[zt+n|zt, zt−1, · · · ] = 0, n > 0.
The mentioned approach to modeling news shocks allows for a first-order autore-
gressive representation for the exogenous process of the form:
xˆt = Mxˆt−1 + ξt (2.3)
where5:
xˆt = (xt v1,t v2,t v2,t−1 · · · vq,t · · · vq,t−q+1)′
ξt = (v0,t v1,t v2,t 0 · · · vq,t 0 · · · 0)′
For example, assuming anticipation occurs up to three periods ahead (q = 3),
the exogenous process can be written as:

xt
v1,t
v2,t
v2,t−1
v3,t
v3,t−1
v3,t−2

=

ρ 1 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0


xt−1
v1,t−1
v2,t−1
v2,t−2
v3,t−1
v3,t−2
v3,t−3

+

v0,t
v1,t
v2,t
0
v3,t
0
0

This representation illustrates the information updating structure and the prop-
agation mechanism of news shocks through conditional expectations of future values
of the exogenous variable xt. Being forward-looking, at any period t the economic
5M is a (1 +
∑q
j j) × (1 +
∑q
j j) square matrix whose first entry is ρ whereas the others are
either 1 or 0 in order to recover all the anticipated shocks vj,t−j present in (2.1). The vector of
innovations ξt is normal i.i.d with zero mean and finite variance-covariance matrix.
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agents acting upon the information set:
Ft = {xt, z1,t, . . . , zj,t, z1,t−1, . . . , zj,t−1, . . .}
rationally react even before the anticipated shocks are actually realized. Given the
best forecast of future values of the error term zt:
Et[zt+j] =
q∑
i=j
vi,t−i+j j ≤ q
the expected value of xt+j at time t can be easily obtained as:
Et[xt+j] = ρ
jxt + ρ
j−1
j∑
i=1
vi,t+1−i + ρj−2
j∑
i=2
vi,t+2−i + . . .+ vj,t j ≤ q
A slightly different approach to formalizing the endogenous arrival of new infor-
mation requires integrating filtering algorithms, like the Kalman one or least squares
projection, in order to extract signals out of a noisy environment. More precisely,
this approach (e.g., Beaudry and Portier, 2004; Andersen and Beier, 2005; Karni-
zova, 2007), which enables us to specify the anticipated components of the error term
forcing the exogenous variable(s) as one-step ahead expectations revisions, models
anticipation and information updating within a richer information structure where
exogenously given signals are assumed to convey noisy news on future realizations
of the error variable zt; this allows the economic agents to gather some (possibly
imperfect) information about incoming innovations to the exogenous states by solv-
ing a signal extraction program6. In every period t, the agents therefore observe, in
addition to current (and past) realizations of the fundamental shock zt in (2.1), an
exogenous (noisy) signal sjt as part of an information flow on the j ∈ [1, q] periods
ahead disturbances zt+j:
sjt = zt+j + ut, ut ∼ N(0, σ2u)
with ut being uncorrelated with the corresponding vector of fundamental impulses
zt at all lags and leads.
6That is, the agents are endowed with informative signals and learn as an unintended conse-
quence of such observations (passive learning).
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While being unable to disentangle the two components of the signals they receive,
all the agents collect the same public signal so that the noise term does not vanish
in the cross-section average. This non-trivial information problem and consequently
the way new information enters the economy is crucial for the behavior and the
dynamic adjustment process of macroeconomic systems. The conditional (rational)
expectations in period t of future states xt+i, i ≥ 1 are indeed not entirely determined
by the history of their realizations, i.e. it is generally Et[zt+i] 6= 0. Least squares
projection implies:
Et[zt+i] ≡ E[zt+i|sit, sit−1, ...] = Θst+i−j if i ≤ j (2.4)
where Θ ≡ σ2v/(σ2v + σ2u).
It should be noted that the terms “news” and “noise” are not necessarily re-
stricted to denote (possibly imperfect) information agents receive today as to devel-
opments in the economy tomorrow. Part of the literature indeed label “news” as
new information which becomes available at the beginning of each time period. For
instance, Lorenzoni (2009) and Blanchard et al. (2009) build models of demand-
side economic fluctuation allowing for noise shocks - in the form of imperfect signals
on current, not observable (exogenous) variables - to affect public beliefs. In what
follows, we will not be concerned with this latter branch of literature.
2.3 News shocks or correlated sunspots? A simple example
We first consider a simple single-equation model under a news shock, studied in
Fe`ve et al. (2009). Let (Ω,F , {Ft} ,P) be a filtered probability space, and yt be a
scalar endogenous variable adapted to Ft which evolves according to7:
yt =
φ
1 + φγ
yt−1 +
γ
1 + φγ
Et(yt+1) +
1
1 + φγ
zt (2.5)
φ ∈ (−1, 0) ∪ (0, 1), |γ| < 1
where Et(·) := E(·|Ft) denotes the conditional expectation operator. The realization
7Structural parameters are chosen so as to ensure the existence of a (locally) unique RE equi-
librium.
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of the exogenous variable zt is assumed to be fully anticipated one period in advance
(news shock):
zt = vt−1, vt ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σv)
If the sequence for E(yt) is bounded
8, the following determinate stationary so-
lution obtains, that only involves fundamentals, as expressed in ARMA (1,1) form:
(1− φL)yt = γ(1 + γ−1L)vt (2.6)
where L denotes the lag operator. The non-invertibility of the MA component
suggests that statistical inference based on simple autoregressions is generally invalid
(e.g., Leeper et al., 2008).
Model identification also involves difficulties for empirical analysis. Consider the
following RE model featuring a lagged expectation but no news shocks9:
yt = a01Et(yt+1) + a11Et−1(yt) + bvt (2.7)
a01 6= 0, a11 6= 1
The reduced form of (2.7) is given by:
1∑
i=0
a∗i yt+i−1 = λt − bvt−1 (2.8)
a∗0 = a11 − 1, a∗1 = a01
where λt =
∑1
k=0 ak1ξt−k, with ξt := yt − Et−1(yt) being an arbitrary martingale
difference sequence with respect to Ft. Thus, model (2.7)’s equilibrium is subject
to a correlated sunspot shock λt.
Let us assume that ξt = pivt for some arbitrary parameter pi ∈ <. The forecast
errors can indeed be expressed as ξt = pivt + δst, i.e. as a linear combination of
the fundamental shock and an extraneous (non-fundamental) sunspot variable st
satisfying Et−1(st) = 0, which is assumed to be observed by the agents10. The
8This is usually enforced by the existence of a transversality condition in the underlying opti-
mization framework.
9We will be more specific about the role of restrictions imposed to the alternative model when
presenting the general result in the following section.
10That is, St := σ(sk, k ≤ t) ⊂ Ft.
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impact parameters pi and δ are to be selected endogenously; as demonstrated in
Lubik and Schorfheide (2003), not all the reduced form parameters are uniquely
determined under equilibrium indeterminacy.
Here, we focus on the case where st := 0 almost surely, ∀t (parametric indeter-
minacy)11. Then from (2.8) we obtain the ARMA (1,1) representation:(
1 +
a∗0
a∗1
L
)
yt = pi
(
1 +
(a11pi − b)
a∗1pi
L
)
vt (2.9)
Let pi = γ. Then for any element in the set:
S :=
{
(a01, a11, b) : a01 =
(γ − b)
(1 + φγ)
; a11 = 1− φa01; b 6= γ
}
which is non-empty12, model (2.5) and (2.7) generate the same reduced form fore-
casts, and thus are observationally equivalent.
It is important to emphasize the role of the lagged expectation term Et−1(yt) in
this simple model economy. Equilibrium indeterminacy allows for self-fulfilling ex-
pectations revisions even in the absence of any fundamental shock in (2.7), i.e. when
b = 0 (e.g., Benhabib and Farmer, 1994). Then observational equivalence would ob-
tain for any (non-fundamental) sunspot variable ξt := st ∼ i.i.d.N(0, γσv)13. How-
ever, in this case the presence of a lagged expectation is crucial for the result, as it
creates room for correlated sunspots to arise in equilibrium.
2.4 A general equivalence result for multivariate news shocks models
In this section, we discuss the possibility of empirically evaluate the relative
importance of different types of beliefs shocks on aggregate macroeconomic variables
using the predictions generated by the theory. The main question is whether it is
possible for an econometrician looking at time series data {Yt} to decide if the latter
11This is the case when the equilibrium reduced form for yt is to have a moving average structure
with respect to the innovation vt. Indeed, for such a type of solutions the following property holds:
ξjt := Et(yt+j)−Et−1(yt+j) = pijvt, ∀j ∈ N . However, not all the real parameters pij are necessarily
arbitrary (see Broze and Szafarz, 1991).
12In particular, the restrictions imposed to (2.7) are preserved.
13While it would be harder to justify coordination of agents’ expectations revisions on funda-
mental shocks if the latter were not present, this result is still consistent with the RE framework.
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are generated by a model with a determinate equilibrium under news shocks or
rather by an indeterminate equilibrium model which allow for correlated sunspots.
As an example, assume that the econometrician were to be confronted with data
exhibiting high volatility and persistence, so that he might arguably conjecture
that such time series properties shall be ascribed to the presence of anticipated
shocks to fundamentals (e.g., Fe`ve et al., 2009). In what follows, we point out
that such conjecture may happen to be incorrectly validated by the data when
observational equivalence arises between stochastic linear models driven by different
types of beliefs shocks. Hence, the theory may fail to provide actually testable
identifying restrictions.
For the purpose of our analysis, we assume that the news shocks model is exactly
identified, i.e. we assume that unique values for the structural parameters can be
recovered from the estimates of the reduced form and from independent linear re-
strictions suggested by the theory (e.g., Rothenberg, 1971; Beyer and Farmer, 2008).
Let Yt = [y1t, . . . , ynt]
′ be a vector-valued endogenous variable, and let the follow-
ing VARMA process define the equilibrium reduced form of a general multivariate
RE model featuring (potential) news shocks Zt = [z1t, . . . , znt]
′, whose j-th element
is zjt = vj,t−sj , {sj ∈ {0, 1, . . . , q} ;Vt = [v1t, . . . , vnt]′, Vt ∼ i.i.d.N(0,Σv)}, where q
represents the maximum anticipation horizon:
(I − ΦL)Yt = Γ(L)Vt, Γ(L) = Γ0 +
q∑
i=1
ΓiL
i (2.10)
with Γ0 non-singular. We prove the following
14:
Theorem 1. Let G0(EF(Y−, Y, Y+), Z; Θ0) = 0 be an exactly identified news shocks
RE model with structure {G0,Θ0}, whose equilibrium reduced form is the VARMA
process (2.10). Then a class G1(EF(Y−, Y, Y+), V ; Θ1) = 0 of observationally equiv-
alent RE models exists, which is only subject to the i.i.d. shocks Vt.
Proof. - See Appendix A.2.
Theorem 1 shows that a family of lagged expectations LRE models under i.i.d.
fundamental shocks always exists, which generate the same likelihood function as the
news shocks model. This identification failure is inherent to the RE hypothesis (e.g.,
14The t-dated information set is Ft := σ(Yk, k ≤ t). The time the forecast is formed cannot be
posterior to the dating period of the expected variables.
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Sims, 1980)15. It allows to construct alternative economies driven by different types
of expectations shocks which cannot be disentangled empirically. This observational
equivalence problem is analogous to that discussed in Beyer and Farmer (2007), in
which an econometrician with no independent information on the true variances of
the (unobservable) fundamental shocks and the (unobservable) sunspot variables
may well be unable to uncover the latter from the real world data.
One way of coping with this problem may consist in testing the hypothesis that
the data are generated by an indeterminate equilibrium model. In this respect,
testing strategies which are able to control for dynamic misspecification - i.e. the
omission of lags, expectational leads or variables with respect to the actual data gen-
erating process (Fanelli, 2010) - should be preferred over system-based ones which
exploit information on autocovariance patterns of observed time series to deliver
evidence on determinacy versus indeterminacy (Lubik and Schorfheide, 2004)16.
2.5 Conclusion
The main goal of this chapter was to study identification of linear dynamic RE
models under news shocks. The main question addressed was whether these models
are empirically distinguishable from lagged expectations RE systems which allow
for equilibrium correlated sunspots. By means of the general martingale solution
approach, it is shown that, for any exactly identified news shocks model, there
exists an observationally equivalent class of indeterminate RE systems, which are
only subject to i.i.d. fundamental shocks.
Since the alternative models possess different determinacy properties, different
implications for policy-making are also likely to arise. We believe that this is-
sue should be carefully addressed in likelihood-based estimation exercises intended
to evaluate the quantitative importance of news shocks and anticipation effects as
drivers of business cycles.
15A simple corollary of this result is that not only may alternative specifications of news shocks
in RE models - i.e. i.i.d news and correlated news processes - have identical information content
to rational agents (e.g.,,, Leeper and Walker, 2011), but even lead to observationally equivalent
equilibrium dynamics.
16This latter approach to testing for indeterminacy is in fact affected by dynamic misspecification
problems. A different direction is followed by studies on how to address the non-invertibility
property of news shocks models (e.g.,, Kriwoluzky, 2009; Dupor and Han, 2011).
54
Our analysis might also serve as a robustness check for Bayesian studies on inde-
terminacy testing (e.g., Lubik and Schorfheide, 2004). In fact, enhanced time series
properties could still be reproduced with parameters from the determinacy region
when news shocks are present, as they are typically associated with endogenous
propagation.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1 The proof works as follows. We first introduce a gen-
eral multivariate LRE system without news shocks whose reduced form admits the
existence of forecast errors in VMA representation, which can be assumed to be
arbitrarily related with the fundamental shocks Vt. A set of conditions, in the form
of linear restrictions, is then found on this correlation structure and the parameters
of the alternative multivariate RE system in order to construct an observationally
equivalent model. The assertion is proven by showing that this system of constraints
always admits solutions.
To begin with, let us consider the following LRE system:
G1(EF(Y−, Y, Y+), V ; ·) = 0 :
Yt =
∑∑
(k,i)∈I
Ak,i+kEt−k(Yt+i) +BVt (2.11)
where Ak,i+k are conformable matrices and:
I := {(k, i = h− k) : k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , K} , h ∈ {0, 1, . . . , H}}
that is, h and k refer to the lead of the expectations and to the conditioning σ-field
Ft−k.
Any solution to (2.11) satisfies the recursive system:
J1∑
i=J0
A∗iYt+i =
K∑
k=0
H∑
h=1
h−1∑
j=0
AkhΞ
j
t+h−k−j −BVt (2.12)
where:
(i) A∗0 = −I +
∑
k:(k,0)∈WeAkk, A
∗
i =
∑
k:(k,i)WeAk,i+k, i 6= 0;
(ii) J0 = min {i ∈ Z : A∗i 6= 0}, J1 = max {i ∈ Z : A∗i 6= 0};
(iii) −K ≤ J0 ≤ 0 ≤ J1 ≤ H;
(iv) Ξjt := Et(Yt+j)−Et−1(Yt+j) are H n-dimensional (forecasts) revision processes.
However, (2.12) is an equilibrium reduced form of (2.11) if and only if a set of
constraints is imposed to the revision processes Ξjt , i.e. the components of the latter
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may not generally be chosen as arbitrary martingale difference sequences. Let us
set J1 = H = 1, J0 = 0 and K = q. Equation (2.12) then rewrites:
A∗1Yt + A
∗
0Yt−1 = Λt −BVt−1, A∗i 6= 0 i = 0, 1 (2.13)
where Λt =
∑q
k=0Ak1Ξt−k.This reduced form only involves (n− n1) arbitrary mar-
tingale differences as components of the revision process Ξt, where n1 is the number
of zero roots of the following characteristic equation:
det
(
J1∑
i=J0
A∗iµ
J1−i
)
= 0 (2.14)
The matrix A∗0 is generically invertible. By requiring A
∗
1 to be non-singular
17, no
zero root exists, and Ξt is fully arbitrary. Serially correlated sunspot variables Λt
then enter model (2.11)’s equilibrium reduced form. Given arbitrariness of forecasts
revision processes, we can set Ξt = ΠVt for some matrix Π ∈ <n×n. Then, for any
non-singular A∗1 matrix and Π = Γ0, we can obtain a system of n
2(2q + 1) linear
restrictions18 of the form:
A11 = I − A01Φ (2.15)
B = A11Γ0 − A01Γ1 (2.16)
Ai1 = A
−1
01 ΓiΓ
−1
0 , i ∈ {2, . . . , q} (2.17)
Ai−1,0 = −Ai1, i ∈ {2, . . . , q} (2.18)
Aq0 = 0 (2.19)
in exactly n2(2q + 1) ‘unknowns’ (i.e. the structural parameters of the alternative
RE model)19. Clearly, once A∗1 is chosen, system (2.15)-(2.18) always admits a
solution, which we label Θ1. Along with (2.11), this yields the class of observational
equivalent models G1(EF(Y−, Y, Y+), V ; Θ1) = 0.
17This step involves no loss of generality for the elements of A∗0 are really free parameters.
18Of which, n2(K − J0) = n2q are zero-restrictions imposed on some of the A∗i matrices by the
assumption H = J1 = 1 and J0 = 0.
19Equivalently, we could have imposed Ai−1,0 = Ai1 = 0 in (2.18).
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Part II
Political Economy
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Chapter 3
The Role of the Judiciary in the Public Decision
Making Process
3.1 Introduction
A leading concern regarding democratic political systems is the leverage that
special interest groups may claim on actual policies by means of political influence-
buying and monetary contributions to policy-making institutions. This phenomenon
is observed to be pervasive in modern democracies and has gained a prominent
position in the political economy debate.
The role of political influence was indeed noted since the middle of last century
in the literature on public choice (e.g., Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Olson, 1965;
Hillman and Katz, 1987) and political economy of trade policy and protection (e.g.,
Hillman, 1982, 1989). The seminal contributions of Stigler (1971), Grossman and
Helpman (1994, 2001) and Dixit et al. (1997), have provided a characterization
of the public decision maker as an auctioneer who may receive bids from various
entities, in the form of bribes, campaign contributions, or other alluring incentives1.
In some political systems, notably the United States, the provision of contribu-
tions to politicians may be perfectly legal and considered to be lobbying, whereas in
other systems the same transfers would be regarded as illegal and accordingly iden-
tified as bribery. Somewhat surprisingly, while in most of the literature lobbying
and bribery can be viewed as the same phenomenon2, little attention has been paid
to the role of the judiciary in preventing illegal rent-seeking through bribery.
In fact, while focusing on judicial review as part of the checks and balances
against the misuse of political power by the executive branch (e.g., Hanssen, 2004),
1The literature on the causes and the consequences of corruption on social welfare is by now a
large chapter of public economics, as reviewed in Jain (2001) and Aidt (2003).
2The differences between lobbying and bribing have not been extensively addressed in the
theoretical literature; in the pioneering work of Grossman and Helpman (1994), lobbying takes the
form of monetary transfers from lobbies to politicians, which could equally be interpreted as bribes
(e.g., Coate and Morris, 1999). Harstad and Svensson (2011) attempt to draw the boundary by
tackling the question why firms choose to lobby - aiming at changing existing rules or policies - or
bribe - attempting to get around existing rules or policies -, and the consequences of this choice in
a growth framework.
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the political economy literature on corruption has generally neglected to investigate
the interrelations between the judicial oversight of the policy-making process and
the incidence of political corruption. Intuitively, the scope of corruption depends on
the expected benefits to politicians from becoming corrupt; hence, systematic and
well-targeted efforts toward the investigation and prosecution of bribery cases might
serve as a powerful device for corruption deterrence. However, effective oversight
of the political process typically faces institutional and operational constraints, like
political interference or judicial subversion, which may hinder the proper functioning
of this mechanism.
A better understanding of corruption then calls for a careful analysis of the
interplay among institutions in shaping the incentives for bribery. While the internal
organization of the state affects the strategic behavior of organized groups, it may
also alter the incentives for policy-makers to abuse power in their own interest. In
principle, the presence of a judiciary that oversees the market for bribes should foster
corruption deterrence. However, independent judiciaries that act in corrupt societies
are vulnerable to taking bribes (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002); hence, mechanisms for
enforcing judicial accountability are of crucial importance.
This work aims at shedding some light on these issues by developing an en-
dogenous policy framework that captures the interplay among a policy-maker who
allocates public funds from a fixed budget between two groups, a judiciary that
oversees the political process and investigates corruption charges and a lobby group
that may bribe the policy-maker to bias the allocation of funds in its favor and/or
the judiciary to exert less effort in investigating corruption in the allocation process.
We characterize the political equilibria of the model when accounting for both this
form of multiplicity of actors involved in the process of policy-making and the pos-
sibility that, while being independent of the political authority, the judiciary itself
is bribed by the lobby group3.
Existing work dealing with corruption in the judicial branch has mostly focused
on the corruption of law enforcers and its implications for the deterrence effect
of laws (e.g., Becker and Stigler, 1974); on the related issues of optimal monitoring
and compensation schemes for law enforcers (e.g., Polinsky and Shavell, 2001) and of
3Aiming at influencing the judicial choice in their favor, i.e. toward a less tightening oversight
activity to set up. The case in which interest groups face the decision of whether they should
lobby the political bodies to switch policy, or rather challenge existing policy before the courts, is
developed by Rubin et al. (2001).
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optimal regulation in the presence of corrupt contract enforcers (e.g., Immordino and
Pagano, 2010); and on the general contracting problem under judicial agency from
a theoretical perspective (e.g., Bond, 2009). More closely related to our approach is
the recent work of Priks (2011), who examines how judicial dependence influences
corruption at different levels of the government in a model in which the central
authority, the low-level officials and the judiciary are potentially corrupt. Similarly
to our model, Priks (2011) argues that even highly corrupt (independent) judiciaries
may reduce corruption. The two works, however, differ in several respects. First,
we analyze the relationship between judicial independence and political corruption
by means of a menu-auction model in which a lobby group acts as the principal of
both the policy-maker and the judiciary. While Priks (2011) focuses on explaining
how independent judiciaries affect the distribution of rents between officeholders
and central authorities, we rather study how the presence of corruptible judiciaries
that oversee the political process impacts on the mechanism by which lobby groups
can influence policy outcomes, i.e. bribery. Second, our model formalizes some
relevant features that are commonly presumed to exert influence on judicial decision-
making, like the efficiency of courts. Lastly, Priks (2011) does not deal with the
issue of judicial accountability, when independent judges are vulnerable to external
influence.
The independence of judiciaries may in fact facilitate corruption in this branch
because no other government entity has the authority to oversee them (e.g., Rose-
Ackerman, 1978; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002). We show that judicial independence
is a necessary condition for deterrence effects to arise from the oversight activity of
judiciaries. In fact, dependent judges are not able to prevent the interest group and
the government body from maximizing the profits from the deals between them.
This set of results complements those of Landes and Posner (1975), who regard the
existence of an independent judiciary as a key element in the successful functioning
of political systems where public policies emerge from the attempts of interest groups
to influence political decisions in their favor.
While the independence of the judiciary is crucial to its effectiveness, judges
must also be held accountable for their institutional role. Our analysis suggests
that preserving the efficiency of independent judiciaries can serve as an instrument
for self-enforced judicial accountability, even in the presence of corrupt judges. This
finding is in line with Dal Bo´ et al. (2006), who point out that well-functioning
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judicial systems increase the cost of corrupt deals, whereas slow and/or ineffective
judicial systems raise the incentives for engaging in corrupt behavior.
We also show that the trade-off between judicial accountability and judicial dis-
cretion vanishes when the judiciary is dependent on the political authority. When
the policy-maker is excessively concerned with political contributions, entrusting
the former with power over the judiciary prevents the existence of (possibly partial)
deterrence equilibria. Conversely, the presence of an independent judiciary, even if
corrupt, breaks the exclusive bargaining channel with the political authority, and
thus weakens the lobby’s incentives to engage in bribery - the latter not being able
to create large rents. This in turn might reduce the total corruption4.
The remaining chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews empirical
literature on the relationship between judicial agency and political corruption. The
theoretical model is introduced in section 3.3, while section 3.4 carries out the equi-
librium analysis. Section 3.5 illustrates the case of a dependent judiciary. Section
3.6 concludes. For the sake of exposition, all the proofs and major technical details
are relegated to Appendix.
3.2 Background
The starting point of our analysis is the question of whether the structure of the
judiciary plays a role in determining political corruption, under the assumption that
judges themselves may be bribe-takers. This section documents several empirical
facts that our framework is able to explain jointly.
Empirical contributions to the study of judicial systems suggest that judicial
dependence plays an important role in explaining high levels of corruption. Ades
and Di Tella (1997) and La Porta et al. (2004) show that political influence over
judicial institutions typically increases corruption. More generally, a few strands of
econometric research demonstrate the beneficial effects of judicial independence on
economic growth and social welfare, developing numerous indicators and providing
evidence that countries with strong independence of judicial institutions enjoy higher
economic performance and political freedom.
4This insight is reminiscent of Rose-Ackerman (1978)’s argument that heightening the number
of individuals who must be bribed in order to achieve the desired outcome may in fact be socially
preferable.
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Figure 3.1. Political Corruption and the judiciary.
Source: Aaken et al., 2010 (left panel); Djankov et al., 2002 (right panel). The
original indexes of political corruption are rescaled in order that higher scores stand
for higher levels of corruption.
The seminal contribution of Feld and Voigt (2003) introduces a twofold notion
of judicial independence - de jure independence, as described in the constitutional
establishment of the supreme court, and de facto independence, that is judicial
independence as it is actually implemented in practice; exploiting a cross-sectional
sample they present evidence that only de facto judicial independence is conducive
to growth. Recently, Aaken et al. (2010) take on an estimation strategy - based
on the construction of two ad hoc indicators of independence - in order to test the
hypothesis of whether government power over prosecutors may raise government
members’ incentives to misuse such power in order to prevent the prosecution of
illegal activities or crimes - like corruption - committed by themselves. In Figure 1
(left panel) we plot the relationship between (de facto) judicial independence and
political corruption for a cross-section of countries. The empirical evidence shows
that the factual independence of judges is a robustly significant determinant of
cross-national variation in political corruption.
Even if the concept of de facto independence refers to the factual implementation
of judicial independence beyond its formal provision, this feature is not sufficient to
cover the overall effectiveness of the judicial role. In particular, the action of the
judiciary depends on its quality as well as its autonomy from external influence, in
particular from the private sector. There is no shortage of evidence about judicial
corruption, though it is often anecdotal in character. Several instances, especially
63
in the U.S., are indeed given in which the latter has been detected and its existence
proven ex-post (see Bond, 2009). Substantial systematic evidence points to the fact
that the rule of law does not apply in many countries and that judicial decisions are
in fact subject to influence (e.g., Boudreaux and Pritchard, 1994).
To our knowledge, the existing theoretical work has tended to focus on each of
these features separately. We attempt to bridge this gap by developing a conceptual
framework encompassing this larger set of institutions and focusing on two deter-
minants of quality of the judiciary: efficiency and integrity. The efficiency of the
judiciary is understood as the ability of a court system to process criminal cases in
a professional manner and at a reasonable cost and time. A number of potential
determinants have been considered in the literature: adequate endowment of judges
and equipment, training of staff, legal formalism and characteristics of the case man-
agement system. Even if efficiency has multiple facets, it is nonetheless measurable,
unlike some of the other features (Dakolias, 1999)5.
A second dimension of judicial quality is integrity. If the independence of the
judiciary regards autonomy from the political power, the integrity refers to its degree
of corruptibility by other special interests. Just as judicial efficiency fosters the
rule of law, the integrity of its members guarantees the fairness and impartiality
of the prosecution system. According to selected literature (e.g., Mauro, 1995), the
relationship between the quality of the judiciary and the presence of political and/or
bureaucratic corruption can be regarded as a stylized fact. For example, Figure 1
(right panel) shows linear correlations between an index of judicial efficiency and
the level of corruption in a cross-section of countries (obtained by Djankov et al.,
2002).
It is important to emphasize that different legal systems provide quite different
incentives to judges. In particular, a framework of civil/common law could influ-
ence the quality of the judiciary or its dependence from political power and also
the degree of corruptibility within the system. Our model formalizes the interaction
between the quality and the independence of the judiciary in order to shed some
light on their joint effect on the public decision-making process in the presence of
illegal rent-seeking activities. Hence, for the sake of simplicity independence, effi-
ciency and integrity of the judiciary are taken to be partly exogenous.
5An important contribution to the analysis of courts’ behavior is Djankov et al. (2002), who
collect and investigate data on judicial activity from a large sample of countries.
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3.3 The model
We consider a simple economy populated by N individuals divided into two
groups of size nk, with
∑2
k=1 nk = N . Utility (welfare) is derived from the consump-
tion of pure group-specific public goods. Under homogeneous preferences within
each group we have:
Uk = nkGk(qkB) (3.1)
where qk ≥ 0, with
∑
k qk = 1, is the share of a fixed budget B allocated between the
groups as group-specific public goods, and Gk(·) is a twice-differentiable function
satisfying G′k(·) > 0 and G′′k(·) < 0 for k = 1, 2. With no loss of generality, we
normalize B = 16.
The effective redistribution scheme results from the interplay of two government
institutions. While public policies are unilaterally determined by the decisions of
a politician (P ), their determination is influenced by the behavior of a separate
institution, the judiciary (J), which is given the role of overseeing the political
process. In a setting a´ la Grossman and Helpman (2001), an organized interest group
k may decide to make its political contribution contingent on the selected policy by
formulating a transfer schedule Tk(qk). The schedule maps any feasible value for
the shares qk ∈ [0, 1] into a non-negative contribution to P . In our simple economy,
contributions are illegal (outright bribes). As P will choose the policy vector (qˆ1, qˆ2)
that maximizes its own objective, the joint (net) welfare of the members of the lobby
group k is given as
Vk = Uk(qˆk)− Tk(qˆk) (3.2)
We model a reduced form for P ’s objective function, assuming that fixed weights
are exogenously assigned to the welfare levels of the two different groups in the econ-
omy7. When choosing the tax revenue shares qk to be allocated for the production of
the public goods, the policy-setting authority is thereby concerned with the public’s
6More generally, we could let B = t
∑
k nkyk and uk = (1− t)yk +Gk(qkB), where yk denotes
(exogenously given) gross income and t is the tax rate. None of the results derived herein depend
on our simpler modeling choices.
7Here, as in the standard literature on endogenous policy, θk reflects political relevance and
may represent population or electoral weights.
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well-being and with the receipts it gets from the groups of interest. We explicitly
allow for uncertainty in the payment of the contributions. This mirrors the degree to
which the policy-maker is actually captured by the lobby group and is linked to the
oversight of the judiciary. This feature is modeled by letting P benefit from the ef-
fective transfers only with (known) probability f ∈ [0, 1]. Accordingly, a risk-neutral
politician chooses q ∈ [0, 1] to maximize8:
VP = f
2∑
k=1
Tk(qk) + l
2∑
k=1
θkVk(qk)
where
∑
k θkVk(·) is the social welfare function with weights θk > 0 for k = 1, 2 and∑
k θk = 1, while l > 0 denotes the (exogenous) degree of preference of P for social
welfare relative to bribes.
Groups may differ in their ability to capture institutions and outbid rival seekers
of favorable policies. We assume that group 1 only acts as a bribe provider, and let
group 2 represent the unorganized general public (e.g., Olson, 1965). To simplify
notation, we set q1 = q (and q2 = 1 − q accordingly), so that T (q) and T̂ ≡ T (qˆ)
will denote the bribe schedule with which the lobby confronts the politician and the
effective transfer eventually paid by the lobby in exchange for the chosen policy qˆ,
respectively. The payoff function of P then reduces to
VP = fT (q) + l
2∑
k=1
θkVk(qk) (3.3)
The judiciary is in charge of an anti-corruption office which is incidental to the
effective transfer of the bribe T̂ . The incentives of the judiciary are shaped by its
internal structure as well as by the institutional interplay with the political body.
Following Posner (1994, 1995), we view the judiciary as a rational agent aiming at
optimizing a payoff function where economic variables (revenues and costs) and the
institutional target of monitoring bribery are linked together. We also characterize
the quality of judiciary in terms of her efficiency and integrity (e.g., Caselli and
Morelli, 2004).
Technically, we assume the existence of one-to-one correspondences between the
oversight activity carried out by J and both the probability (1 − f) with which it
8The probabilistic formulation of the objective function is also used by Fredriksson and Svensson
(2003) to capture political instability.
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finds evidence of the bribe T̂ and the cost, determined by a univariate function S,
in terms of effort to be exerted or resource allocation for the anti-corruption task
to take place. We thereby consider f as the choice variable for J and denote with
S(f) the cost associated with any level of prosecution activity:
S(f) = α−1(1− f), α > 0 (3.4)
so that identifying any bribe offered to P is costly but bounded from above (S(0) =
1/α). The parameter α is a measure of the efficiency of the judiciary; it summarizes
the influence of adequate budgetary allocations, sufficient number of staff, adequate
training on the judicial work.
The objective function of J reflects the burden of political corruption - in terms
of the cost S(f) and the discrepancy (measured by the weighted ex-post transfer
fT̂ ) between the welfare maximizing allocation and the bribery-induced one - as
well as the opportunity of benefiting from bribes from the lobby group:
VJ(f) = (1− λ)C(f) + λ
[
−S(f)− fT̂
]
, λ ∈ [0, 1]
where λ is interpreted as J ’s level of integrity. C(f) denotes the bribe offered by
the lobby group.
For the sake of convenience, the previous expression - taken to be maximized
over f ∈ [0, 1] - is written in the following form:
VJ(f) = (1 + σ)
−1
[
σC(f)− S(f)− fT̂
]
, σ ≥ 0 (3.5)
where the scalar σ = λ−1(1 − λ) can be regarded as the degree of judicial corrupt-
ibility.
Under complete and symmetric information, the objectives (3.3) and (3.5) are
common knowledge to P , J and the lobby group. To preserve model consistency,
we assume that the judiciary needs to find compelling evidence to prosecute corrupt
politicians: though bribe payments are observable, bribe-takers can be prosecuted
only with probability (1 − f)9. Also, we make a strong assumption in that, if
9It is important to emphasize that our conceptual framework deals with illegal rent-seeking.
As a consequence, transfers do not take the form of legally enforceable contracts. This evidently
creates room for commitment issues since, once the policy is chosen, the lobby group may not
feel bound to their promises; however, arguments on political care for future monetary/electoral
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identified, the bribe T̂ is confiscated but can neither contribute to financing public
goods nor be of any utility to J .
In the following subsection we discuss our modeling choices.
3.3.1 Discussion of the model
Our model can be viewed as a special case of the multiple agents, multiple princi-
ples framework developed by Prat and Rustichini (2003) and applied in Fredriksson
and Millimet (2007) and Aidt and Hwang (2008)10. The assumption that only one
group is able to bribe public institutions is important in at least two dimensions.
First, it allows for a full characterization of the transfer schedules for general (twice-
differentiable) utility functions, as the equilibrium outcome can be implemented by
globally truthful transfers. This can fail to be obtained in the case of the multiple
lobbies set-up. Second, competition among several lobby groups would typically ex-
tend to the different layers of decision-making. Encompassing this case is thus likely
to result in considerable complexity, and may require more restrictive assumptions
on functional forms for the underlying preferences11.
We also emphasize that the asymmetric case can be regarded as a good reduced-
form representation of political corruption in real-world politics. Jain (1998) argues
that corruption differs from legal lobbying in its level of competition: while the
latter typically provides transparent rules for potential competitors, bribery is rather
a rent-seeking channel through which incumbents prevent potential entrants from
entering the bidding process. From this point of view, corruption is commonly
described as a more monopsonistic form of rent-seeking (e.g., Lambsdorff, 2002).
Furthermore, theoretical work demonstrates that organized groups may decide not to
be politically active due to strategic motives (e.g., Aidt, 2002); this idea is supported
by some empirical evidence showing that several existing groups are often latent and
do not engage in lobbying activities (e.g., Wright 1996).
support or career concerns from a repeated-game perspective can be advocated to circumvent this
problem.
10See also Mazza and van Winden (2008) for an endogenous policy model of a hierarchical
government in which multiple policy tasks are shaped by lobbying activities.
11On the other side, the presence of multiple lobby groups may instead weaken the policy dis-
tortion problem by increasing the costs of rent-seeking and even lead, under some conditions, to
the (political) welfare maximizing allocation, the one that would result under absence of lobbying
activities (e.g., Mazza and van Winden, 2008).
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It is widely recognized that there exist two main dimensions to corruption. On
the one side, the supply-side-driven form of corruption is based on the search to
extend one’s privileges by bribing people in a position of authority and power, for
favors that are not consistent with the rule of law. On the other side is demand-side
corruption, which is enforced from the top by bribe-takers and does not necessarily
rely on the existence of private agents searching for political favors. While both
depict important observable facts, they need different modeling assumptions. In the
canonical models of corruption (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Aidt and Dutta,
2008), the policy-maker takes the lead and distorts the policy to create rents and
attract bribe payments. The common agency framework has been used rather to
explain special interest politics in modern democracies, as it seems to fit quite well
the political process underlying the formation of economic policies - like public
goods provision - where the available policies are bargained upon and exchanged
for payments from constituents, that can take the form of campaign support or il-
legal bribes. The quasi-linear structure of preferences, in which transfers between
principal(s) and agent(s) are equivalent to transferable utility, is indeed consistent
with the interpretation of lobbying as supply-side-driven corruption (e.g., Coate and
Morris, 1999). Moreover, the assumption that the process is driven by bribe-payers
helps to model situations in which multiple public decision-makers are subject to
influence via sequential bribery, as is the case of our contribution. We recognize,
however, that while bribes and influence-buying via campaign contributions and
other means cannot be considered perfect substitutes, different assumptions on the
way policy-making and lobby groups’ activities interact may lead to quite different
outcomes and policy implications. This is particularly true in the case of two or
more special interest groups. As an example, Epstein and Nitzan (2006) develop a
two-tier policy-making model in which rent-seeking government institutions, a legis-
lator and a bureaucrat act as principals of the special interest groups. The authors
illustrate how this modeling assumption may distort the tendency of policy-makers
to compromise and thus lead to different outcomes with respect to the common
agency framework. Nonetheless, in the asymmetric case, the assumption that the
bargaining power is fully allocated to the lobby group does not impose any restric-
tions on the equilibrium outcome of the model. Crucially, the probability f is not
taken to be a function of the size of the contribution T , which therefore enters lin-
early the objectives of the policy-setting authority and of the lobby group; it follows
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that under Nash bargaining - or any different bargaining structure with full informa-
tion whose solution is jointly (Pareto) efficient for both the contracting sides - the
equilibrium policy proves to be independent of the negotiation process (Grossman
and Helpman, 2001).
The specification of the judiciary’s objective function deserves further discus-
sion12. According to the principles of the rule of law, a leading decision criterion in
judicial behavior should be represented by the maximization of the deterrence effect
that enforcement measures produce, whereas the judicial system ought to be de-
signed in order to eradicate or circumvent the role of special interests within judges’
behavior. A peculiar issue involved in this process is the concern for track records
as a measure of career prospects. From a broader perspective, the one that ties
the legalist model of judicial behavior and the rational choice theory, the judiciary
can be seen as a public decision-maker with a payoff function in which economic
incentives, an ethical concern for not fully accomplishing her institutional role, and
a negative externality from the expected feedback on career prospects are merged
together. Notably, such an approach combines two main aspects, namely rationality
- rational agents act to advance their own particular interest - and strategic behavior
- all the agents involved in the decision-making process identify the effects of the
actual constraints and the interdependence of their actions in a forward-looking way.
Thus, the effective set of incentives for judicial decision makers is only partly shaped
by their internal structure. In this respect, we stress that our specification does not
make the concern for track records conflict with the judicial role of guardian of the
rule of law13.
3.4 Equilibrium analysis
3.4.1 One-layer bribery
We first analyze the case where the lobby group can only bribe the politician,
12We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out to us the importance of arguing on this point.
13We can thus think of the judge as being penalized in terms of reputation and/or career ad-
vancements for having failed to find compelling evidence on the bribes received by the politician.
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that is σ = 0 and (3.5) turns into:
VJ(f) = −
(
(1− f)α−1 + fT (qˆ)) , α > 0
so that J ’s objective is given by the sum (with negative sign) of the cost (4) and the
weighted ex-post transfer to the politician. The timing of the model is as follows:
(i) J selects the level of oversight activity, determining f , and commits to carry
it out;
(ii) the lobby group formulates the bribe schedule T (q);
(iii) P observes T (q) and sets the policy qˆ; the lobby pays T (qˆ);
(iv) if not traced, the bribe is received by P .
We derive the subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the model through backward
induction14. At the policy-making stage, f ∗ is predetermined, so using (3.2) and
(3.3), the objective function for P becomes:
VP = (f
∗ − lθ1)T (q) + l
2∑
k=1
θkUk(qk)
We note that P will give in to the lobby group (accepting T̂ ) only if the proba-
bility of obtaining the bribe exceeds a given threshold (i.e., lθ1). Indeed, a sufficient
condition for the absence of corruption is lθ1 ≥ 1; when the latter is not fulfilled,
the lobby group can influence P via bribery only if f ≤ lθ1. More precisely, we have
the following:
Lemma 1. In the SPE of the model:
i) If lθ1 ≥ 1, no bribery occurs and P chooses qˆ∗ = argmaxql
∑
k θkUk(qk);
ii) If lθ1 < 1 and f
∗ ≤ lθ1, no bribery occurs and P chooses qˆ∗;
iii) Iff f ∗ > lθ1, the lobby group bribes P and obtains qˆL > qˆ∗.
In the first two cases, the lobby offers T = 0 and no interaction with P takes
14The analysis is restricted to the equilibrium profile insofar as the results obtained are invariant
with respect to the form of the transfer schedule off-the equilibrium.
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place. The equilibrium policy is determined by the first-order condition15:
2∑
k=1
θkU
′
k(qˆ
∗) =
2∑
k=1
θknkG
′
k(qˆ
∗) = 0 (3.6)
While resulting in the same equilibrium outcome16, the first two sub-cases of
the Lemma capture two different situations. In case (i), bribing a strongly welfare-
oriented politician is not feasible. In case (ii), bribery is feasible but a sufficiently
high level of judicial oversight prevents bribery from occurring. We label the first
case as First Best (FB) equilibrium, and the second one as Full Deterrence (FD)
equilibrium. In the former case, the presence of the judiciary is irrelevant, whereas
in the latter, it proves fundamental.
In the third case, the subgame-perfect equilibrium entails corruption. The policy-
bribe pair (qˆL, TL) is such that qˆL jointly maximizes the objective function of P and
the lobby, the latter acting as a principal. The equilibrium is then defined by
(f ∗ − lθ1)∂T
∂q
(qˆL) + l
2∑
k=1
θkU
′
k(qˆ
L) = 0
subject to:
U ′1(qˆ
L)− ∂T
∂q
(qˆL) = 0
which gives the first-order condition17:
f ∗U ′1(qˆ
L) + lθ2U
′
2(qˆ
L) = 0 (3.7)
We note that the main effect of bribery relative to the no corruption case is
that the marginal utility of the lobby group gets a larger weight in the political
calculus (since f ∗ > lθ1). Given the strict concavity of the Gk function, the budget
share is biased in favor of the lobby group (qˆL > qˆ∗) so that U1(qˆL) > U1(qˆ∗) and
U2(1− qˆL) < U2(1− qˆ∗). The equilibrium bribe TL ≡ T (qˆL) is such that
VP (qˆ
∗, 0) = VP (qˆL, TL)
15This requirement fully characterizes the optimal choice of P , since Uk is concave in q1 ≡ q for
k = 1, 2.
16In terms of absence of bribery, and hence of the choice of the optimal shares qˆ∗k.
17Again, sufficiency is guaranteed by concavity.
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which delivers:
TL =
l
f ∗ − lθ1
{
θ1[U1(qˆ
∗)− U1(qˆL)] + θ2[U2(qˆ∗)− U2(qˆL)]
}
(3.8)
Since ∂T
L
∂qL
= − 1
f∗−lθ1
[
lθ1
∂U1
∂qL
+ lθ2
∂U2
∂qL
]
> 0 from (3.7), from qˆL > qˆ∗ it follows
TL > 0. This proves sufficiency for the last claim of Lemma 1. The participation
constraint of the lobby group is not binding in equilibrium18.
Consider now the first stage of the game. In order to perform its anti-corruption
task, J selects the level of oversight activity which minimizes
[
S(f) + fT̂
]
over
f ∈ [0, 1]. While S(f) is monotonically decreasing in the control variable, the effect
of f on T̂ is ambiguous. Indeed it holds:
∂T̂ (f)
∂f
= − l
(f − lθ1)2
2∑
k=1
θk
[
Uk(qˆ
∗)− Uk(qˆL)
]
− l
f − lθ1
2∑
k=1
θk
∂Uk
∂f
(3.9)
This relation captures the equilibrium trade-off induced by a marginal increase
in the level of f . The first term on the right-hand side is negative - because a higher
f allows the lobby group to lower its bribe schedule for a given f . The second term
is positive as it reflects the equilibrium response to bribery. From ∂U1
∂f
≡ ∂U1
∂qL
∂qL
∂f
> 0
and ∂U2
∂f
≡ ∂U2
∂qL
∂qL
∂f
< 0, and given condition (3.7), the higher the value of f , the
larger is the loss of social welfare. As a consequence, the lobby group must offer a
larger bribe to compensate P for this loss.
Two different scenarios can therefore emerge. If lθ1 ≥ 1, Lemma 1 ensures that
bribery never occurs; with T = 0, every non-zero level for the oversight activity of
the judiciary is of no consequence, and the optimal choice is f = 119. Conversely, if
lθ1 < 1 - a restriction which would be otherwise sufficient for bribery to occur - we
can derive a pair of functions (qˆ(f), T̂ (f)) which map from any value of f in [0, 1]
to the corresponding optimal choice of P and the bribe offered by the lobby group,
respectively, under which T̂ (lθ1) = 0 and T̂ (f) > 0 for all f > lθ1.
Given differentiability and compactness assumptions, a solution to J ’s minimiza-
tion problem does exist. The following Proposition states that, under a minimum
efficiency requirement, the judiciary will be able to fully deter bribery.
18That is, U1(qˆL)− T (qˆL) > U1(qˆ∗). This shows that the lobby group has an incentive to bribe
P for any f > lθ1 chosen at the upper node.
19This justifies our definition of First Best outcome, since no costly action by the judiciary is
necessary to achieve the maximum welfare condition.
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Proposition 1. Let lθ1 < 1. Then there always exists a (finite) threshold α such
that J optimally selects f ∗ = lθ1 if and only if α ≥ α.
Proof. - See Appendix A.3.
Hence, in the presence of a sufficiently efficient judiciary, there is no incentive
for the lobby group to engage into bribery (Full Deterrence equilibrium). Similarly,
full capture (i.e. f = 1) results if and only if α is below a given (non-zero) threshold
α < α, as any non-zero effort cost for the judicial activity would otherwise reduce
her welfare. As a consequence, deterrence effects are hindered by the presence of a
highly inefficient (though incorruptible) judiciary: for α ∈ (α, α), J ’s optimal choice
f ∗ ∈ (lθ1, 1) results in partial bribery deterrence.
3.4.2 Two-layer bribery
In this section, we investigate the possibility that, while being independent of
the political authority, J itself is bribed by the lobby group. With some algebra, it
is possible to rewrite the first term on the right-hand side of (3.9) and use (3.7) to
obtain:
∂U1
∂f
− ∂T̂
∂f
=
1
(f − lθ1)2
{
lθ1[U1(qˆ
∗)− U1(qˆL)] + lθ2[U2(qˆ∗)− U2(qˆL)]
}
which is positive as the payoff of the lobby group is a monotone function of f . This
clearly raises the question whether - and under which conditions - it is optimal for
the lobby group to bribe the judicial authority at the first stage of the game. When
faced with multiple access points to the decision-making, the lobby group needs to
evaluate strategically which choices it should attempt to affect, while accounting for
the possibility that bribery at one layer may not suffice to fully control reactions at
the other.
The objective of the judiciary is now given by equation (3.5), which we repeat
below:
VJ(f) = (1 + σ)
−1
[
(−S(f) + σC(f))− fT̂
]
, α, σ > 0 (3.10)
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whereas P ’s objective is:
VP = fˆT (q) + l
2∑
k=1
θk
{
Uk(qk)− Tk(qk)− Ck(fˆ)
}
(3.11)
where only T1 ≡ T and C1 ≡ C can take on non-zero values. The sequence of events
therefore includes a preliminary stage where the lobby group decides whether to
bribe J via the transfer schedule C(f). J selects the value fˆ maximizing (3.10),
obtaining the matching monetary reward C(fˆ) ≥ 0. Then, the lobby group decides
whether to influence P by submitting the bribe schedule T (q), and finally P chooses
a budget allocation {qˆ, 1− qˆ} maximizing (3.11) and collects the bribe T (qˆ) ≥ 0
with probability f .
At the lowest node, P has no power to influence J ’s choice, and fˆ and C(fˆ) are
predetermined. The expression for the optimal TL(fˆ) is obtained as in the previous
section. At the upper node, the optimal choice of f is jointly efficient for J and the
lobby20:
fˆL = argmaxf∈[0,1]
{
−S(f)− fT̂ (f) + σC(f)
}
s.t.
∂U1
∂f
− ∂T̂
∂f
− ∂Ĉ
∂f
= 0
where:
C ′(f) =
1
(f − lθ1)2
{
lθ1[U1(qˆ
∗)− U1(qˆL)] + lθ2[U2(qˆ∗)− U2(qˆL)]
}
is always positive for f ∈ (lθ1, 1]. It follows that fˆL ≥ fˆ ∗, with fˆ ∗ denoting the
optimal choice for the case with no bribery at J ’s level.
We can thereby compute C(fˆL) as the bribe which leaves J indifferent between
fˆL and fˆ ∗:
S(fˆ ∗) + fˆ ∗T̂ (fˆ ∗) = S(fˆL) + fˆLT̂ (fˆL)− σC(fˆL)
or:
C(fˆL) =
1
σ
[
− (fˆ
L − fˆ ∗)
α
+ fˆLT̂ (fˆL)− fˆ ∗T̂ (fˆ ∗)
]
(3.12)
with the following participation constraint for the lobby group holding in equilib-
20Note that bribing the judiciary at this stage of the game is feasible insofar as λ < 1 (σ > 0).
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rium:
U(qˆ(fˆL))− T̂ (fˆL)− C(fˆL) ≥ U(qˆ(fˆ ∗))− T̂ (fˆ ∗) (3.13)
Again, we seek conditions under which, at equilibrium, no bribes to neither P nor
J are paid. Hence, we will assume hereafter that α ≥ α21, so that from Proposition
1 it follows fˆ ∗ = lθ1. Bribing the judiciary would instead yield fˆL: since α has been
proven to be the minimal level of efficiency such that lθ1 ≡ argmax {−S − fT (qˆ)}
in [0, 1], and since C(f) > 0 for f > lθ1, we have fˆ
L > lθ1.
The bribe to be paid to J amounts then to:
C(fˆL) =
1
σ
[
− (fˆ
L − lθ1)
α
+ fˆLT̂ (fˆL)
]
with C(fˆL) fulfilling equation (3.13), which is equivalent to requiring:
1
σ
[
− (fˆ
L − lθ1)
α
+ fˆLT̂ (fˆL)
]
≤ U(qˆ(fˆL))− U(qˆ∗)− T̂ (fˆL)
Since this holds for any α ≥ α, we state the following:
Proposition 2. Let lθ1 < 1. Then there always exists a non-zero threshold σ such
that, for a sufficiently high α, J optimally selects fˆ ∗ = lθ1 if and only if σ < σ.
Proof. - See Appendix B.3.
Proposition 2 ensures that, for sufficiently low corruptibility levels, the problem
is analogous to that dealt with in section 4.1. A zero-bribe equilibrium - which
generalizes our notion of Full Deterrence equilibrium to the case of a corruptible
judiciary - is therefore obtained in the two-layer bribery case under identifiable
parameter restrictions. In fact, provided that σ < σ, a zero-bribe equilibrium is still
feasible, conditional on a sufficiently high level of judicial efficiency.
We now characterize this finding in terms of both the efficiency and the integrity
of the judiciary (Figure 3.2):
Corollary 1. Let lθ1 < 1. Provided that σ < σ, there always exists a finite α
such that J optimally selects f ∗ = lθ1 if and only if α ≥ α. In particular, we have
α = α(σ) with dα/dσ > 0
21We have already shown that a zero-bribe equilibrium is not feasible if α < α even when the
judiciary is not corruptible.
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Figure 3.2. Feasibility of the Full Deterrence equilibrium.
Proof. - See Appendix C.3.
The following claim complements this insight:
Corollary 2. Let lθ1 < 1. Then f = 1 obtains if and only if α < α(σ) with α(σ) > 0
and dα/dσ > 0
Proof. - See Appendix D.3.
3.5 Bribery under judicial dependence
The tension between the independence of judiciaries, the effective oversight and
democratic accountability of judges is a well-known concern in the design of institu-
tions and the internal organization of the state. When no other government entity
can oversee them, judiciaries enjoy a high level of discretion over choices in their
domain and thus may be biased toward those who benefit from a corrupt status quo.
Dependent judiciaries, by contrast, are likely to be constrained by politicians who
have power over them and thus fail to accomplish their institutional role.
The goal of this section is to explore the relationship between corruption and
judicial independence from political influence. We formalize the notion of judicial
dependence by assuming that at the beginning of the game the nature (as a pseudo-
player) selects all the relevant parameters of the model (i.e. the level of welfare
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interest of the politician (l), the level of judicial efficiency (α) and the degree of
corruptibility of the judiciary (σ)), and yet the politician has the power to change
either of the parameters that characterize judicial preferences22.
We investigate the existence of (possibly partial) deterrence equilbria conditional
on judicial dependence. Let us consider the corruptibility of judiciaries, measured by
σ > 0. The case of an independent judiciary, which is immune from political inter-
ference, has been developed in the previous section. When l and σ are independently
given, the existence space of bribery equilibria is obtained under the requirements
of Lemma 1 and Proposition 2. The scenario is depicted in Figure 3, which shows
three possible regions according to the thresholds σ and l = 1/θ1. When l ≥ l the
First Best equilibrium always obtains. If l < l but σ < σ, Proposition 2 applies
and the Full Deterrence equilibrium is achievable conditional on the efficiency of
the judiciary being sufficiently high. Only when the welfare interest of P and the
integrity of J are both low (that is, l < l and σ > σ), qˆ∗ is unfeasible.
Let us now consider the case of a dependent judiciary. In particular we allow the
nature to initially choose l and σ, and endow P with the power to select a different
J , that is to change the value of σ. We have thereby to consider the possibility that
the lobby group bribes P also at this stage of the game to further their political
ends. The timing is as follows:
(i) the nature selects l and σ independently;
(ii) the lobby group 1 formulates the bribe schedule T I(σ);
(iii) P chooses either to keep σ or to change it into σˆ;
(iv) the lobby group 1 formulates the bribe schedule C(f);
(v) J selects fˆ ; the lobby group pays T I(σˆ) and C(fˆ);
(vi) if not traced, T I(σˆ) is received by P ;
(vii) the lobby group 1 formulates the bribe schedule T II(q);
(viii) P sets the policy qˆ; the lobby group pays T II(qˆ);
(ix) if not traced, T II(qˆ) is received by P .
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Figure 3.3 Conditional Full Deterrence region.
Note that in VP it results T ≡ T I + T II . In the last stage of the game the first
claim of Lemma 1 still applies and lobbying never occurs provided that lθ1 ≥ 1. As
to the solution of the game when l < 1/θ1, we prove the following:
Proposition 3. Let lθ1 < 1. In the SPE of the game:
i) P chooses the pair
{
σˆ →∞, qL(fˆ = 1)
}
;
ii) J selects fˆ = 1;
iii) lobbying contributions are
{
Ĉ(f) = 0, T̂ I(σ) = 0, T̂ II(q)
}
, where:
T̂ II(q) =
l
1− lθ1
{∑
k
θk
[
Uk(qˆ
∗
k)− Uk(qˆLk (fˆ = 1))
]}
Proof. - See Appendix E.3.
Intuitively, the lobby group prefers f = 1 to any other f ∈ [0, 1), since for any
f ≤ lθ1, V1 = U(qˆ∗) obtains, while for f > lθ1 it holds ∂V1∂f > 0. For this scenario to
emerge, it needs a sufficiently low level of integrity of the judiciary and thus there
exists an incentive for the lobby group to influence P at the first stage. Since the
22Note that the model remains a game with complete and perfect information in that J and P
observe the outcome of the nature’s draw.
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payoff functions of both the lobby and P are decreasing in C - i.e. the bribe offered
to J -, it proves jointly optimal for them to make it null. This turns out to be
possible in the case of a corruptible judiciary only if its level of integrity is exactly
zero. Hence, in the presence of an incorruptible judiciary, the lobby group and P
share a common interest in changing J by letting σ →∞; this result readily follows
from observing that ∂VP
∂f
is positive if T > 0 in correspondence of the optimal choice
for q.
The equilibrium outcome under judicial dependence is therefore equivalent to
that resulting from a society where no such institutional entity exists; in both the
cases, in fact, the original finding of Grossman and Helpman (2001) is obtained,
according to which the choice of qˆL is optimally biased in favor of the lobby group.
We emphasize that the possibility of achieving the First Best equilibrium is not
affected by the structure of the judicial authority. Yet, the presence of the judiciary
is redundant only when P is sufficiently welfare-interested and bribery proves unfea-
sible, since any degree (and form) of institutional dependence will involve the same
equilibrium outcome. Importantly, we may observe that, according to Corollary 2,
the same conclusion results if P is allowed to determine the level of efficiency of the
judiciary, rather than its integrity. In particular, it is easy to show that a (possibly
zero) level of efficiency exists for every level of integrity of J , such that whenever P
implements it, J optimally selects f = 1 and never claims a form of compensation
from the lobby group. Both the forms of dependence - organizational as much as
hierarchical - appear thereby to be detrimental in the political equilibrium.
It is worth pointing out that the model is consistent with the possibility that
the policy-maker could prefer a good judiciary that fights corruption to a corrupt-
ible one. In fact, a trade-off exists within the politician’s pay-off function, since
the presence of corruption creates benefits (bribes) and costs (in terms of political
welfare). In the political equilibrium, the two forces balance so that the politician
chooses a dependent judiciary only to determine its corruptibility, as its payoff is
never inferior when corruption is present. This is a version of the standard result
of the literature on endogenous policy, namely that policy-makers do not lose from
being captured by special interests. We recognize however that this conclusion de-
pends on the structure of our model and might not extend to other frameworks.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we pursued two different yet related goals: to explore the impact
on corruption of the judicial oversight of the political process and, taking advan-
tage of the former, to investigate the relationship between the corruption of public
decision-makers (politicians and judges) and the independence of judiciaries. Empir-
ical studies on the topic suggest that the institutional design of judicial authorities is
likely to serve as an important determinant of political corruption. Our theoretical
framework provides one potential explanation for such evidence. We indeed found
that the judiciary plays a critical and heretofore unrecognized role in the shaping of
incentives for illegal rent-seeking in policy-making, as it determines the size and the
incidence of bribe payments to politicians.
In particular, we showed that, while political corruption can emerge even under
fully honest and incorruptible judges, the process of judicial oversight may prevent
bribery in the political equilibrium, whenever the judiciary acts in a sufficiently ef-
ficient (although corrupt) environment. Efficient judicial systems may in fact coun-
tervail lobby groups’ influence over prone-to-pressure courts. Hence, provided that
a fraction of judges are held not easy to capture, improving the efficiency of judicial
systems may serve as a controllable instrument for self-enforced accountability. Only
for high levels of corruptibility, a judiciary that is vulnerable to bribery represents
an insurmountable impediment to the functioning of the institutional mechanism
designed to curb corruption, however well-targeted and efficient, and no deterrence
equilibrium is feasible.
We also argued on the role of judicial independence in corrupt societies. Our
analysis shows that deterrence equilibria are unfeasible under perfect (hierarchical
as well as organizational) dependence on the judiciary of the political power. From
a normative perspective, our results suggest that insulating judicial branches from
political interference should configure an important issue of institutional design.
Our model delivers several predictions regarding the incidence of corruption in
different legal and political systems. First, the location of judges and prosecutors -
whether inside the executive branch, autonomous judiciaries or other agencies that
are isolated from the regime in power - is a crucial determinant of the degree of
judicial oversight of the political process, and thus influences dramatically the oc-
currence of bribery in the system. Second, states whose institutional arrangements
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grant the judicial branch strong (functional and hierarchical) independence from po-
litical interference should be characterized by weaker correlations between political
corruption and judicial corruption, while under judicial dependence the two phenom-
ena should prove highly correlated. However, identifying the causality nexus is not
a trivial task: while the presence of strong bribe-providers can generate incentives
to make judicial dependence from political power an important aspect of institu-
tion design (as predicted by the model), judicial dependence can also prevent the
prosecution of political corruption, which thus becomes more attractive and hence
more likely (Aaken et al., 2010). Moreover, there seems to be no direct measure for
judicial corruption to be exploited in order to derive empirical evidence supporting
the model’s predictions. We leave this aspect of the analysis to future work.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1 Denote G(f) := fT (f). First note that from Ĝ(f) =
0 when f < lθ1, it follows that J optimizes over f ∈ [lθ1, 1]. The Proposition is
proven in three steps:
1. Consider αI such that, for f → lθ+1 , VJ(lθ1) > VJ(f), that is S(f) + Ĝ(f) >
S(lθ1). Note that the one-sided limits limf→lθ1Ĝ(f) from above and below
are finite and equal to zero. The threshold value αI is accordingly identified
through the following second-order Taylor expansion of Ĝ(f) around lθ1:
(1− f)
α
+
[
Ĝ(lθi) + (fi − lθi)∂Ĝ
∂f
+
(f − lθ1)2
2
∂2Ĝ
∂f 2
+RĜ
]
>
(1− lθ1)
α
which is equivalent to:
(f − lθ1)∂Ĝ
∂f
(lθ1) +
(f − lθ1)2
2
∂2Ĝ
∂f 2
(lθ1) +RĜ >
(f − lθ1)
α
which in turn holds for:
α >
1
∂Ĝ
∂f
(lθ1) +
(f−lθ1)2
2
∂2Ĝ
∂f2
(lθ1) + (f − lθ1)−1RĜ
= αI
2. Let fˆ = argmax {VJ} when α = αI ; if fˆ > lθ1, consider αII such that S(lθ1) <
S(fˆ) + Ĝ(fˆ). The previous expression translates into:
(1− lθ1)
α
<
(1− fˆ)
α
+
fˆ
fˆ − lθ1
{
l
2∑
k=1
θk[Uk(q
∗)− Uk(qL)]
}
which holds for:
α >
(fˆ − lθ1)2{
fˆ l
∑2
k=1 θk[Uk(q
∗)− Uk(qL)]
} = αII
3. Follow this procedure until at αN , fˆ = lθ1 obtains. A finite αN will exist as
Ĝ is bounded from below (i.e., Ĝ ≥ C on (lθ1, 1], for some constant C > 0).
We will then have α = αN .
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The first step ensures VJ has a local maximum at f = lθ1. The second and third
steps ensure this is also the global maximizer in [lθ1, 1].
B.3 Proof of Proposition 2 Let α → ∞ and consider the upper bound of the
contribution paid by group 1 against fˆL in this case. We can obtain it by making
equation (13) hold with equality (with T̂ (fˆ ∗) = 0 from Proposition 1):
C(fˆL) = U(qˆ(fˆL)))− U(qˆ(fˆ ∗))− T̂ (fˆL) = ∆U(qˆ(fˆL))− T̂ (fˆL)
We can now substitute it in the objective function of J to obtain:
V J = − f
1 + σ
T̂ (f) +
σ
1 + σ
[∆U(qˆ(f))− T̂ (f)]
where V J represents the maximum utility stream that J could obtain by choosing
f . Now we show that there exists a non-zero σ such that for σ < σ the lobby can
never grant J a payoff equal to V J(lθ1). Given Lemma 1, we let f ∈ [lθ1, 1] and
consider the following:
1. Consider σI such that, for f → lθ+1 , V J(lθ1) > V J(f), that is −(f + σ)T̂ (f) +
σ∆U(qˆ(f)) < 0. We can rewrite this condition by adopting second-order
Taylor expansions of Ĝ(f) := fT̂ (f), T̂ (f) and U(qˆ(f)) around lθ1:
−
[
(f − lθ1)
(
∂Ĝ
∂f
+ σ
∂T̂
∂f
)
+
(f − lθ1)2
2
(
∂2Ĝ
∂f 2
+ σ
∂2T̂
∂f 2
)
+RĜ + σRT̂
]
+σ
[
(f − lθ1)∂U(qˆ)
∂f
+
(f − lθ1)2
2
∂2U(qˆ)
∂f 2
+RU
]
< 0
which holds for:
σ <
(f − lθ1)∂Ĝ∂f + (f−lθ1)
2
2
∂2Ĝ
∂f2
+RĜ
(f − lθ1)
(
∂U(qˆ)
∂f
− ∂T̂
∂f
)
+ (f−lθ1)
2
2
(
∂2U(qˆ)
∂f2
− ∂T̂
∂f
)
+
(
RU −RT̂
) = σI
where all partial derivatives are evaluated at lθ1.
2. Let fˆ = argmax {VJ} when σ = σI ; if fˆ > lθ1, consider σII such that −(f +
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σ)T̂ (fˆ) + σ∆U(qˆ(fˆ)) < 0 which holds for:
σ <
Ĝ(fˆ)
∆U(qˆ(fˆ))− T̂ (fˆ) = σII
3. Follow this procedure until at σN , fˆ = lθ1 obtains. A finite (non-zero) σN
will exist since, for σ = 0, J chooses fˆL = lθ1 given T (lθ1) = 0 and T (f) > 0
∀f > lθ1, whereas for σ → ∞, J chooses fˆL > lθ1 as ∆U(qˆ(f)) − T̂ (f) > 0
and T̂ (f) is bounded from below. We will then have σ = σN .
The first step ensures V J has a local maximum at f = lθ1. The second and third
steps ensure this is also the global maximizer in [lθ1, 1].
C.3 Proof of Corollary 1 The proof readily follows from Propositions 1 and
2. Indeed, when α > 0 is finite, it is easier for the lobby to respect the incen-
tive compatibility constraint of J ; in particular we can now rewrite the condition
V J(f)− V J(lθ1) = 0 for f > lθ1 as:
fT (f)− σ[∆U(qˆ(f))− T̂ (f)] + ∆S(f) = 0
where ∆S(f) is negative and decreasing in α; so we can obtain the mapping from
α to σ of the values that satisfies this expression.
D.3 Proof of Corollary 2 The proof for σ = 0 is similar to that of Proposi-
tion 1. However, in this case we need to show that f = 1 maximizes VJ over
[0, 1]. To reduce notation, let ∂G
∂f
:= Gf . Define αI = 1/Gf (f = 1). If α < αI ,
G(1) is a local maximum for VJ . Now, consider fˆ ≡ argmax {VJ} ∈ [0, 1]; if
fˆ < 1 define αII =
1−fˆ
fˆT (fˆ)−T (1) < αI . Iterating, we can find αN = α(0) such that
f = 1 ≡ argmax {VJ} ∈ [0, 1]. Lastly, if for α = α(0) f = 1 ≡ argmax {VJ}, this is
true ∀α < α(0) since VJ is decreasing in α ∈ [0, 1).
Now let us consider a generic σ > 0. We can find α(σ) with the same procedure
as before. Indeed, denoting with V CJ =
1
1+σ
V NCJ +
σ
1+σ
C and V NCJ the payoffs of a
corruptible and an incorruptible J respectively, the whole sequence of conditions is
easily respected since C ′(f) is positive (and the bribe that the lobby group is willing
to offer to J is maximum for f = 1). Starting from αI =
1+σ
(G′(f=1)−σC′(f=1)) , we can
obtain another sequence that converges to α(σ). Since every term of the sequence
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is increasing in σ, it follows that α(σ) is increasing in σ.
E.3 Proof of Proposition 3 We solve again the game by backward induction:
1. In the third stage, given fˆ - that is, the level of control chosen in the second
stage -, we obtain q(fˆ) and T II(q(fˆ)) as before;
2. In the second stage, given σˆ, fˆ and C(fˆ) are determined;
3. As to the first stage, we begin determining the optimal solution for the lobby.
We previously showed that ∀f ≤ lθ1 V1 = U(q∗) while, if f > lθ1, from ∂q∂f > 0
and ∂V1
∂q
> 0, it follows that ∂V1
∂f
> 0 so that the lobby strictly prefers f = 1
to any f ∈ [0, 1). Also, we can note that both V1 and VP are decreasing
in C at the optimum. In particular, V LP = l
∑
i θiUi(q
∗) − lθ2C(fˆ) and V L1 =
U(qˆ)−T (qˆ)−C(fˆ). From this it follows directly that in the NE of the subgame
it is jointly optimal for P and the lobby to set f = 1 and C = 0. In particular,
P chooses σ → ∞ since this is equivalent to choosing f = 1 with certainty
and determining Ĉ = 0. To show this, we consider the optimal solution for
the problem of J . From section 4, fˆ maximizes −(S + fT ) + σC subject to
the constraint ∂U
∂f
− ∂T
∂f
− ∂C
∂f
= 0. Then fˆ satisfies:
−∂S
∂f
− fˆ ∂T
∂f
− T (fˆ) + σ
[
∂U
∂f
− ∂T
∂f
]
= 0
or:
− 1
σ
[
∂S
∂f
− fˆ ∂T
∂f
− T (fˆ)
]
+
∂U
∂f
− ∂T
∂f
= 0
so that for σ → ∞ the solution to this problem coincides with the optimal
choice for the lobby, which was showed to be equal to f = 1. Lastly, from (12),
we can observe that C → 0 as σ →∞, since the term in brackets is bounded
from above.
Accordingly, the whole game reduces to a single stage game where P chooses
the pair (∞,qL(fˆ = 1)) and the lobby pays T I + T II , so that in equilibrium it
must be:
T̂ I + T̂ II =
1
1− lθ1
{
l
∑
k
θk[Uk(q
∗)− Uk(qL(fˆ = 1))]
}
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However, the only time-consistent pair of T I and T II is given by T I = 0 and
T II = l
1−lθ1
{∑
k θk[Uk(q
∗) − Uk(qL(fˆ = 1))]
}
, since the lobby pays T I prior
to the decision over the policy qL.
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Chapter 4
Lobbying (Strategically Appointed) Bureaucrats
4.1 Introduction
The practice of delegated legislation, according to which bodies other than leg-
islatures are vested with relevant law- and rule-making functions, has a long history
in most modern democracies. Delegating policy authority to various bureaucracies
involves fundamental issues about policy-making in administrative states. While
granting sufficiently high discretion in choice would potentially involve an optimal
use of the professionalism and policy expertise of the bureaucracy, it could also
encourage independent policy drift and thus require instruments of control (e.g.,
Gailmard, 2009). The fact that the executive often retains the appointment power
can in principle circumvent the agency problem inherent in delegation, yet the con-
flict between policy goals of higher-level institutions may well exacerbate it (e.g.,
Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999).
The tension between the value of delegation and the role of interest group influ-
ence is also crucial. On the one side, the form of government provides fairly different
incentives to influence-seeking activities. On the other, the possibility of lobby-
driven bureaucratic drift and the negotiation power of agencies should be taken into
account by institutional actors involved in the political process (e.g. Sloof, 2000).
The present study aims to shed some light on the nature of these basic inter-
actions. As a starting point, we exploit Bennedsen and Feldmann (2006)’s model
of delegation in which a legislator delegates political authority to a bureaucracy, in
order to rely on its policy expertise. An organized group is able to influence the
process by initiating bargaining in policy implementation. Rather than viewing the
agency subject of influence, i.e. the bureaucrat, as an exogenous entity, we allow it
to be strategically appointed by the government administration (i.e. the president
or government under separation of powers, or the parliament in a parliamentary
system), in light of both the rule of delegation and the policy negotiation process
with the organized constituency.
Our main result concerns the critical role of strategic appointments in determin-
ing ultimate policy outcomes. It is shown that the impact of bureaucratic lobbying
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on the allocation of political authority does not depend on the preferences and the
strength of the interest group in either form of government. In fact, it only involves
a strategic response from the authority executing the power of appointment. Hence,
the scope of delegation crucially relies on the extent of ideological conflict between
the higher-level institutions. As a consequence, the concern for potential policy drift
is analogous to that arising in the standard model of legislative delegation without
lobbying (e.g. Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999), where it only depends on the rel-
ative magnitude of the policy bias with respect to the informational advantage of
delegation.
We also provide a comparative investigation of the interest group influence on
expected policy outcomes and welfare. We show that lobbying bureaucrats charged
with implementing policy plays no role in the political process under both govern-
ment structures. While bureaucracies are the sole responsible for policy choices un-
der delegated legislation, the actual policy outcomes are (almost) entirely ascribable
to the preferences of the higher-level institutions. This finding has important con-
sequences for the theory of agenda setting and political control. First, our analysis
contributes to the well-known debate over actual devices available to a legislature to
control bureaucratic policy-making, for it suggests that strategic appointments may
work as a substitute for legislative oversight and action restrictions (e.g., Gailmard,
2009). Second, from the perspective of optimal statutory design, the model predicts
that divided governments should be characterized by more stringent boundaries to
which agency decisions ought to conform, independently of the active participation
of interest groups in agency decision-making.
To complement our analysis, we present two intuitive modifications of the basic
model. The first one reflects the observation that the legal intervention is generally
less frequent than appointments of bureaucratic agencies, whereas political systems
are typically surrounded by a certain degree of electoral uncertainty. Thus, legis-
latures may well be unaware of the true preferences of agencies when selecting the
amount of policy authority to be delegated. We show that core qualitative findings
regarding the impact of bureaucratic lobbying on policy outcomes and their vari-
ability remain unaltered. In the second modification, we account for the possibility
that the lobby may directly exert pressure to influence the agency selection process,
rather than policy implementation1. If the government administration is prone to
1However, we do not consider situations where the interest group may find it profitable to
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pressure from special interests, lobbying does have an impact on both the scope
of delegation and the expected policy outcome. Compared to the basic model’s
predictions, this finding suggests that, in the presence of strategic appointments of
bureaucracies, mechanisms that hold higher-level institutions accountable for their
political role should configure a relevant issue of institutional design.
The remaining chapter is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews
the related literature. Section 3 lays out the basic framework of our analysis, while
in section 4 we derive the political equilibria under optimal delegation and strategic
agency appointments, and discuss the model’s implications regarding the incidence
of lobbying across different political systems. Section 5 presents the mentioned mod-
ifications of the basic model, while the last section offers concluding remarks. For
the sake of exposition, all the proofs and major technical details are relegated to
Appendix.
4.2 Related literature
Conceptually, this study is related to several strands of literature. One deals
with the optimal allocation of policy authority between elected representatives and
non-elected bureaucratic agencies. The focus of a sizable principal-agent literature
has been the tradeoff between informational advantages and loss of political con-
trol (e.g. Tirole, 1994), and the existence of monitoring abilities and punishment
devices for the optimal design of delegation schemes (e.g. Epstein and O’Halloran,
1994, 1999; Huber and Shipan, 2002), while no scope for lobbying is considered.
Complementary studies on this issue have investigated instead the monitoring role
for interest groups over bureaucrats via an information provision mechanism which
activates when legislative policies are intended to serve special interest groups and
agencies depart from their legislative mandate (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984;
Banks and Weingast, 1992; Epstein and O’Halloran, 1995).
While numerous recent contributions have paid attention to the subject of policy
formation under lobbying in the presence of multilevel (hierarchical) and/or multi-
member political structures (e.g. Hoyt and Toma, 1989; Bennedsen and Feldmann,
engage in multi-tier lobbying and thus attempt to influence decision-making at both layers (e.g.,
Mazza and van Winden, 2008).
90
2002; Epstein and Nitzan, 2002, 2006; Mazza and van Winden, 2008) or the optimal-
ity of bureaucratic arrangements - i.e. what should be delegated and what should
not - from a social welfare standpoint (Alesina and Tabellini, 2007), relatively few
studies have been devoted to the relationship between interest groups influence over
decision-making and the potential for delegated legislation. Spiller (1990) develops
a multiple principals agency theory to investigate the extent to which legislators
could be willing to allocate policy authority to regulators when the latter might
be targeted by organized interest groups. Austen-Smith (1993) studies legislative
lobbying at the agenda setting stage (Committee) and the voting stage (House),
concluding that only agenda stage lobbying is likely to be influential. Diermeier and
Myerson (1999) focus on the role of varying constitutional arrangements on the in-
ternal organization of legislatures. Their main result concerns the incentives toward
the deterrence of collusive behavior that an institutional environment based on the
existence of separate (and independent) legislative chambers induces. Sorge (2010)
studies the interaction between multi-level lobbying in a divided government and the
allocation of political power when multiple policy instruments are available. Sim-
ilarly, Grajzl (2011) investigates the interplay of political lobbying and delegation
exploiting a property rights approach, according to which delegation also involves
a rent-dissipation effect from allowing (exclusive) bargaining between the interest
group and the bureaucracy.
The present work is distinct from the cited literature in that it accounts for the
possibility of strategic agency selection, in the same spirit of Calvert et al. (1989),
Bertelli and Feldmann (2007) and Krehbiel (2007). Notably, Bertelli and Feldmann
(2007) consider a presidential appointment game in which the Senate is required to
wield an indirect control over agency decisions by exercising her power of confirma-
tion of presidential nominees and subsequent amendment of implemented policy via
direct legislation. We rather incorporate the role of legislatures by acknowledging
their power of allocating political authority to various bureaucratic agencies, which
in fact are held responsible for a great deal of policy tasks in modern democracies. In
doing so, we explicitly address the issue of integrating the theoretical work on inter-
est group lobbying and the rational choice theory of agency selection and delegated
legislation from a game-theoretic perspective.
Our analysis is clearly inspired by the seminal work of Bennedsen and Feldmann
(2006), who study the effects of bureaucratic lobbying in an otherwise standard im-
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perfect information delegation model. More precisely, their analysis focuses on the
influence of interest group lobbying on the bureaucratic policy making and its con-
sequences for optimal statutory design under different political structures. However,
their framework does not account for the possibility that the bureaucratic agency be
selected strategically, so as to circumvent the effects of bargaining over policy imple-
mentation. As a consequence, it does not allow to address the relevant question of
whether, and under which conditions, lobbying strategically appointed bureaucrats
impacts on the process of legislative delegation and the resulting policy outcome.
This work aims at making a step further toward understanding these issues.
4.3 The model
Players and preferences. The model builds upon Bennedsen and Feldmann
(2006). Four different players are involved in the political game: an administration
(A), a legislator (L), a bureaucrat (B), and an organized interest group (I). The
policy space X ⊂ < is one-dimensional, and the policy outcome x = p + ω is
assumed to be a linear function of the effectively chosen policy, p, and of a noise
variable, ω, uniformly distributed over [−r, r]. We regard r as a measure of the ex
ante uncertainty in the political environment, and interpret ω accordingly as specific
(unforeseen) contingencies to which new policies are expected to apply.
Factual implementation of policy results from the negotiation between the bu-
reaucratic agency and the special interest group. Under Nash bargaining - or any
jointly efficient negotiation rule - the policy outcome always constitutes some com-
promise between B’s and I’s ideal policies. Without loss of generality, we restrict
attention to the extreme case of take-it-or-leave-it offers from the interest group. As
the transfer offered by the lobby enters objectives linearly, this assumption on the
allocation of bargaining power does not impose any restrictions on the equilibrium
outcome of the model.
All the players have single-peaked preferences over the policy outcome x of the
form:
Uj(x(p)) = −(x− xj)2, j ∈ {A,L} (4.1)
and:
UB(x(p), t) = −(x− xB)2 + αBt(p), αB > 0 (4.2)
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UI(x(p), t) = −(x− xI)2 − αIt(p), αI > 0 (4.3)
where t(p) is interpreted as a measure of transferable utility, that the interest group
is able to assign to the bureaucracy B. It can be thought of as explicit incentive
contract or rather as a promise of future earnings in the private sector (e.g. Gross-
man and Helpman, 1994, 2001). The parameters (αI , αB) are taken to represent the
relative values of the transfer from the point of view of the group and the bureau-
cratic agency, respectively.
Information assumptions. While the actors’ ideal points and the objectives (1)-
(3) are common knowledge, we maintain the informational rationale of delegation
by assuming that the bureaucrat and the interest group only have the expertise to
learn the actual realization of the policy shock ω.
Political structure. A distinguishing feature across political systems and forms
of government is their connection to political conflict and the extent of executive
and legislative power. In the parliamentary system, the constituency of the ad-
ministration and the legislature are the same, and the fusion of powers is intended
to promote the coordination of governmental functions and the implementation of
public policies. The principles that inspire the relationships between the branches
of government, as derived from the doctrine of the separation of powers, rather
view the latter as distinct and independent of one other. We adopt Bennedsen and
Feldmann (2006)’s convention to refer to unified government as the parliamentary
system and to divided government as the system of separation of powers. Hence,
while alignment between administrative and legislative preferences emerges in the
former (i.e. xA = xL), the latter is characterized by a given degree of ideological
conflict (i.e. xA 6= xL). Without loss of generality, we focus on the case xL ≤ xA.
Timing of events. The appointment-delegation-lobbying game unfolds as follows:
Date 0. The administration strategically appoints the bureaucratic agency;
Date 1. The legislator designs a fixed window2 D, which reflects the scope of
delegation, by specifying a reference policy q and a distance d ≥ 0, such that
D := [q − d, q + d];
Date 2. The bureaucrat and the interest group learn the realization of the policy
shock ω. Then the interest group formulates an incentive schedule t(p) to be offered
2Thus, we only consider the case of a fixed discretion window, as in Bennedsen and Feldmann
(2006). The model could be fruitfully generalized to encompassing the possibility of bureaucratic
subversion (e.g. Gailmard, 2002).
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to the bureaucrat;
Date 3. The bureaucrat selects the policy p ∈ D, and payoffs are realized.
4.4 Optimal delegation and strategic agency appointment
In this section, we derive the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the model
by backward induction. The main results are introduced and discussed separately
for the two political systems at issue (in subsections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 respectively),
while conclusions on the degree of policy bias and political influence induced by
bureaucratic lobbying will be jointly presented in the last subsection. To ease the
comparison of results, we use the superscript P (resp. S) for the parliamentary
system (resp. the separation-of-powers system) to label relevant variables and other
quantities.
4.4.1 Parliamentary system
The following Proposition characterizes the solution of the appointment-delegation
game under bureaucratic lobbying in the parliamentary system (i.e. when xA = xL).
Proposition 1. Let β = αB
αB+αI
and xˆ = βxI + (1 − β)xPB. In the parliamentary
system:
(i) A appoints a bureaucracy whose ideal policy is xPB = (1− β)−1[xA − βxI ];
(ii) L chooses the reference policy and the degree of discretion:
qP = xL, d
P = r ⇒ DP = [xL − r, xL + r]
(iii) Given (qP , dP ), the appointed B is induced by the lobby to implement policy:
pP = xˆ− ω, ∀ω ∈ [−r, r]
under the transfer t∗(xˆ) = αB(xI − xA)2.
Proof. - See Appendix A.4.
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Intuitively, the bureaucracy implements the policy yielding the outcome xˆ if
|pP − qP | ≤ dP (delegation window), where xˆ has the form of a compromise between
B’s and I’s ideal points in the policy space. The legislature allows for maximum dis-
cretion since no bureaucratic drift arises from delegation, given the optimal appoint-
ment mechanism at work. Indeed, when appointing the agency, the administration
takes into account the induced policy choice pP that results from the incentive sched-
ule, and thus strategically pins down bureaucratic preferences xPB so as to countervail
the lobby-driven implementation bias with respect to the no lobbying scenario.
In equilibrium, the legislature fully relies on the bureaucrat’s expertise to resolve
uncertainty, irrespective of the location of the interest group’s ideal point: while
the administration is unconstrained in its choice of the agency, the latter enjoys
full discretion dP = r in offsetting any ex post shock ω3. In this sense, strategic
agency selection works as a perfect substitute for legislative oversight: absent this
mechanism, the induced policy outcome would indeed be xˆ
′
= βxI+(1−β)x′B, where
x
′
B denotes the ideal policy of the agent. Hence, only at the knife-edge condition
xI = x
′
B - which removes any gain for the interest group from engaging in lobbying
- would the legislature grants the bureaucracy full discretion4.
It is important to emphasize that no lobbying at the implementation stage is not
a credible threat, as the interest group will always have an incentive to influence bu-
reaucratic decision-making even though, once B is strategically chosen, no deviation
of the actual outcome from A’s ideal policy xA can be induced via lobbying
5. Hence,
the equilibrium transfer t∗(pP ) is a strictly positive quantity whenever xI 6= xA.
However, the direction of influence from the interest group is non-influential with
respect to the amount of delegated authority, as the mechanism of strategic agency
selection prevents the former from moving the bureaucrat’s induced policy xˆ away
from the legislator’s ideal one.
The following Corollary summarizes other straightforward results:
Corollary 1. In the parliamentary system:
3That is, for any ω ∈ [−r, r], DP is symmetrically constructed around L’s ideal policy xL with
distance |xL − r|.
4Given that the legislature’s (expected) welfare is monotonically decreasing in the equilibrium
level of xˆ, it also follows that, without strategic appointments, the legislature experiences a decrease
in its utility whenever |xˆ′ − xL| 6= 0
5The lobby’s individual rationality constraint is always satisfied for generic (αI , αB) (see the
Appendix).
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(a) The higher the ex ante uncertainty r, the higher the bureaucratic discretion
(information rationale);
(b) The expected policy outcome with delegation is E(x) = xL (no implementation
bias);
(c) (i)
∂xPB
∂r
= 0; (ii)
∂xPB
∂xA
=
∂xPB
∂xL
> 0; (iii)
∂xPB
∂xI
< 0; (iv)
∂xPB
∂β
> (<)0 if xA > (<)xI .
Proof. - See Appendix B.4.
Notably, part (b) of Corollary 1 underlines that, given the alignment of the
administration’s preferences with those of the legislature, bureaucratic lobbying does
not involve costs for the allocation of policy authority to the bureaucratic agency
and no (expected) policy bias - either induced by the lobbying activity or due to
independent bureaucratic drift - arises. Hence, legislative delegation allows to rule
out any suboptimal outcomes, i.e. those whose distance is such that |x− xL| > 0.
The described equilibrium conditions provide a set of functional relationships
upon which we can conduct comparative statics analysis. Not surprisingly, given
the absence of ideological conflict between the executive and the legislature, the de-
termination of the 2r-wide delegation window has no impact on the agency selection,
and only the locations of the interest group and administrative’s ideal points xI and
xA, and I’s bargaining advantage β
6 determine the optimal choice of the appointee,
which moves in the direction that keeps the induced policy outcome xˆ(xPB) = xA
unaltered.
4.4.2 Separation-of-powers system
A standard result from the theory of delegation without lobbying is that, in
a system of separation of powers, the optimal amount of delegated authority is
inversely related to the extent of political conflict between the legislature and the
executive (Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999).
In the presence of bureaucratic lobbying, Bennedsen and Feldmann (2006) have
shown that the impact of interest group influence on the conflict between the leg-
islature’s ideal policy and the bureaucratic policy choice, and thus on the scope
6We can regard β as bargaining strength in take-it-or-leave-it bargaining in that, coeteris
paribus, the higher (lower) the relative value αB (αI) that the bureaucrat (the interest group)
assigns to the transferred resource t(p), the higher β and thus the closer xˆ to the lobby’s ideal
point xI .
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of delegation, is a well-defined function of the location of the lobby. Specifically,
Bennedsen and Feldmann (2006) characterize the range of the ideal point xI for
which bureaucratic lobbying brings about an expansion of delegated authority and,
coeteris paribus, the range for which the legislature delegates more under a system
of separation of powers than under a parliamentary structure.
The possibility of strategically selecting the bureaucracy dramatically changes
the picture. We show that lobbying at the policy implementation level has no impact
on the allocation of decision power to the bureaucracy, which proves only dependent
on the wedge between the preferences of the higher-level political institutions and
the level of ex ante uncertainty r. This is reflected in the fact that the lobbying-
induced policy outcome xˆ is a function of neither the lobby’s ideal point nor of its
bargaining strength, i.e. βxI +(1−β)xSB = xˆ(xA, xL, r). The delegation window DS
proves to be a proper (non-degenerate) symmetric interval around xL, with the policy
discretion dS being a non-linear function of r and the ideological conflict |xA − xL|.
Accordingly, the bureaucracy is not granted maximum discretion in equilibrium.
Importantly, legislative delegation does influence the mechanism of bureaucratic
appointment since it shapes the administration’s discretion in the agency selection
process. The latter proves in fact driven by the policies that appointees can attain
once in office. When inducing xˆ, the administration A needs then to take into ac-
count the possibility that the former lies outside the discretion window DS following
legislative delegation. Under this feasibility constraint, the optimal administrative
strategy lies in choosing the bureaucrat who implements the constrained policy pS
yielding the outcome xˆ. This has the main effect of preventing a degenerate del-
egation window and actually increasing the discretion granted to the bureaucracy
(since xL < xˆ < xA).
We now characterize the SPE of the game under separation of powers. First, it
is shown how it is generally possible - for any choice of xSB and conditional on the
realization of ω - that the delegation constraint be binding and corner policies be
effectively implemented. Second, a non-zero level of bureaucratic discretion occurs
if and only if the (induced) policy bias between the legislature and the bureaucracy
does not overtake the size of ex ante policy uncertainty, i.e. iff |xˆ−xL| < r. We show
that this is always the case. Lastly, the optimal administrative appointee, whose
preferences are endogenous to the degree of delegation, is determined strategically.
Proposition 2. Let xSB be the bureaucracy’s ideal point as optimally chosen by the
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administrator, and xˆ = βxI + (1 − β)xSB the induced policy outcome. Also, let
c := xA − xL denote the preference divergence between the administration and the
legislature. Then in the separation-of-powers system:
(i) xˆ > xL if and only if xA > xL. Furthermore, it holds xL < xˆ < xA;
(ii) A appoints a bureaucracy whose ideal policy is7.:
xSB = (1− β)−1
[
xA +
r
2
−
√
c2 +
r2
4
− βxI
]
(iii) L chooses the reference policy and the degree of discretion:
qS = xL, d
S = r − (xˆ− xL) ⇒ DS = [xˆ− r, 2xL + r − xˆ]
(iv) Given (qS, dS), B is induced by the lobby to implement policy:
pS =

xˆ− ω if ω ∈ [−r + 2(xˆ− xL), r − 2(xˆ− xL)] ⊂ [−r, r]
2xL + r − xˆ if ω < −r + 2(xˆ− xL)
xˆ− r if ω > r − 2(xˆ− xL)
under the transfer t∗(xˆ) = α−1B [(xˆ− xB)2 − (x¯− xB)2], where:
x¯ =

xSB if ω ∈ [−r + 2(xˆ− xL), r − 2(xˆ− xL)] ⊂ [−r, r]
xL + r − |xSB − xL|+ ω if ω < −r + 2|xSB − xL|
xL − r + |xSB − xL|+ ω if ω > r − 2|xSB − xL|
Proof. - See Appendix C.4.
The main message from Proposition 2 is that, while the bureaucracy’s preferences
depend (monotonically) on the ideal points of the higher-level political institutions
and the value of r, the delegation window is not sensitive to the group’s lobbying
efforts, insofar as the latter are countervailed by the strategically selected agency.
However, from the point of view of the legislature’s (expected) welfare, the fact that
7If the separation of powers were rather be characterized by the condition xL > xA, then xˆ < xL
and xSB = (1− β)−1
[
xA − r2 +
√
c2 + r24 − βxI
]
.
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the appointing player exercises political control over bureaucratic choices may prove
harmful, if the actual policy outcome is induced more far away from L’s ideal point
relative to the policy which would prevail absent any strategic selection device8.
It is relatively straightforward to examine the degree of political influence induced
by bureaucratic lobbying across different institutional environments. The following
collection of findings will furnish, among other things, a convenient criterion in this
regard:
Corollary 2. In the system of separation of powers:
(a) ∂d
S
∂r
> 0 (information rationale);
(b) The expected policy outcome with delegation is E(x) = xL +
d
r
(xˆ− xL) (imple-
mentation bias);
(c) dP > dS;
(d) (i)
∂xSB
∂r
> 0; (ii)
∂xSB
∂xA
> 0; (iii)
∂xSB
∂xL
> 0; (iv)
∂xSB
∂xI
< 0; (v)
∂xSB
∂β
> (<)0 if
xˆ > (<)xI .
Proof. - See Appendix D.4.
As its analog in Corollary 1, part (a) of the Corollary 2 confirms the role of the
informational rationale of legislative delegation, while part (b) demonstrates that
allocating decisional power to the bureaucracy necessarily induces bias from the
legislature’s perspective, independently of the extent of the ex ante uncertainty in
the political environment. Nonetheless, benefits from delegation exist, as it prevents
outcomes such that |x− xL| > |xˆ− xL|9.
Contrary to Bennedsen and Feldmann (2006), we thus find that in a system of
separation of powers with strategic agency selection, interest group influence neither
amplifies nor mitigates the conflict between the legislature’s preferences and the pol-
icy effectively implemented by the appointed bureaucracy. This finding lies on the
ability of the administration to control strategically the agency selection process:
8See footnote 3 above and the preceding discussion. Note also that, upon comparing expressions
(4) and (7), Proposition 1 reads as a special case of Proposition 2 when xA = xL.
9Given our assumption of uniform distribution for ω, this also means that, from the legislature’s
standpoint, the distribution of outcomes under optimal delegation (qS , dS) first-order stochasti-
cally dominates the distribution of outcomes under any other degree of delegation d
′ 6= dS (e.g.
Bennedsen and Feldmann, 2006).
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by appointing the bureaucrat, the executive is able to counteract the impact of the
lobby on policy implementation. Hence, the interest group’s preferences and bar-
gaining strength do not matter when it comes to the extent of delegation that occurs,
regardless of whether the government is unified or divided. As a crucial implication,
for given xL and xA, the legislature never delegates more to the bureaucracy under
a separation of powers system than under a parliamentary structure, independently
of the location of the interest group’s ideal policy.
Last, basic comparative statics implications are presented for the equilibrium
agency selection. A higher level of ex ante uncertainty r, by enlarging the delegation
window, allows the administration to appoint an agent further to the right, closer to
A’s ideal point. The same occurs, coeteris paribus, under a shift in the preferences of
the administration, whereas point (iv) underlines the administrative compensation
of a more extreme interest group via the appointment process: if xI < x
S
B, the
equilibrium appointee prefers an outcome closer to that preferred by the lobby.
Remarkably, the sign of the marginal effect of an increase in the interest group’s
bargaining strength β depends on the relative location of the induced policy outcome
xˆ(xSB) with respect to the lobby’s ideal xI , and thus also on the ideological conflict
between A and L and the size of the ex ante uncertainty r.
Most interesting is perhaps the finding that, although the administrative dis-
cretion in agency selection is constrained by legislative delegation, the equilibrium
appointee still depends on the administration’s most preferred policy outcome xA.
This result relies fully on the presence of information asymmetries between the
agents involved in political game: if A were to know in advance the realization ω¯ of
the policy shock, then for any ω¯ /∈ [−r + 2c, r − 2c] the bureaucrat would be cho-
sen whose ideal policy is such that the induced policy outcome xˆ lies at the upper
bound of the discretion window, i.e. r
2
− xL − ω¯, which is independent of xA. In
the incomplete information framework, by contrast, the administration makes the
bureaucrat’s preferences optimally depend on her own ideal policy outcome, at the
potential cost of having the appointee implement - upon learning the value of ω -
the policy at the boundary of the delegation window.
4.4.3 Alternative government structures and the impact of lobbying
Following Bennedsen and Feldmann (2006), we now turn to contrast the effects
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of interest group influence in the parliamentary system with those arising under
separation of powers. In this regard, two types of measures for the incidence of
lobbying are exploited: (1) the expected lobby-induced policy bias under delegation
with respect to the case when no lobbying occurs, and (2) the average impact of
lobbying on the legislature’s expected welfare.
More specifically, we define the lobby’s impact on the (expected) policy outcome
(LIO):
LIOi = E(x|lobbying)− E(x|no lobbying), i ∈ {P, S} (4.4)
and the lobby’s impact on the (expected) legislature’s welfare (LIW):
LIW i = E(UL(x)|dil, xl)− E(UL(x)|dinl, xnl), i ∈ {P, S} (4.5)
where the subscripts (l, nl) reflect the fact that we are comparing our previous
results to the no lobbying scenario. For simplicity, but with no loss of generality, we
normalize xL = 0 and thus consider the case xA ≥ 0.
In the parliamentary system, we have shown that the informational advantage of
delegation fully applies and the legislature is willing to rely on the expertise of the bu-
reaucracy by granting the latter the maximum degree of discretion. Under lobbying,
xˆ = xA is obtained in equilibrium for any ω ∈ [−r, r], and thus E(x|lobbying) = xˆ
with probability one (see Corollary 1). When the agency is not being lobbied, by
contrast, the ally principle xA = xB holds
10 and E(x|no lobbying) = xA. It read-
ily follows that no lobbying-induced (expected) policy bias arises, i.e. LIOP = 0.
Furthermore, given the distribution of outcomes resulting from delegation, the leg-
islature’s expected utility from optimal delegation under lobbying simply reads as
E(−(x)2|dPl , xˆ) = −xˆ2 = 0 both with and without lobbying, and hence LIW P = 0.
In the separation-of-powers system, delegation always occurs (i.e. d > 0) with
induced policy bias xˆ(xSB) > 0. The policy outcomes have a simple two-part distribu-
tion. Indeed, for ω ∈ [−r+2xˆ, r−2xˆ] the agency selects the policy within its domain,
pS, which yields the outcome x = xˆ. By contrast, with probability (1 − dSl /r), the
bureaucrat is constrained by the boundaries of the delegation window and thus -
depending on the actual realization of ω - the policy choice varies uniformly in [−xˆ,
xˆ], which extends symmetrically around xL = 0. It follows that the expected policy
10Note that, in the presence of interest group influence, the principle of appointing political allies
only applies at the knife-edge condition xA = xL = xI , as in Bertelli and Feldmann (2007). This
powerful result generalizes to our incomplete information framework.
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outcome with delegation is simply E(x|lobbying) = dSl
r
xˆ. Since lobbying at the im-
plementation level only entails a strategic reaction from the administration - i.e. for
β ∈ (0, 1), we have xSB,l 6= xSB,nl - but not a different induced policy outcome xˆ or
an alteration in the amount of delegated authority (i.e. dSl = d
S
nl), it is easily shown
that LIOS = 0 and LIW S = 0.
We can conclude that the legislature never loses from negotiated bureaucratic
policy-making across different political systems, and hence proves indifferent be-
tween a biased bureaucracy and an unbiased one, independently of the actual struc-
ture of government. On the other hand, the scope of delegation crucially relies on
the extent of preference divergence between the legislature and the administration.
This result holds true irrespective of how extreme the interest group’s preferences
are or which degree of bargaining power the latter has. If compared with Bennedsen
and Feldmann (2006)’s conclusions on the complex role of bureaucratic lobbying in
policy-making, our findings suggest that strategic agency selection is pivotal for the
result.
The model also delivers clear implications for the optimal design of statutes in
different institutional environments. Notably, political systems or other governance
arrangements in which some degree of misalignment between policy goals of the
higher-level institutions exists, should be characterized by a lower amount of dele-
gated policy authority. This is in line with the general theory of delegated powers
and political control (e.g. Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999).
4.5 Modifications of the basic model
4.5.1 Delegation with unknown bureaucratic preferences
It is well-known that the process of legislation is generally shaped by a wide array
of constitutional, statutory and also informal norms, which may severely constrain
the timing of law-making (e.g. Gersen and Posner, 2007). As a matter of fact,
legal intervention is generally less frequent than appointments of executive agencies
and other bureaucratic personnel. Also, democratic political systems are typically
surrounded by some degree of electoral uncertainty, and legislature may be uncertain
as to which party or coalition will be in government when the delegated policy-
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forming power is actually exercised. This raises the question of whether and how
the costs and benefits of delegated legislation are altered by limited information on
the true preferences of delegates. In other words, if the legislature lacks information
as to who will receive authority under delegation, which degree of discretion (if any)
should the latter be granted?
Here we explicitly address this issue by letting the legislature opt for delegation
before the administrative design of bureaucratic agencies takes place. More precisely,
we consider the following game:
Date 0. The legislator designs the delegation window by specifying the reference
policy q and the distance d ≥ 0;
Date 1. The government administration strategically appoints the bureaucratic
agency;
Date 2. The bureaucrat and the interest group learn the realization of the policy
shock ω. Then the interest group formulates an incentive schedule t(p) to be offered
to the bureaucrat;
Date 3. The bureaucrat selects the policy p, and payoffs are realized.
The solution is easily characterized as follows:
Proposition 3. Let xjB, with j = {P, S}, be the selected agency in the political
system j, and xˆ
′
= βxI + (1− β)xjB. Then:
(a) In the parliamentary system (xA = xL):
qP = xL; d
P = r; xPB = (1− β)−1[xA − βxI ]; pP = xˆ− ω
(b) In the separation-of-powers system (xA − xL = c > 0)11:
qS = xL; d
S = r − |c|; xSB = (1− β)−1[xA − βxI ]
pS =

xA − ω if ω ∈ [−r + 2c, r − 2c] ⊂ [−r, r]
xL + r − c if ω < −r + 2c
xA − r if ω > r − 2c
(c) LIOj = 0 and LIW j = 0, j = {P, S}.
Proof. - See Appendix E.4.
11Again, no loss of generality arises from this simplifying assumption (see footnote 6).
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The crucial piece of inference drawn from Proposition 3 is that the core of qual-
itative findings regarding the impact of bureaucratic lobbying on expected policy
outcomes and their variance remains unaltered, independently of the actual form of
government. Once again, this confirms the relevance of the appointment process as
the primary source of influence on ultimate policy choices. Specifically, as claimed
in part (a) and part (b) of the Proposition, the only effect of the reversal of moves
is in fact a contraction in the amount of agency discretion - as the legislature at-
tempts to circumvent the (expected) policy bias and the boundaries of the discretion
window, upon which the nomination choice is conditioned, become more stringent.
This in turn brings about a reduction in the (expected) welfare of the higher-level
political institutions. All in all, this result provides a new perspective from which
to look at the optimal timing of legal intervention (e.g. Gersen and Posner, 2007),
for it suggests a theoretical rationale for timing rules which delay or slow down the
legislative process.
4.5.2 Lobbying the administrator
Under strategic appointments, the impact of bureaucratic lobbying on the polit-
ical process is null. Intuitively, this raises the question of whether the lobby might
find it profitable to circumvent her inability to influence policy implementation by
interfering directly with the selection of agencies.
In order to analyze the new interactions occurring among the players, we first
need to modify our basic framework along two main dimensions. First, while keep-
ing the model’s primitives, the administration only is now portrayed as subject of
influence. Consistently, A’s preferences are expressed by the following single-peaked
utility function:
UA(x, t(x)) = −(x− xA)2 + αAt(x), αA > 0 (4.6)
where t(x) and αA represent the transfer from the lobby - contingent on the bureau-
cracy’s location and thus on the ultimate policy outcome - and the relative value of
the latter to A. Assuming no lobbying at B’s tier, the bureaucrat’s utility function
solely depends on its ideal policy xB, as chosen at the upper stage, that is:
UB(x) = −(x− xB)2 (4.7)
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while the preferences of the legislature and the lobby are characterized as (we set
xL = 0 and consider with no loss of generality the case xA ≥ 0 and xI 6= 0):
UL(x) = −x2 (4.8)
UL(x, t(x)) = −(x− xI)2 − αIt(x), αI > 0 (4.9)
The second slight adaptation concerns the timing of events. The interest group
maintains knowledge of the actual value of the noise parameter ω when lobbying
the administrative branch12. Once nominated, the bureaucratic agency will in turn
learn the realization of the policy shock, owing to its expertise. The new timeline is
thus as follows:
Date 0. The interest group learns the realization of ω, then formulates an incentive
schedule t(x) to be offered to the administrator;
Date 1. The government administration appoints the bureaucratic agency, that has
the expertise to infer ω;
Date 2. The legislator designs the delegation window by specifying the reference
policy q and the distance d ≥ 0;
Date 3. The bureaucrat selects the policy p, and payoffs are realized.
While the analysis of the administrative lobbying game is similar to that pre-
sented in the previous sections, several differences arise with respect to the basic
framework. Crucially, the presence of lobbying at the agency selection stage pre-
vents the administrator from acting strategically. In either political system, there-
fore, lobbying does affect both the equilibrium level of delegated authority and the
(expected) policy outcome. These effects, however, are non-monotonic, as they de-
pend on the relative distance between the lobby’s location - and then of the induced
policy - and the ideal point of the legislature. In fact, greater agency discretion -
both with and without lobbying at A’s tier - enlarges the expected policy bias from
delegation. Interest group influence can in principle attenuate the conflict between
the legislature’s preference and the bureaucrat’s policy choice - i.e., it might move
the expected policy closer to xL - as a consequence of a reduction in delegation.
The foregoing arguments are summarized in the following set of results:
Proposition 4. Let λ := αA
αA+αI
, xˆ
′′
:= λxI + (1 − λ)xA, and Γ := r2 −
√
x2A +
r2
4
.
12Again, we restrict attention to take-it-or-leave-it offers from the interest group.
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Then:
(a) In the political system j = {P, S}:
qj = 0; dj = max
{
r − |xˆ′′|, 0
}
; xjB ≡ xˆ
′′
pj =

xˆ
′′ − ω if ω ∈ [|xˆ′′|+ xˆ′′ − r, r − |xˆ′′ |+ xˆ′′ ]
− r+ω
2
if ω < |xˆ′′ |+ xˆ′′ − r
r−ω
2
if ω > r − |xˆ′′|+ xˆ′′
(b) In the parliamentary system (xA = 0):
(i) Administrative lobbying always reduces delegation, i.e. dPl < d
P
nl;
(ii) LIOP > 0 if and only if 0 < xI <
r
λ
;
(iii) LIW P < 0;
(c) In the separation-of-powers system (xA > 0):
(i) Administrative lobbying increases delegation - i.e. dSl > d
S
nl - if and only if:
−(2− λ)xA
λ
− Γ
λ
< xI < xA +
Γ
λ
(ii) LIOS > 0 if and only if:
xI > −1− λ
λ
xA, xI 6= r
λ
− 1− λ
λ
xA and I < xI < I
(I and I given in the Appendix)
(iii) LIW S > 0 if and only if dSl > d
A
nl;
(d) The legislature delegates more to the bureaucracy under the separation-of-
powers system than under the parliamentary one if and only if:
xI < −1− λ
2λ
xA
Proof. - See Appendix F.4.
Part (a) of the Proposition is the counterpart to Propositions 2 and 3 in the
basic model. It says that the optimal choice of the bureaucrat always emerges as a
compromise between the administrator’s and the lobby’s ideal policies. The optimal
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level of delegation, which remains a function of the misalignment of preferences
of the executive and the legislature, can be higher in either form of government,
depending on the relative location of the interest group.
Parts (b) and (c) of the Proposition establish that administrative lobbying always
reduces delegation in the parliamentary system - as it biases the appointed bureau-
crat away from the legislature’s ideal point -, while its effect on optimal delegation
in the separation-of-powers system is non-monotonic, depending on the location of
the interest group and its bargaining strength. Hence, a higher discretion - that the
bureaucrat is granted in exchange for its expertise in reducing political uncertainty
- can occur in equilibrium.
Finally, the lobby’s preferences and bargaining strength are also crucial to the
existence of non-zero effects to both the expected policy bias and the variation in the
expected legislature’s welfare. Again, equilibrium relationships are nonlinear, given
the endogeneity of the appointment mechanism (and lobbying efforts) to the delega-
tion choice. Hence, contrary to the basic model, interest group influence plays here
a key role in the political process. This argument makes a strong case for mech-
anisms that are designed to enforce the accountability of higher-level institutions
rather than of bureaucratic agencies.
4.6 Conclusion
The main contribution of this work concerns the analysis of legislative allocation
of delegate power and strategic appointments in the presence of bureaucratic lobby-
ing. To this end, it develops a formal model with early-stage strategic agency selec-
tion in which the object of choice is the ultimate decision-maker to be vested with
political authority, subject to the principles and the rules of delegated legislation.
Using this framework, we have showed that bureaucratic lobbying never reduces the
scope of delegation across different political systems, as it engenders no influence on
the extent of (expected) policy bias induced by delegated legislation. By contrast,
the optimal degree of delegated authority emerges as an exclusive (monotonic) re-
lationship between agency discretion, on the one hand, and the ideological conflict
between the higher-level institutions and the uncertainty in the political environ-
ment, on the other. An important corollary of this result is that the legislature need
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not shape delegated legislation on the degree of interest group influence on agency
decision-making. Rather, the primary source of control on ultimate policy outcomes
lies in the process of strategic agency selection. Thus, our analysis raises questions
about the wisdom of civil service rules for appointments that preclude government
executives from interfering with the nomination of bureaucratic personnel.
Potential applications of the framework presented in this work include the des-
ignation of a whole range of bureaucratic entities at various levels, like top bureau-
crats, regulatory agencies or other key officials in executive departments, who are
entrusted with a (possibly limited) power of rule-making. In this regard, we em-
phasize that our study is best suited for governance environments where legislation
has much to do with the delegation of policy-forming power to bureaucracies. In
most political systems, secondary legislation indeed allows bodies other than the
legislature to exercise a limited law-making function, when general principles and
boundaries are laid down in the primary act. Legislative allocation of delegated
authority is in fact a foundational institution in most representatives democracies.
From this perspective, the present model may help to better discern the complex
processes that generate and govern incentives for the players involved. By contrast,
the model’s predictions are unlikely to reflect the real working of political systems
where the legislative power is almost exclusively vested in the legislature. This may
explain the apparent inconsistency that some parliamentary systems which make
large recourse to primary law-making, are characterized by lower amounts of dele-
gated policy authority.
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Appendix to Chapter 4
A.4 Proof of Proposition 1 Until date 1, the proof is equivalent to that of Lemma
1 in Bennedsen and Feldmann (2006), where the lobby will induce - for any given
xPB - the bureaucrat to optimally choose the policy outcome xˆ = βxI + (1− β)xPB, if
the legislative constraint is not binding, i.e. if (xˆ− q)− d ≤ ω ≤ (xˆ− q) + d, which
is non-empty if and only if |xˆ− q| ≤ d + r. If the bureaucrat is constrained, either
of the boundary of the delegation window will be implemented, depending on the
realization of ω. Hence, the legislature will optimally set:
(qP , dP ) = argmax{q,d}EUL s.t. d ≥ 0 (4.6)
or qP = xL and d
P = r − |xˆ− xL| (if the latter is positive, dP = 0 otherwise).
Note that, under knowledge of xI and β, a one-to-one correspondence exists
between the set of choices for the bureaucrat’s preferences and the set of policy
outcomes. Then, at date 0 the administration will solve:
max
xˆ
EUA =− 1
2r
∫ xˆ−xL−r+|xˆ−xL|
−r
(r − |xˆ− xL|+ ω)2dω
− 1
2r
∫ xˆ−xL+r−|xˆ−xL|
xˆ−xL−r+|xˆ−xL|
(xˆ− xL)2dω
− 1
2r
∫ r
xˆ−xL+r−|xˆ−xL|
(−r + |xˆ− xL|+ ω)2dω
=− 1
r
(xˆ− xL)(r − 1
2
|xˆ− xL|)
where we have used the fact that xL = xA, and r ≥ |xˆ − xL|. Straightforward
maximization leads to xˆ = xL and hence to x
P
B = (1− β)−1[xA− βxI ], with dP = r.
Accordingly, the legislative constraint is never binding.
It remains to check whether the individual rationality constraint of the interest
group is fulfilled, i.e. if the transfer t∗(xˆ) satisfies:
−(xˆ− xI)2 − αIt∗(xˆ) ≥ −(xB − xI)2 (4.7)
where the right-hand side term reflect the fact that the interest group is aware of
the strategic nomination of B and cannot credibly commit not to lobby the chosen
agency. Since the optimal transfer t∗ makes the individual rationality constraint of
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the latter be binding, i.e.:
t∗(xˆ) =
1
αB
(xˆ− xB)2 = αB(xI − xA)2
the equation (4.7) is verified if and only if αB + αI > 0, which is always true.
B.4 Proof of Corollary 1 a) Trivial; b) Already shown in subsection 4.4.3; c)
Trivial;
C.4 Proof of Proposition 2 Almost the same as Proposition 1, with the exception
that at date 0 the administration solves:
max
xˆ
EUA =− 1
2r
∫ xˆ−xL−r+|xˆ−xL|
−r
(r − |xˆ− xL|+ ω − c)2dω
− 1
2r
∫ xˆ−xL+r−|xˆ−xL|
xˆ−xL−r+|xˆ−xL|
(xˆ− xL)2dω
− 1
2r
∫ r
xˆ−xL+r−|xˆ−xL|
(−r + |xˆ− xL|+ ω − c)2dω
=
1
6r
[(−c− |xˆ|)3 − (|xˆ− xL| − c)3]− 1
r
(xˆ− xA)2(r − |xˆ− xL|)
The first-order condition for this problem is:
1
2r
[
−(−c− |xˆ|)2 |xˆ− xL|
xˆ− xL − (|xˆ− xL| − c)
2 |xˆ− xL|
xˆ− xL
]
− 1
r
[
(xˆ− xA) (2r − 2|xˆ− xL|)− (xˆ− xA)2 |xˆ− xL|
xˆ− xL
]
= 0
Assume xˆ > xL, then the f.o.c. reduces (after some computation) to:
xˆ2 − (2xA + r)xˆ− (x2L − 2xLxA − xAr) = 0 (4.8)
whose real (distinct) solutions are xˆ = xA+
r
2
±
√
c2 + r
2
4
, thus centered around xA+
r
2
.
Hence, the administration will optimal set xSB = (1−β)−1[xA+ r2−
√
c2 + r
2
4
−βxI ].
Note that xˆ > xL holds if and only if c > 0, which is always the case
13. Also, it
13See footnote 7 above for the case in which in the separation-of-powers system we have c =
xA − xL < 0.
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clearly obtains that xˆ < xA.
The demonstration that the group’s IR constraint is not violated, given the equi-
librium transfer t∗(xˆ), is identical to that presented for the parliamentary system as
it only relies on the signs of (αB, αI).
D.4 Proof of Corollary 2 a) The optimal degree of discretion in the separation-
of-powers system is:
dS =
r
2
− c+
√
c2 +
r2
4
which is clearly monotonically increasing in r (precisely, ∂d
S
∂r
∈ (0, 1)); b) Already
shown in subsection 4.3; c) It follows trivially from xˆ > xL; d) Note that we can
also write xSB = (1− β)−1[r − d(r, xA, xL) + xL − βxI ]. Then:
(i)
∂xSB
∂r
= (1− β)−1
(
1− ∂dS
∂r
)
> 0;
(ii)
∂xSB
∂xA
= (1− β)−1
√
c2+ r
2
4
−c√
c2+ r
2
4
> 0;
(iii)
∂xSB
∂xL
= (1− β)−1 c√
c2+ r
2
4
> 0;
(iv)
∂xSB
∂xI
= −(1− β)−1β < 0;
(v)
∂xSB
∂β
= (1− β)−2(xˆ− xI) > 0 iff xˆ > xI .
E.4 Proof of Proposition 3 For any given (q, d, xjB) chosen at the upper node,
the agency will implement the policy pj which leads to xˆ
′
= βxI + (1− β)xjB if the
delegation constraint is not binding, and either (q+ d+ω) or (q− d+ω) otherwise.
Hence, the administration will optimally select xjB so as to solve:
max
xˆ′
EUA =− 1
2r
∫ xˆ′−q−d
−r
(q + d+ ω − xA)2dω
− 1
2r
∫ xˆ′−q+d
xˆ′−q−d
(xˆ
′ − xA)2dω
− 1
2r
∫ r
xˆ′−q+d
(q − d+ ω − xA)2dω
=
1
r
[
1
3
(r − d)3 + (q − xA)2(r − d) + (xˆ′ − xA)2d
]
which results in xˆ
′
= xA. The legislator will thus design the delegation window
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by choosing (q, d ≥ 0) so as to maximize its expected utility EUL, i.e. qj = xL
and dj = r − |c|.Hence, while in the parliamentary system all the previous findings
continue to hold, under separation of powers the discretion of the agent is reduced
- since xˆ = xA +
r
2
−
√
c2 + r
2
4
< xA = xˆ
′
- and so is the (expected) welfare of the
higher-level institutions relative to the case where the bureaucratic preferences are
known to the legislature. The last claim of Proposition 3 can be easily proved using
the same argument as in subsection 4.4.3 in the main text.
F.4 Proof of Proposition 4 For a given xjB, with j ∈ {P, S}, and no lobby-
ing at B’s tier, the proof is analogous to that of Propositions 1 and 2. The only
difference lies in that the delegation variable dj ≥ 0 can be zero if r = |xjB|. Hence,
dj = max
{
r − |xjB|, 0
}
. The bureaucrat, upon observing ω, chooses pj = xjB − ω if
the delegation constraint is not binding, and either of the boundaries - which are
endogenously defined by the reference policy qj = xL = 0, the level of discretion d
j
and the lobby-induced choice of bureaucratic preferences xjB - otherwise.
At the first stage, the administrator will appoint the bureaucrat so as to maximize
its utility from policy subject to the legislative reaction functions (qj(xjB), d
j(xjB))
and the incentive t(x) offered by the interest group. Given A’s best response, this
is equivalent to the following constrained optimization program:
max
x,t(x)
UI(x, t(x)) = −(x− xI)2 − αIt(x)
s.t.:
−(x− xA)2 + αAt(x) ≥ −(x˜j − xA)2, t(·) ≥ 0
|x− ω| ≤ r − |x|
where x˜j is the policy outcome the administrator will optimally induce via strategic
appointment of B under no lobbying in political system j14. The optimal transfer at
x is to let the participation constraint be binding, i.e. t(x) = αA−1[(x−xA)2− (x˜j−
xA)
2], so that, if the delegation constraint is not binding, the first-order condition
yields the unconstrained maximum:
xˆ
′′
:=
αAxI + αIxA
αA + αI
= λxI + (1− λ)xA = xjB, j ∈ {P, S}
14Hence, x˜P = xA = 0 and x˜S = xA + r2 −
√
xA + r
2
4 .
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whereas the solution - and hence the bureaucrat’s policy choice - corresponds to ei-
ther of the boundaries of the delegation window if the legislative constraintD(xL, r, xˆ
′′
)
holds with equality, which happens if either ω < (|xˆ′′ |+ xˆ′′−r) or ω > (r−|xˆ′′ |+ xˆ′′).
Hence, the optimally chosen bureaucrat is invariant with respect to the actual
form of government. However, given the existence of policy conflict in the separation-
of-powers system, different implications arise for both the optimal degree of bureau-
cratic discretion and the impact on expected policies and welfare.
Let us first focus on the parliamentary system. Given xA = xL = 0, without
lobbying the legislature will grant full discretion to the bureaucracy (i.e. dPnl = r)
and hence the choice of the bureaucrat will comply with the ally principle (i.e.
xPB = xA). It readily follows that d
P
l < d
P
nl.
Also, we have:
LIOP =
dl
r
λxI =
r − λ|xI |
r
λxI
>0 iff 0 < xI <
r
λ
<0 iff − r
λ
< xI < 0
=0 iff |xI | = r
λ
and LIW P < 0 if and only if λ|xI | > 015, which is always the case.
In the separation-of-powers system, lobbying increases delegation if and only if:
dSl > d
S
nl ⇔ |xˆ
′′ | < xA + Γ
or:
−(2− λ)xA
λ
− Γ
λ
< xI < xA +
Γ
λ
Note that the upper bound is consistent with the condition xI > −1−λλ xA, which is
necessary and sufficient for xˆ
′′
to be positive, and vice versa for the lower bound.
Since the legislature’s expected welfare is directly related to the equilibrium level
of delegation, the same condition on the interest group’s location also characterizes
the sign of LIW S, as stated in the main text.
15The expected legislature’s welfare is indeed a monotonically decreasing decreasing function of
|xjB |, with or without lobbying.
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Finally, we have:
LIOS =
dl
r
xˆ
′′ − r − |xA + Γ|
r
(xA + Γ)
and hence:
i) If xI ≤ −1−λλ xA or xI = ± rλ − 1−λλ xA, then LIOS < 0;
ii) Let xI > −1−λλ xA and xI 6= rλ − 1−λλ xA. Then LIOS > 0 if and only if:
[r − λxI − (1− λ)xA][λxI + (1− λ)xA]− [r − (xA + Γ)][xA + Γ] > 0
which defines the extremes (I, I) of the interval on xI for which the lobby’s impact
on expected policy outcome is positive, i.e.:
I = Π(λ, xA, r)−
√
Π2(λ, xA, r) + 4λ2Ω(λ, xA, r)
I = Π(λ, xA, r) +
√
Π2(λ, xA, r) + 4λ2Ω(λ, xA, r)
where:
Π(λ, xA, r) := −λ[2(1− λ)xA − r]
Ω(λ, xA, r) := Γ(Γ + 2xA − r)− λ(r − (2− λ)xA)xA
Comparing the optimal level of delegation across the two political systems is
straightforward. In fact, we have dS > dP if and only if |λxI + (1 − λ)xA| < λ|xI |.
The latter holds:
i) If xI ≤ −1−λλ xA;
ii) If xI > −1−λλ xA and λxI + (1− λ)xA < −λxI , or −1−λλ xA < xI < −1−λ2λ xA. This
completes the proof.
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